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Preface
This thesis marks the end of my Ph.D studies in Finance at Copenhagen
Business School. The thesis consists of three empirical studies on the liq-
uidity of the corporate bond market. Each of the three essays in the thesis
are self-contained with included literature reviews and can be read indepen-
dently.
Structure of the thesis
The three essays study the US corporate bond market with special attention
to bond liquidity. All essays are empirical studies which rely heavily on
the availability of transactions data. Earlier studies had to use quoted bond
prices for empirical studies, but with the introduction of the TRACE system
and with the following dissemination of transaction prices the data quality
on corporate bonds has improved immensely. In the years after 2000 a
range of studies assessed the performance of structural credit risk models and
found that they were not able to fully explain the size of the average credit
spread for corporate bonds. Huang and Huang (2003) suggested (among
others) that the remaining non-default-component of the credit spread was
an illiquidity premium. Using transaction data this thesis studies the impact
of illiquidity and trading frictions on corporate bonds.
The ﬁrst essay forms the basis of the following two essays and describes
in detail how the data from TRACE should be handled and cleaned up
before usage. Most other papers using the disseminated data from TRACE
lack such a description, are doing an insuﬃcient clean up procedure or have
misunderstood how the errors accumulate in TRACE. Both Bloomberg and
WRDS which both provide TRACE data fail to remove the majority of the
errors. In the essay I present an error ﬁlter and show that it is able to clean
out almost all errors. I also show how commonly used liquidity measures
will be severely biased if nothing is done.
The second essay (co-authored with Peter Feldhu¨tter and David Lando)
use the transaction data from TRACE to estimate various corporate bond
liquidity measures and asses their performance before and after the onset
of the subprime crisis. A linear combination of the Amihud price impact
measure, a measure for roundtrip costs and the standard deviation of these
1
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two can explain most of the illiquidity related variation in credit spreads.
We further use the measure to shed new light on ﬂight-to-quality, liquidity
risk, the impact of trading frequency, the eﬀect of funding shocks to the lead
underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
The third essay investigates index driven price pressure in corporate
bonds. Corporate bond index revisions are completely information free
events. Still, the trading activity from index trackers makes the price tem-
porarily change for bonds included or excluded from the index. Both the
price pressure return and the following reversal return are signiﬁcant. In
the cases when the reversal returns are also economically signiﬁcant, bond
dealers participate as liquidity providers and trade against their inventory.
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Essay 1
Liquidity Biases in TRACE 1
Published in the Journal of Fixed Income 19(2), 2009.
Abstract
The transactions database TRACE is rapidly becoming the standard data source
for empirical research on US corporate bonds. This paper is the ﬁrst to thoroughly
discuss the assumptions needed to clean the disseminated TRACE data and to
suggest that diﬀerent ﬁlters should be used depending upon the application. 7.7%
of all reports in TRACE are errors and in some cases up to 18% of the reports
should be deleted. Failing to correct for these errors will bias popular liquidity
measures towards a more liquid market. The median bias for the daily turnover
will be 7.4% and for a quarter of the bonds the Amihud price impact measure will
be underestimated by at least 14.6%. Further, calculating these two measures on
the same data sample would potentially bias one of them.
1This paper has been published in the Journal of Fixed Income 19(2), 2009. I would
like to thank Marti Subrahmanyam, Raghu Sundaram, Peter Feldhu¨tter, David Lando,
and participants in the ”Seminar in Derivatives” at Stern School of Business. All errors
are my responsibility.
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1.1 Introduction
Since July 2002, all corporate bond transactions in the secondary market
have been disseminated through the TRACE system (Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine). Before TRACE most empirical corporate bond mar-
ket studies had to rely on daily quotes and constructed matrix prices for
the bonds which could bias the results as discussed in Sarig and Warga
(1989) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009). With the higher
data quality and growing time series dimension of the TRACE database
the scope for research applications with corporate bonds has increased im-
mensely. However, 7.7% of the reports in TRACE are errors i.e. reports
that are later corrected, cancelled etc. Failing to correct for these errors
will bias the two popular liquidity measures, turnover and Amihud price
impact, in the direction of a more liquid market. The median error for the
average daily turnover is 7.4% and the Amihud price impact measure will
be at least 14.6% too low for a quarter of the total sample. These biases can
almost be avoided if the TRACE data are cleaned up properly before use,
but this cleaning requires certain assumptions about which reports are actu-
ally errors. Even after correcting for the reporting errors, liquidity measures
depending on the price sequence, e.g. the Amihud price impact measure,
might still be biased towards a more liquid market. This happens because of
the way so-called agency transactions are registered in TRACE. An agency
transaction is a transaction in which a broker facilitates a trade between a
customer and another broker. Typically the middle broker passes the bond
on to the customer but charges a commission. This commission is not always
visible in the TRACE recorded price. When the commission is not visible
in an agency transaction two consecutive prices will be the same, because
both the interdealer trade between the two brokers and the broker-customer
trade are reported with the same price. Since the customer typically pays
a commission, whether visible in TRACE or not, this price sequence is mis-
leading. It looks like the broker facilitated a service free of charge or the bond
traded without moving the price, neither of which are true. If we eliminate
the agency transaction duplicates, the Amihud price impact measure empir-
ically increases. On the other hand, the agency transactions are included in
the oﬃcial FINRA TRACE fact book statistics which means that calculating
the turnover measure on the data sample without the agency transactions
will bias the turnover downwards when comparing with the fact book statis-
tics. This suggests that the Amihud price impact measure and the turnover
measure should not be calculated on the same data sample if the turnover
should be comparable to the oﬃcial statistics. This reasoning is likely to
extend more generally to measures depending on the price sequence versus
measures depending on the total volume.
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) provides a good description of how
they ﬁlter the TRACE data for errors. But they have a proprietary version
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of the data which enables them to completely eliminate reporting errors
(assuming that brokers actually comply with the reporting guidelines). The
same complete elimination of errors cannot be done with the disseminated
TRACE data, because the disseminated information only allows a partial
identiﬁcation of the reporting errors. The empirical identiﬁcation then has
to rely on a number of assumptions that are usually not stated in research
papers. This paper aims at setting a common standard for how to use the
disseminated data by clarifying the necessary assumptions and shortcomings
of error ﬁlters. We set up an algorithm designed to ﬁlter out the errors and
test the performance against oﬃcial numbers for the trading activity. Based
on this indirect quality test of the ﬁlter we are able to ﬁlter out almost all
errors.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to point out that bond market data should be
used with care. Sarig and Warga (1989) argue that there can be liquidity
driven noise errors in daily prices for bonds because prices are given even
on days where the particular bond has not been traded for several days. In
these cases the broker sets a matrix price based on prices of similar bonds
that did trade and issuer characteristics. Diﬀerences in what the brokers
deﬁne as similar bonds lead to a dispersion in the prices reported by diﬀerent
brokers. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009) show that this matrix
pricing bias in prices is still very much present in daily corporate bond
prices from Datastream. Bond matrix pricing may be sensible to use for
bonds that trade very infrequently or for a fair value price of the bond in
a legal sense as under the FAS 1572, but it is inappropriate for research on
a transaction level. This makes the disseminated TRACE data even more
valuable especially for microstructure research of bond market liquidity.
In section 1.2 we give a brief summary of the dissemination history of the
TRACE data and explain in depth how the design of the TRACE system
accumulates reporting errors. In section 1.3 we explain how and under what
assumptions we can identify the errors. We set up an algorithm that ﬁlters
out the reporting errors and assess the performance of the algorithm. In
section 1.4 we look at the potential biases from the reporting errors. Ignoring
the errors will make the corporate bond market seems more liquid than it
actually is. Section 1.5 explains the problems with the recording of agency
transactions in the TRACE system. In some cases it is not enough just to
ﬁlter out the error reports, it may also be necessary to carefully consider the
handling of agency transactions.
1.2 Reporting Errors
This section gives a brief introduction to the phases in the TRACE initiative
and goes on to describe how trade report ﬁlings by brokers accumulate errors
2Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, September 2006.
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in the disseminated TRACE data.
1.2.1 Trace History
In 1998 the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) began reviewing the
debt market with a particular focus on price transparency. But as early as
1994 the NASD3 (now FINRA) started a surveillance system for 50 high yield
bonds known as the ﬁxed income pricing system (FIPS). In January 2001
the SEC went on to approve rules that required NASD members to report all
over-the-counter (OTC) secondary market transactions in corporate bonds.
The actual reporting started in July 2002 with the launch of the TRACE
system.
The TRACE system allows the regulatory authorities to keep a complete
trail of audit and enhances the transparency of the market by disseminat-
ing transactions. The amount of disseminated information has gradually in-
creased since the launch. The reason for not just oﬀering full disclosure from
the start was conﬂicting views about the eﬀect of improving transparency.
1. July 1, 2002
Dissemination of all investment grade issues with initial issuance above
$1 billion and of the former FIPS bonds.
2. March and April 2003
Dissemination of all investment grade issues with initial issuance above
$100 million and at least an A- rating. In addition to the FIPS spec-
ulative grade bonds another 120 BBB rated bonds were added for
dissemination.
3. October 1, 2004.
Trades in all bonds are disseminated (99% in real time).
4. November 3, 2008.
Buy-Sell side information is disseminated for trades from this date on.
Since July 2005 all transactions must be reported within 15 minutes of the
actual transaction.
1.2.2 Reporting and Dissemination
According to the FINRA rule 6700 series (formerly NASD rule 6200 series)
all members are required to report an OTC corporate bond transaction in
the secondary market using the TRACE system. In case of a buy or a sell
from a customer the broker that facilitates the trade has to ﬁle a report with
detailed information about the transaction. If two brokers trade with each
3National Association of Securities Dealers now called The Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority.
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other (i.e. an interdealer trade) both of them ﬁle a report resulting in two
reports referring to the same transaction. However, it is important to note,
that only one of the two interdealer reports is actually disseminated4.
The TRACE system is essentially a one-day system and reporting is only
possible within the system operating hours5. This means that a reporting
error can easily be corrected if the correction is made within the same day
as the report was ﬁled. In this case the broker ﬁles a new report, but the old
report containing the error still remains in TRACE. In the disseminated data
this yields two reports. The ﬁrst report contains the error, the second report
either cancels or corrects the wrong report but none of them replaces the
ﬁrst report. Panel A of table 1.1 shows an example of a same-day cancelation
of a reported trade and panel B shows a same-day correction of a reported
trade. It is easy to identify both the cancelation and correction through the
trade status of the report and to link them to their original reports through
the original message sequence number, which is unique on an intraday level.
With a cancelation as in panel A we should delete both reports, whereas
with a correction as in panel B we should delete the original report and keep
the correction.
Bond ID Date Time Price Par
volume
Yield Sequence
Number
Original
SN
Status
Panel A
AA.HM 20070105 15:05:57 99.356 800000 5.3167 17473 . T
AA.HM 20070105 15:05:57 99.356 800000 5.3167 17478 17473 C
Panel B
AA.HM 20070112 12:21:45 99.404 600000 5.2690 10405 . T
AA.HM 20070112 12:21:45 99.381 600000 5.3100 11788 10405 W
Table 1.1: Disseminated Trade Reports with same-day corrections. This table
contains two typical examples of how same-day corrections are disseminated in TRACE.
Panel A shows a cancelation of a trade. This can be seen from the ’C’ in trade status of
the second report. The original report can be identiﬁed by the original message sequence
number. Panel B is a correction of an original report. This can be seen from the ’W’ in
the trade status for the second report in panel B. The table only displays a selection of
the disseminated information about each report. These are bond ID, Date, Time, Price,
Par Volume, Yield, Message Sequence Number, Original Message Sequence Number and
Trade Status.
Trade reports ﬁled on a later day than that of the actual transaction
still contain the information of the actual transaction6 but are marked in
4See TRACE FAQ on Reporting at the FINRA TRACE website.
5Reporting outside system hours follows special rules.
6The date and time of the actual transaction and not the date and time of the ﬁling of
the report.
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the disseminated data as an as-of trade. This plays a role for reporting
errors detected on a later date. If a broker has to cancel a report ﬁled on
an earlier date, this is done by ﬁling a report identical to the original report
but marked as a reversal7. A correction on a later date is done by ﬁrst ﬁling
the reversal, thereby canceling the report containing the error, and then
the broker has to ﬁle the right report but now marked as an as-of trade.
In the disseminated data a reversal implies that we should delete both the
original report and the reversal report. Table 1.2 shows an example of a
report that has been canceled by a reversal and then followed up by an as-
of trade report containing the correct information. In this case we cannot
identify the original report by its message sequence number, because it is an
intraday number and the reversal and the original are not ﬁled on the same
day. Instead the original report is identiﬁed as a report that is identical to
the reversal (except that the original is not marked as a reversal). Note how
small the error is in the original trade report compared to the correction
both for the same-day correction and for the reversal. It is not clear that
we could have identiﬁed any of these trades as being errors based on the
prices or yields alone. In this sense most errors in TRACE are not outliers
deviating from the surrounding reports.
Bond ID Date Time Price Par
volume
Yield As-Of
CSCO.GB 20060221 15:21:42 100.348 1000000 5.17050
CSCO.GB 20060221 15:21:42 100.348 1000000 5.17050 R
CSCO.GB 20060221 15:21:42 100.348 1000000 5.17042 A
Table 1.2: Disseminated Trade Reports with non-identical reversals. This table
contains a typical example of how a reversal is disseminated in TRACE. The reversal
report is an identical copy of the original report but with a ’R’ in the as-of indicator. Some
reversals are followed up by an as-of report indicated by the ’A’ in the as-of indicator.
The follow up report then contains the correct trade report information. The table only
displays a selection of the disseminated information about each report. These are bond
ID, Date, Time, Price, Par Volume, Yield and As-Of indicator.
Failing to delete the error reports will yield a substantial amount of
double counting8. We show in section 1.4 that this double counting will
severely overstate the trading activity and depth of the market.
7See FINRA (2008) page 31.
8In a strategic analysis of the transaction prices it is debatable which of the reports to
use but not without taking a stand on whether or not the market found the given report
credible or not at the time of the ﬁling of the original report.
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contains a typical example of how a reversal is disseminated in TRACE. The reversal
report is an identical copy of the original report but with a ’R’ in the as-of indicator. Some
reversals are followed up by an as-of report indicated by the ’A’ in the as-of indicator.
The follow up report then contains the correct trade report information. The table only
displays a selection of the disseminated information about each report. These are bond
ID, Date, Time, Price, Par Volume, Yield and As-Of indicator.
Failing to delete the error reports will yield a substantial amount of
double counting8. We show in section 1.4 that this double counting will
severely overstate the trading activity and depth of the market.
7See FINRA (2008) page 31.
8In a strategic analysis of the transaction prices it is debatable which of the reports to
use but not without taking a stand on whether or not the market found the given report
credible or not at the time of the ﬁling of the original report.
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1.3 Error Filter
This section describes a simple algorithm that detects and deletes the re-
porting errors. Based on the disseminated transaction information it is not
possible to set up a perfect ﬁlter, so we test the performance of the proposed
error ﬁlter by comparing with the statistics from the oﬃcial TRACE fact
book.
1.3.1 Description
The ﬁltering of the reporting errors in the disseminated data takes place in
three steps.
1 Deleting true duplicates.
In the disseminated data each report has an intra-day unique message
sequence number. We delete any duplicates identiﬁed by the message
sequence number9.
2 Deleting reversals.
Since reversals are typed in later than same-day corrections we start
by deleting those which are newest in a chronological sense. All reports
marked as a reversal are deleted and for each reversal we also delete
the original report. Each reversal should exactly match one original
report10.
3 Deleting same-day corrections.
There are two types of same-day corrections in the disseminated data.
These can be identiﬁed by the trade status of the report. If the cor-
rection is a cancelation, both reports should be deleted and if it is a
correction only the original should be deleted. Contrary to reversals
the original can be identiﬁed through the original message sequence
number which is given as part of the correcting report.
1.3.2 Stylized facts
Even though the outline of the ﬁlter is quite simple in principle, it is not
possible to actually implement it in that exact form. Particularly the second
step of the algorithm can be problematic. When a broker ﬁles a reversal she
9A duplicate in this step indicates that two interdealer reports have been disseminated,
even though only one should have been according to the description of the disseminated
data. In the TRACE data disseminated though WRDS, this is no longer a big issue.
However, it used to be. At some point in 2007 the database was altered and almost
all these duplicates removed. Before that point in time almost 25% of all reports were
duplicates of this type.
10It is not possible to partially reverse a trade report or to have a reversal canceling
more than one original report. See FINRA (2008) page 31.
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has to supply a 10-digit TRACE-assigned control number from the original
trade allowing the SEC to keep a linkage between the reversal and the origi-
nal report. The only way to make the same linkage within the disseminated
data, between an original trade report and a reversal, is to rely on brokers
ﬁling the reversal as an exact replica of the original (as they should do ac-
cording to guidelines11 and as we saw it in table 1.2). But not all reversals
can be matched with an identical original report. In panel A of table 1.3
we have a reversal without any identical report but with a possible original
report. These two reports diﬀer on two variables. The diﬀerences may just
be a matter of rounding, but more than one report may match if we were
to round the numbers. In panel B we have another reversal with a possible
original report. Again the two reports are not identical12. In these two ex-
amples the reversals diﬀer on three variables all together and in the second
example the original cannot be matched by rounding either the reversal or
the original. This makes it hard to set up a rule for identifying an original
report when the reversal does not match any reports exactly.
Bond ID Date Time Price Par
volume
Yield As-Of
Panel A
CSCO.GB 20060412 11:39:03 99.250 3000000 5.42600
CSCO.GB 20060412 11:39:00 99.250 3000000 5.42635 R
Panel B
CSCO.GB 20060215 13:45:33 99.809 1MM+ 5.29398
CSCO.GB 20060215 13:45:33 99.809 2000000 5.29398 R
Table 1.3: Disseminated Trade Reports with non-identical reversals. This table
contains two examples of reversals for which the original trade report is not identical to
the reversal. This makes the identiﬁcation of the original report hard or even impossible.
The table only displays a selection of the disseminated information about each report.
These are bond ID, Date, Time, Price, Par Volume, Yield and As-Of indicator.
In the TRACE User Guide it is stressed that one reversal report can only
cancel one original report. This may be the rule, but in some cases as in
table 1.4 it could be, that the reversal is meant to cancel more than just one
report, since the reversal matches four other reports. It is rather unusual
in the data to have more trades in the same second with matching prices
11According to FINRA (2008) page 31 a reversal should be exactly identical to the report
it is reversing.
12The second example in table 1.3 is due to a rating change between the date of the ﬁrst
report and the date of the reversal report. Trading volumes are censored for investment
grade bonds at $5 millions and for speculative grade at $1 million.
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but diﬀerent quantities. This makes the trade sequence seems suspicious.
On the other hand one could argue that a broker might be chopping up a
deal into smaller pieces but actually selling it all to just one customer for
some reason. If this is the case the price sequence is misleading since the
negotiated price is not for separate small trades but for a larger package i.e.
a larger volume, in which case we do not have 9 consecutive trades with the
same the price but one larger trade.
Bond ID Date Time Price Par
volume
Yield As-Of
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 10000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 10000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 20000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 20000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 10000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 20000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 10000 5.02100
CSCO.GB 20060217 14:25:00 101.000 10000 5.02100 R
CSCO.GB 20060217 16:01:09 101.000 10000 5.02100
Table 1.4: Disseminated Trade Reports with non-identical reversals. This
table shows an example where the reversal matches more than just one trade report.
According to TRACE guidelines one reversal is only meant to cancel one original report.
The table only displays a selection of the disseminated information about each report.
These are bond ID, Date, Time, Price, Par Volume, Yield and As-Of indicator.
On a more technical note the disseminated TRACE data from WRDS
do not include the ﬁling date of the reports, which would be helpful when
we want to match the reversal with the original report13. In panel A of table
1.5 the reversal matches the as-of trade report and not what is likely to be
the original report. In this case the bond has gone from a speculative grade
rating to an investment grade rating in the time between the original report
ﬁling and the ﬁling of the reversal report. At the time of the original ﬁling
the volume then was censored at $1 million dollars whereas at the time of
the reversal report the censoring was at $5 million. Looking at the message
sequence numbers (not shown in the table) the reversal and the as-of trade
have consecutive numbers with the reversal having the lower number. This
indicates that the reversal is ﬁled before the as-of trade report and therefore
meant to cancel the third report in panel A14. In panel B the as-of trade
matching the reversal was ﬁled with a wrong time record. Then the reversal
13The ﬁling date is actually public information in the way that it is disseminated for
example as part of the FISD time sales data.
14There is a possibility of the two reports being ﬁled at diﬀerent days and still getting
consecutive number, but it is a rather small possibility. This question could be resolved
with the information about ﬁling date as for example FISD contains. If the reports are
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is canceling the as-of trade that it matches and the last as-of trade is the
one with the correct time record. In this case it is safe to assume that the
reversal is referring to the as-of trade. In panel C of table 1.5 it is again
not clear which report the reversal is meant to cancel. The reversal does not
actually match any of the other reports but comes closest to matching the
as-of report. As in panel A the message sequence numbers indicate that the
reversal is ﬁled before the as-of trade in which case it could not be canceling
the as-of trade. It then seems most likely that the reversal is meant to
cancel one (or both) of the other reports. In conclusion, since we are not
allowed to see the direct link between the reversal and the original report in
the disseminated data, the ﬁlling date (which is public information but not
provided by WRDS) would be helpful when making the indirect link.
Bond ID Date Time Price Par
volume
Yield As-Of
Panel A
CSCO.GB 20060215 15:01:40 100.028 5000000 5.24356 R
CSCO.GB 20060215 15:01:40 100.028 5000000 5.24356 A
CSCO.GB 20060215 15:01:40 100.028 1MM+ 5.24356
Panel B
CSCO.GB 20060330 12:54:00 99.370 25000 5.39700 R
CSCO.GB 20060330 12:54:00 99.370 25000 5.39700 A
CSCO.GB 20060330 13:12:00 99.370 25000 5.39700 A
Panel C
CSCO.GB 20060828 16:53:00 99.656 15000 5.33700
CSCO.GB 20060828 16:53:00 99.656 15000 5.33700
CSCO.GB 20060828 17:13:57 99.656 15000 5.33702 R
CSCO.GB 20060828 17:13:57 99.656 15000 5.33700 A
Table 1.5: Disseminated Trade Reports with reversals of as-of trades. This
table shows three examples where it is not clear which reports the reversals are meant to
cancel. It could look like the reversals are canceling the as-of reports, which is only true
in panel B. The table only displays a selection of the disseminated information about each
report. These are bond ID, Date, Time, Price, Par Volume, Yield and As-Of indicator.
When using the disseminated TRACE data from WRDS we make the
following choices when implementing the ﬁlter. If there is no identical match
for a reversal based on the parameters shown in table 1.3-1.5 we only delete
the reversal because the original report cannot be identiﬁed with certainty.
Second, if there is more than one trade report, that matches the reversal
ﬁled on the same day and the reversal has the lower message sequence number then the
reversal was ﬁled before the as-of report for sure. In this case the reversal could not be
canceling the as-of trade, since the as-of trade was not yet ﬁled.
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we delete all of them not including any as-of trades that might match the
reversal. That is, we do not delete any as-of reports that match the reversal
on the chosen set of parameters. Then we would not make a mistake in panel
A and C of table 1.5 but we do make an error in panel B of the same table.
We delete too few reports when we cannot ﬁnd an original report and
when we do not delete as-of trades that are later reversed. On the other
hand we delete to many reports when we delete all ordinary reports that
match a reversal.
1.3.3 Performance
Each year FINRA publishes a TRACE Fact Book with summary statistics
of trading over the past year. We test the performance of our error ﬁlter
by matching the number of trades post ﬁltering for the 10 most frequently
traded investment grade bonds in 2007 with the numbers for the same bonds
from the oﬃcial fact book. In table 1.6 we can see that the algorithm per-
forms fairly well. The most traded bond that year was a General Electric
bond with an oﬃcial number of 12,857 trades. In the raw data ﬁle the same
bond has 13,479 trade reports, but after the ﬁltering the number of trade
reports is 12,856, i.e. only 1 report short of the oﬃcial number. Apparently,
there is some discrepancy between the fact book of 2007 and the number
of disseminated reports in that the second most traded bond according to
the fact book was a Morgan Stanley bond. However for unknown reasons,
the raw TRACE ﬁle only displays one third of the transactions reported for
the bond in the TRACE fact book. All of the other bonds are close to the
oﬃcial number of trades. The largest deviation is 1.5%. Looking at the
sign of the deviations we can see that the ﬁlter most commonly deletes too
few observations. This happens because the dominating problem is that we
cannot match a reversal with an original report. For the few bonds where we
delete too many observations some reversals have matched more than just
one original report. When we compare this with the number of unmatched
reversals the latter problem seems most important. If we only deleted one
report each time we had an identical match to a reversal and refrained from
deleting more than one if there were more matches, we would still get a small
error percentage for the ﬁlter.
The ﬁrst step of the algorithm deletes 2,532 reports15. These are the
reports which match in pairs on all parameters including the unique intra-
day message sequence number. When two reports ﬁled on the same day
have matching message sequence numbers it means that they are refering
to the same trade and one of them has to be deleted if we want to avoid
double counting. These reports are interdealer trades where both reports
are accidentally disseminated for some reason. In the second step of the
algorithm we delete reversals and matching original reports. There are a
15Our data sample covers transactions up to and including 2008Q3.
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Symbol Issuer Name Coupon Maturity Actual Raw
Reports
Post
Filter
Rev.
Missing
Dev.
Pct.
GE.ADF GE Company 5.000 2/1/13 12,857 13,479 12,856 12 -0.01
MS.QP Morgan Stanley 4.750 4/1/14 12,333 3940 3788 11 -
GS.OU Goldman Sachs Group 5.700 9/1/12 11,573 12,061 11,577 16 0.03
C.HEF Citygroup 5.000 9/15/14 11,212 11,693 11,217 19 0.04
GE.AAD GE Capital Corp. 6.000 6/15/12 11,085 11,511 11,086 21 0.01
BLS.HW Bellsouth Corp. 6.000 11/15/34 10,450 11,072 10,594 148 1.38
WMT.HN Wal-Mart Stores 4.550 5/1/13 9,681 10,052 9,678 18 -0.03
GE.WB GE Corp. 5.875 2/15/12 9,468 9,957 9,470 16 0.02
GS.WL Goldman Sachs Group 5.625 1/15/17 8,108 8,655 8,115 15 0.09
JPM.QP J. P. Morgan Chase 5.750 1/2/13 8,051 8,365 8,048 10 -0.04
Table 1.6: Performance of the error ﬁlter. This table shows the error ﬁlter per-
formance on a selection of bonds for which the actual number of trades are known from
the Trace Fact Year Book 2007. The selected bonds are the top 10 most traded invest-
ment grade issues in 2007. The diﬀerences between the ﬁltered disseminated data and
the actual number of trades arise because a perfect ﬁltering is not possible using only
the disseminated data. In the table ’actual’ refers to the actual number of trades, ’raw
reports’ refers to the number of reports disseminated in Trace, ’post ﬁlter’ refers to the
number of reports or trades left after applying the ﬁlter, ’rev. missing’ refers to the
number of reversals where it was not possible to ﬁnd an identical original report and
’the deviation in percentage’ is between the actual number of trades and the post ﬁltered
amount.
total of 418,626 reversal reports and we end up deleting 763,013 reports in
this second step. As in table 1.6 we are not able to match all of the reversals
with an original report. Table 1.7 shows a summary of the ﬁltering process.
Note that a total of 120,420 reversals remains unmatched in the ﬁltering.
Finally, in the third step we delete same-day cancelations and corrections.
We end up with a total of 26,943,152 trade reports having deleted 1,404,978
reports in the third step. The database contains a total of 29,113,675 raw
reports of which we have dropped 7.5% in our ﬁltering. The oﬃcial error
rate is 7.7% which is slightly higher than ours since we still lack to match
some reversals to their original reports.
When introducing a new reporting system such as the TRACE system it
is natural for the users to make errors simply because they are not familiar
with the system yet. Figure 1.1 shows a time series plot of the monthly
reporting error rate. There is a clear downward trend in the error rate over
time, but it is still far from zero. So even if we decided only to look at a new
data sample from TRACE, we would still need to ﬁlter the data before use.
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Figure 1.1: Monthly Percentage of Error Reports. This graph shows the monthly
percentage of error reports in the disseminated TRACE data. There is a small decline in
errors over time. The error rate peaks after the start of the last phase of the dissemination
in 2004Q4.
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Description Trade reports
Raw reports 29,113,675
Step 1
Deleted 2,532
Post step 1 29,111,143
Step 2
Deleted 763,013
Reversals 418,626
Unmatched Reversals 120,421
Post step 2 28,348,130
Step 3
Deleted 1,404,978
Post step 3 26,943,152
Table 1.7: Filtering Summary. This table shows how many reports that are deleted
in each step of the error ﬁlter and for step 2 the table lists the number of unmatched
reversals. The unmatched reversals are the main problem for the ﬁlter as seen in table
1.6
1.4 Error Impact
In this section we ﬁrst show that ignoring the reporting errors will bias some
of the most commonly used liquidity measures. Secondly, we show that
replacing the error ﬁlter with a standard stock market ﬁlter is not a viable
alternative. In stock market research there are well tested ﬁlters which screen
the price sequences for outliers. However, applying a similar approach to the
TRACE data will have almost no eﬀect on the biases from section 1.3.
1.4.1 Market Liquidity
If the TRACE data are not cleaned up before use, the number of transactions
will be too high. For many research applications this will lead to a bias in
the results16. Furthermore, the reporting error percentage is increasing in
the trade size of the bonds. In table 1.8 the error percentage is listed for
diﬀerent trade sizes. For trades of par value $1,000,000 and above the amount
of error reports is 13.2%. Most studies ﬁnd larger trades more interesting
than smaller trades, because these trades are likely to have been carried out
by well informed institutional traders with high bargaining power and 90%-
16This section is in part inspired by the SAS-programs that WRDS has on their website.
These are very helpful for ﬁrst time users but they are ignoring the problems with reporting
errors. Using their code for research will result in the biases of this section.
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95% of all trading measured by volume takes place in institutional trade
sizes (typically a institutional trade is deﬁned as a trade with par value size
above $100,000).
Trade Size Error Pct
-5,000 5.27
5,000-10,000 4.60
10,000-25,000 4.71
25,000-250,000 6.86
250,000-1,000,000 11.68
1,000,000- 13.24
Table 1.8: Errors as a function of trade size. This table shows the error percentage
as a function of the trading size. As the trading size increases so does the number of
corrections and cancelations.
A typical measure of liquidity is the turnover of an asset. We deﬁne the
turnover for a bond as the daily average of total trading volume taken over
days with at least one trade17. When the error reports are deleted from the
raw TRACE data the turnover will be lower. That is, if we do not delete the
errors the trading activity on the market will appear higher than it actually
is. From table 1.9 we can see that the median turnover deviation is 7.2%. A
large part of the bonds have the same turnover measure before and after the
ﬁltering simply because these bonds have very little or no reports deleted in
the ﬁltering. But at the other end of the scale a quarter of the bonds will
have the turnover overestimated by more than 14%.
Another popular measure of liquidity is the Amihud price impact mea-
sure. We calculate a quarterly measure for each bond by ﬁrst calculating
a daily Amihud measure and then taking the median across days with a
non-zero measure. The daily measure is given on the form:
Amihudbond,t =
1
N
N |rij |
Qj
where N is the number of trades on day t for the bond, rij is the return
between consecutive trades j and i and Qi is the dollar par volume for trade
i. Note that taking the median rather than the mean across the quarter
makes the measure far more robust. But even with this robust deﬁnition
of the Amihud measure a large part of the bonds have a too low measure
pre ﬁltering. In table 1.9 we can see that the median bias is at 0.0% but
that for more than a quarter of the quarterly measures the bias is as high
17This deﬁnition is taken from one of the example programs for TRACE on the WRDS
website. Since the majority of the bonds trade infrequently a more proper deﬁnition would
be to take the average over all days.
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as 14.6%. The same bias is 34.5% for the Amihud measure calculated using
only institutional trade sizes. A lot of the error reports are duplicates of
the original reports (at least on the part of the report that enters in the
calculation of the Amihud measure). Inserting these duplicate reports in the
price sequence underestimates the price impact, because there will be too
many zero returns between consecutive trades.
We have only showed that there will be a bias for the turnover measure
and for the Amihud price impact measure, but the bias is likely to extend
to all liquidity measures based on either the trading activity or the price
sequence.
Quantile Turnover Amihud
All
Amihud Large
Q3 14.3% -14.6% -34.5%
Median 7.2% -0.0% -6.9%
Q1 0.1% -0.0% -0.0%
Table 1.9: Bias distributions. This table shows the distribution of the size of the
bias in percent. The bias is calculated as the deviation between the measures calculated
with and without ﬁltering the data. The bias distribution is calculated for the turnover,
the Amihud measure using all trades and the Amihud measure using only trades above
$100.000 in par volume.
1.4.2 Price Sequence Filter
It is typical in stock market research to set up a ﬁlter based on the price
sequence. These ﬁlters aim at detecting outliers that potentially would bias
results. Typically an observation is classiﬁed as an outlier if the price falls
outside a certain price range, because the stock might then be trading under
special conditions, or if the price deviates to much from the other prices
close in sequence. It makes good sense to use a price ﬁlter like this to ensure
that research results are not inﬂuenced by a small number of questionable
observations. The same kind of ﬁlter can be applied to the TRACE data but
it is in no way a substitute for the error ﬁlter from section 1.3. The price
sequence based ﬁlter could be motivated by the desire to detect broker typos.
But it is actually hard for a broker to ﬁle a trade report to the TRACE system
containing a typo. Once a broker ﬁles a report to the TRACE system, the
system automatically assesses the report and compares the reported price
to other reported prices for the same issue. If the price falls outside a range
based on these prices the report is not approved and the broker has to either
change the price or overwrite the system. In case that the broker overwrites
the system and ﬁles the report anyway, the system then widens its price
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range. If the price is still outside this new range the report is dismissed again
and the broker has to report and explain the price by phone to FINRA18.
In order to test the performance of a typical price based ﬁlter we apply
the price ﬁlter19 from Han and Zhou (2008). We identify an outlier and
delete it using the following criteria: trade size is missing or zero; price is
less than $1 or greater than $500; price is more than 20 percent away from
the median price in a day; or price is more than 20 percent away from the
previous trading price. In table 1.10 we can see the cross section between
the price sequence based ﬁlter and the error ﬁlter from section 1.3. Only
a very small number of reports are categorized as errors/outliers with the
price sequence based ﬁlter and of the reports deleted by the price sequence
ﬁlter only 19% percent were also marked as errors by the error ﬁlter from
section 1.3. More than 99.6% percent of the errors detected by the error
ﬁlter from section 1.3 did not show up in the price sequence based ﬁlter.
This shows that the price sequence based ﬁlter can in no way substitute
for the original error ﬁlter. The majority of the reporting errors are still
present after applying the price sequence ﬁlter. Still it may be valuable to
apply a price sequence based ﬁlter after the error ﬁlter in order to delete
potential inﬂuential outliers. These outliers may just be actual trades that
traded under some special conditions. We will brieﬂy return to the question
of special conditions below.
EF: Error EF: Non-Error Total
PSF: Error 7,782 33,548 41,330
PSF: Non-Error 2,162,741 26,909,604 29,072,345
Total 2,170,523 26,943,152 29,113,675
Table 1.10: Price sequence based ﬁlter. This table shows how the error ﬁlter (EF)
from section 1.3 and the price sequence based ﬁlter (PSF) from section 1.4.2 intersect.
1.5 Remaining Issues
Even after we have applied the error ﬁlter there may still be a substantial bias
in some liquidity measures. This is due to certain reporting rules special for
the TRACE system. The Amihud price impact measure will have a median
downward bias at 7.7% in the post ﬁlter sample, which actually increases
the formerly stated bias when ignoring all errors. In this section we explain
18See FINRA (2008) page 17.
19This price ﬁlter is just one of the ﬁlters that Han and Zhou (2008) use to clean up the
data.
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why using the post ﬁlter sample is not enough to ensure unbiased results.
Further ﬁltering will however, cause a bias in the turnover measure, when
comparing to the oﬃcial fact book statistics. If the goal is to match the
turnover statistics from the fact book, then we should not make any further
ﬁltering. For studies of liquidity where the price sequence matters we will
argue that further ﬁltering is required. This suggests that the Amihud price
impact measure and the turnover measure should not be calculated on the
same data sample.
1.5.1 Agency Transactions
In the post ﬁlter data sample there is still a lot of double reports. These
reports match on every parameter except the message sequence number,
which means that they are not referring to the same transaction i.e. they
are not the result of double reporting in interdealer transactions20. The
double reports are for the most part a result of agency transactions where an
introducing broker passes on a trade from an executing broker to a customer.
In general, transactions between the broker and a customer can either be a
principal transaction or an agency transaction. In a principal transaction
the dealer trades with the customer against her own inventory. In an agency
transaction the dealer does not have the bond in question on inventory, but
buys it from another dealer (from the other dealers view this is a principal
transaction) and passes it on to the customers account. In this transaction
the dealer that has the contact with the customer is the introducing dealer
and the dealer selling the bond to the introducing dealer is denoted the
executing dealer. This agency transaction requires three reports to be ﬁlled
to the TRACE system and two of the reports will be disseminated. First the
interdealer transaction gives two reports (one principal sell and one agency
buy) and then the introducing dealer ﬁles an agency sell report21. The
introducing broker is most commonly compensated by taking a commission
on the sale but technically passes the bond on at the same price as she
bought it at without a markup or a markdown. In TRACE bond prices
are disseminated as the price including any commission (see FINRA (2008)
page 49). A separate ﬁeld indicates whether or not the price includes a
commission but the actual size of the commission is not reported. For smaller
20One could conject that these reports are then unmatched interdealer reports which by
accident are reported as two separate transactions. However, brokers ﬁling unmatched in-
terdealer reports are alerted by the TRACE system, which should eliminate the possibility
of such unmatched reports (see FINRA (2008) page 41).
21Green, Holliﬁeld, and Schu¨rhoﬀ (2007a) provide an excellent discussion on reporting
problems with agency trades in the municipal bond market and the same discussion applies
to the corporate bond market. However, the problem with agency transactions is likely to
be more pronounced for research dealing with the TRACE data because Green, Holliﬁeld,
and Schu¨rhoﬀ (2007a) investigate the primary market whereas TRACE has reports on the
secondary market where agency transactions are far more common.
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trade sizes a commission can have a huge impact on the actual price, but
since we do not know the size of the commission it may be preferable to just
delete reports that include commission. But the introducing broker does
not always charge a commission per trade instead the customer can have an
account with the broker where he pays an annual wrap fee which is usually
some percentage of the value of the assets on the account. In these cases
the broker transfers assets to the account without taking any transaction
based commission. Since the broker is only allowed to include bona ﬁde
commissions when reporting to TRACE22 these agency transactions appear
to have no commission in TRACE. In the disseminated TRACE data this
will give two reports that are identical on all aspects except the message
sequence number.
Note that based on table 1.6, the post ﬁlter data can be regarded free
of any error reports, since we are very close to replicate the oﬃcial number
of trades in the TRACE fact book. But this is before we consider deleting
any further duplicates that come from agency transactions. If we want to
compare our estimates with the same data sample that is used in the oﬃcial
statistics on for example the total market turnover we should not delete any
more reports. In the oﬃcial turnover statistics an agency transaction counts
as two transactions. This means that we are going to underestimate the
turnover if we delete one of the duplicates. On the other hand the Amihud
price impact measure will be too low thus giving us a bias in the direction of
a more liquid market23. How we treat the agency transactions clearly should
depend on what the data are used for.
Quantile Turnover Amihud
All
Amihud Large
Q3 9.7% -34.3% -15.4%
Median 4.9% -7.7% -0.0%
Q1 1.4% -0.0% -0.0%
Table 1.11: Agency transaction bias distributions. This table shows the distri-
bution of the diﬀerences between the post error ﬁlter data and the post error ﬁlter data
with only one agency transaction report per agency trade. The Amihud measure will be
biased downwards if the agency trades are not removed. The bias is most signiﬁcant for
the sample using all trades since agency trades are likely to be small in trade size. The
turnover will be lower once the agency transactions are taken out. However, this will
bias the turnover downwards compared to the FINRA statistics.
22See FINRA (2003).
23It is possible to construct a price sequence where this reasoning does not hold and the
Amihud measure would be too high, but empirically the Amihud measure does increase
in value when we delete the agency trades.
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Each agency transaction with no commission returns a zero return for
consecutive trades (empirically) lowering the Amihud measure. This bias
can be avoided by deleting one of the agency reports but remember that
this just causes another bias in the turnover. In table 1.11 we can see that
this approach (agency ﬁltering) will raise the Amihud measure based on
all trades by 7.7% for the median bond when we compare to the Amihud
measures based on the post error ﬁlter sample. The agency eﬀect is greater
for the measure based on all trades since agency trades are most likely to
be small in trade size. One explanation could be that retail investors only
have accounts with one broker whereas larger institutional traders have a
better opportunity to screen the market by themselves thereby mitigating
any agency fee. If we were to calculate the daily turnover on the same sample
as the Amihud measure this will lower the turnover by 4.9% for the median
bond. But as discussed before this will be a bias compared to the FINRA
statistics.
Another problem with the agency transactions is that we cannot identify
them directly in the disseminated data because the agency trade indicator is
not disseminated. We can only indirectly identify them as the duplicates and
the reports that include a commission. The buy-and-sell side information is
only disclosed from November 3th of 2009 and onwards. In table 1.12 we
take a look at the distribution of trading partners in all pairwise duplicate
transactions of November and December 2009. According to our agency
transaction identiﬁcation argument these trades should all be pairs of one
interdealer trade and one dealer-costumer trade. As can be seen from the
table this is the case for 71% of the pairs. The remaining pairs consists of 16%
with two interdealer trades and only 13% with two dealer-costumer trades.
Primarily the latter kind of pairs are wrong to delete since they are not
part of any agency transactions as we have deﬁned them. The transaction
pairs with two interdealer transactions with the same information are usually
part of a special construction eg. a one-sided automatic give up reported
with anonymous partners (see FINRA (2008) page 23.). As with agency
transactions it seems reasonable to delete one of the interdealer reports.
The error rate using our approach then lies around 13% when identifying
the agency transactions. Once buy-sell side information is known this kind
of errors can of cause be avoided.
Not all pair of agency reports are ﬁled with the same transaction time
record. A lot of the transactions have 1 to 30 seconds between the ﬁrst and
the second report. So if we really want to get rid of the agency report bias,
we should look for identical reports within for example a 60 second time
slot. After the ﬁrst error ﬁlter we have 26,943,152 trade reports left. If we
delete one of the two reports in an agency transaction but require that the
trades match within the second we are left with 24,702,916. Widening the
time frame to 60 seconds reduces this number to 23,824,156. Only deleting
the agency trades matching exactly on the second still leaves a substantial
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Trader Identity Transaction
pairs
Percentage
2 Dealer-Costumer 10,499 12.8%
Interdealer/Dealer-Customer 58,614 71.5%
2 Interdealer 12,855 15.7%
Table 1.12: Distribution of pair reports. This table shows the distribution of
the trading partners in pair trades executed with the same information ie. two trades
with the same volume, price, time stamp etc. The sample is taken from November and
December of 2009, at which point the buy-and-sell side information was disclosed. The
pair transactions can either be interdealer/interdealer, interdealer/dealer-costumer, or
two dealer-costumer.
amount of agency transactions left. Of cause since we cannot actually iden-
tify an agency report we cannot be absolutely sure that the 60 second range
is the right approach.
1.5.2 Special Conditions
A ﬁnal thing to consider before using the data is whether the bond in the
particular trade was trading under some form of special condition. In the
disseminated data an indicator tells if the report is for a trade with special
conditions.
The most usual special condition is that the bond has an odd number
of days to settlement (i.e. diﬀerent from 3 days). It could also be special
conditions classiﬁed in TRACE as a cash trade, the price was a weighted
average, the seller had some kind of special option etc.
1.6 Conclusion
The disseminated corporate bond transactions data from TRACE have to
be cleaned up before use. Any result obtained with the raw data ﬁle stands
a chance of being biased. We show that two popular liquidity measures are
biased towards a more liquid market if the reporting errors are not ﬁltered
out of the data. The median bias for the turnover is around 7.4% and for
a quarter of the bonds the Amihud price impact measure will be more than
14.6% too low. Just ﬁltering out the reporting errors is not enough to ensure
that the results will be unbiased. The ﬁling rules for agency transactions can
also cause a bias in some cases. Deleting the duplicate agency transaction
reports possibly reduces this bias for measures where the price sequence
is important, as in the case with the Amihud measure. However, one has
to be careful before deleting the agency transactions if the total turnover
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is important. The agency trades are part of the oﬃcial turnover statistics
from the TRACE fact book. Deleting them will give a bias when comparing
turnover with the oﬃcial FINRA statistics.
With the disseminated data none of the ﬁlters can be constructed to
eliminate all errors because the information linking the transactions together
is not disseminated. Our ﬁlter relies on a number of assumptions that are
needed in order to indirectly identify the reports with errors. All of the
assumptions we use are fairly conservative and since we are able to closely
replicate the oﬃcial trade statistics, the assumptions seem appropriate24.
24SAS programs, with both kinds of ﬁlters implemented and easy to use, are available
from the author upon request.
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Corporate Bond Liquidity Before and
After the Onset of the Subprime Cri-
sis 1
Co-authored with Peter Feldhu¨tter and David Lando, Copenhagen Business
School.
Abstract
We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads by combining the
superior data quality of transaction-level corporate bond prices from TRACE with
the increase in bond spreads caused by the crisis. A single linear combination of
four liquidity proxies captures most of the liquidity-related variation of spreads
before and during the crisis. The contribution to spreads from illiquidity increases
dramatically with the crisis. We use our measure to shed new light on ﬂight-to-
quality, liquidity risk, the impact of trading frequency, the role of funding shocks
to lead underwriters, and the liquidity of corporate bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
1We thank Yakov Amihud, Sreedhar Bharath, Michael Brennan, Tom Engsted, Edie
Hotchkiss, Marco Pagano, Lasse Pedersen, Ilya Strebulaev and seminar participants at
seminars at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Deutsche Bundesbank, ECB, Oesterre-
ichische Nationalbank, CBS, NYU, and at conferences in Bergen (EFA), Konstanz, Flo-
rence, London and Venice for helpful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
The onset of the subprime crisis caused a dramatic widening of corporate
bond spreads. In light of the strong evidence that illiquidity in addition to
credit risk contributes to corporate bond spreads, it is reasonable to believe
that at least part of the spread widening can be attributed to a decrease in
bond liquidity, and perhaps to an increase in liquidity risk as well. To show
this we need robust measures of liquidity and liquidity risk which enable
us to disentangle the credit risk component and the liquidity component
of corporate bond spreads. Ideally, a robust measure should be signiﬁcant
before and after the crisis, and we would expect it to reveal a strong decrease
in liquidity around the onset of the crisis.
We show in this paper that a sum of four liquidity proxies has been
a consistent contributor to corporate bond spreads both before and after
the onset of the crisis and across rating categories. The four variables are
Amihud’s measure of price impact, a measure of roundtrip cost of trading,
and the variability of each of these two measures. We can think of the
Amihud measure and the roundtrip cost measure as measuring liquidity,
and the two variability measures as representing liquidity risk.
We arrive at our liquidity measure through a principal component anal-
ysis which reveals that the ﬁrst principal component among eight liquidity
variables is almost the same before and after the onset of the crisis and it
is close to being an equally weighted sum of the four variables mentioned
above. When we regress corporate bond spreads on the principal compo-
nents, and control for credit risk, only the ﬁrst component contributes to
corporate bond spreads consistently across ratings and regime. In this sense
our liquidity measure dominates trading frequency of bonds used in Chen,
Lesmond, and Wei (2007) and Roll’s bid-ask measure used by Bao, Pan, and
Wang (2009). This consistency is important for drawing conclusions when
we split the sample by industry and lead underwriter as explained below.
We use our liquidity measure to identify the contribution of liquidity
to corporate bond spreads before and after the onset of the crisis, across
diﬀerent rating categories and across maturity. The procedure we use is to
ﬁrst compute our liquidity measure for each bond in the sample. Within a
rating category, we then order the bonds according to this measure. Higher
values correspond to lower liquidity. We then compute the diﬀerence between
the 5% and the 50% quantiles and multiply by the regression coeﬃcient for
that rating category. The result is the liquidity-related diﬀerence between
the spread of bonds with median and with high liquidity.
How large is then the eﬀect of liquidity on spreads? Before the crisis,
it was small for investment grade bonds both as a fraction of the yield
spread and measured in basis points. The contribution to spreads from lack
of liquidity rose through both an increase in our liquidity measure and in
the sensitivity to this measure across all rating categories at the onset of
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of corporate bond spreads. Ideally, a robust measure should be signiﬁcant
before and after the crisis, and we would expect it to reveal a strong decrease
in liquidity around the onset of the crisis.
We show in this paper that a sum of four liquidity proxies has been
a consistent contributor to corporate bond spreads both before and after
the onset of the crisis and across rating categories. The four variables are
Amihud’s measure of price impact, a measure of roundtrip cost of trading,
and the variability of each of these two measures. We can think of the
Amihud measure and the roundtrip cost measure as measuring liquidity,
and the two variability measures as representing liquidity risk.
We arrive at our liquidity measure through a principal component anal-
ysis which reveals that the ﬁrst principal component among eight liquidity
variables is almost the same before and after the onset of the crisis and it
is close to being an equally weighted sum of the four variables mentioned
above. When we regress corporate bond spreads on the principal compo-
nents, and control for credit risk, only the ﬁrst component contributes to
corporate bond spreads consistently across ratings and regime. In this sense
our liquidity measure dominates trading frequency of bonds used in Chen,
Lesmond, and Wei (2007) and Roll’s bid-ask measure used by Bao, Pan, and
Wang (2009). This consistency is important for drawing conclusions when
we split the sample by industry and lead underwriter as explained below.
We use our liquidity measure to identify the contribution of liquidity
to corporate bond spreads before and after the onset of the crisis, across
diﬀerent rating categories and across maturity. The procedure we use is to
ﬁrst compute our liquidity measure for each bond in the sample. Within a
rating category, we then order the bonds according to this measure. Higher
values correspond to lower liquidity. We then compute the diﬀerence between
the 5% and the 50% quantiles and multiply by the regression coeﬃcient for
that rating category. The result is the liquidity-related diﬀerence between
the spread of bonds with median and with high liquidity.
How large is then the eﬀect of liquidity on spreads? Before the crisis,
it was small for investment grade bonds both as a fraction of the yield
spread and measured in basis points. The contribution to spreads from lack
of liquidity rose through both an increase in our liquidity measure and in
the sensitivity to this measure across all rating categories at the onset of
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the crisis, although the AAA contribution remains small during the crisis.
Our ﬁnding that liquidity components in AAA-rated bonds are small even
after the onset of the crisis is consistent with a ﬂight-to-quality into those
bonds. Measured as a fraction of spreads, there was almost no change in
the liquidity component for speculative grade bonds. When we zoom in on
the time series behavior of liquidity premia, we ﬁnd that they persistently
increase for investment grade bonds during the crisis and peak around the
rapid stock market decline in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. For speculative grade
bonds, premia are less persistent, peak around the Lehman default in the
fall of 2008, and returned almost to pre-crisis levels in the summer of 2009.
Our measure is also useful for analyzing other aspects of corporate bond
illiquidity. We construct a liquidity beta, i.e. a measure for the covariation of
an individual bond’s liquidity with that of the entire corporate bond market.
We show that this liquidity beta is not a signiﬁcant contributor to spreads
before the onset of the crisis but it does contribute to spreads for bonds
except for AAA-rated bonds after the onset of the crisis. This indicates
that the ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect in investment grade bonds found in Acharya,
Amihud, and Bharath (2010) is conﬁned to AAA-rated bonds. We also ask
whether ﬁnancial distress of a lead underwriter of a corporate bond issue
aﬀects the liquidity of the bond in the secondary market. If lead underwriters
are providers of liquidity of the bond in secondary market trading, it is
conceivable that if a lead underwriter is in ﬁnancial distress, the liquidity
of the bond decreases relative to other bonds. We show that bonds which
had Bear Stearns as lead underwriter had lower liquidity during the take-
over of Bear Stearns and bonds with Lehman as lead underwriter had lower
liquidity around the bankruptcy of Lehman. Finally, we investigate whether
the time series variation of liquidity of corporate bonds issued by ﬁnancial
ﬁrms is diﬀerent from the variation for bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms.
There is conﬂicting empirical evidence on this issue: Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and
Neis (2005) ﬁnd that bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms are more illiquid than
other bonds, while Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2009) ﬁnd
this not to be the case. Our time series study reveals that bonds issued
by ﬁnancial ﬁrms have similar liquidity as bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms,
except in extreme stress periods, where bonds of ﬁnancial ﬁrms become very
illiquid, overall and compared to bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms.
The detailed trading data for corporate bonds available from the TRACE
database are critical for our ability to measure liquidity proxies properly,
and they help us shed new light on previous results on liquidity in corporate
bonds. We show that Datastream’s record of zero return days for a bond,
which in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) is used to proxy for days when the
bond does not trade, has little connection to the actual trades recorded in
TRACE. With actual trades, the LOT measure employed in Chen, Lesmond,
and Wei (2007) becomes unrealistically large. We also show that the Amihud
measure is strongly inﬂuenced by restricting the universe of trades to large
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trades, as we do in this paper. Using large trades only, the median price
impact of a 300.000 dollar trade is roughly 0.1%, whereas Han and Zhou
(2008) using all trades obtain an impact of 10.2%.
To support the claim that our measure is not measuring credit risk,
we run regressions on a matched sample of corporate bonds using pairs of
bonds issued by the same ﬁrm with maturity close to each other. Instead of
credit controls, we use a dummy variable for each matched pair and estimate
the response of spreads to our liquidity measure. The measure remains
signiﬁcant. In an appendix, we also show that our regression results change
only slightly if we choose Treasury instead of swap rates as our riskless rates,
and we test for simultaneous equation bias arising from joint determination
of credit and liquidity risk and for omitted variables.
The ﬂow of our paper is as follows. We describe our data set and how
we deﬁne the eight liquidity variables that enter into the regressions. After
providing summary statistics of our liquidity proxies, we run regressions on
the eight liquidity variables one at a time while controlling for credit risk.
We see that four variables stand out as signiﬁcant predictors of spreads. Re-
markably, these four variables also form the ﬁrst component in a principal
component decomposition of the standardized liquidity variables - and this
decomposition is stable before and after the onset of the crisis. We then
perform the same regressions as above - using one principal component at
a time instead of the liquidity proxies. The ﬁrst principal component is the
only consistently signiﬁcant regressor variable. Since the principal compo-
nent is close to being an equally weighted sum of the four liquidity variables,
we deﬁne an operational measure of liquidity as the sum of the four vari-
ables. This measure is then used to measure the contribution of illiquidity
to corporate bond spreads across ratings and maturities, before and after
the onset of the crisis. Furthermore, we use our measure to examine how the
covariance between bond-speciﬁc liquidity and market-wide liquidity aﬀects
bond spreads, and how ﬁnancial distress of a lead underwriter and the type
of ﬁrm issuing the bond aﬀect bond liquidity.
2.2 Literature review
It has been recognized for a long time that the ease with which a security
is traded inﬂuences its price. A comprehensive survey of both the diﬀerent
notions of and the empirical evidence on liquidity can be found in Ami-
hud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005). Here, we will focus on the growing
literature that deals speciﬁcally with corporate bonds.
In recent years, the illiquidity of corporate bonds has been seen as a pos-
sible explanation for the ’credit risk puzzle’, i.e. the claim that yield spreads
on corporate bonds are larger than what can be explained by default risk
- even after adjusting for recovery risk and compensation for bearing de-
fault risk. Huang and Huang (2003) calibrate structural default risk models
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to match the default probabilities and recoveries of corporate bonds. They
use a speciﬁcation of the risk premium - learned from equity markets - to
price the default risk in corporate bonds and show that the resulting credit
spreads are smaller than the observed spreads. Other works supporting the
idea that there are components of credit spreads that are unrelated to de-
fault risk include Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) who show that
yield spreads cannot entirely be explained by credit risk and tax eﬀects, and
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) who show that changes in
credit spreads cannot be explained by credit risk alone. Covitz and Down-
ing (2007) study credit spread components in the short maturity commercial
paper market and while they do ﬁnd evidence of a contribution to spreads
from illiquidity, they ﬁnd credit risk to be the main determinant of spreads
for short maturities. Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) subtract CDS pre-
mia from bond spreads to extract a non-default component of a corporate
bond spread. They show that this component is correlated with proxies for
liquidity both in the cross section of corporate bond spreads and in the time
series evolution of spreads. In our paper, we cover a larger segment of the
corporate bond market than those for which CDS premia exist. Also, it is
frequently the case that the CDS spread is larger than the comparable bond
spread indicating that the CDS market may also be prone to buying and
selling pressures. This suggests that there are also liquidity components in
CDS spreads as conﬁrmed by Bongaerts, Driessen, and de Jong (2009).
Earlier papers which show that liquidity proxies are signiﬁcant explana-
tory variables for corporate bond spreads and bond returns are Houweling,
Mentink, and Vorst (2005)), Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005), and
de Jong and Driessen (2006). An early contribution, which also stresses the
importance of matrix pricing for empirical studies of bond liquidity, is Sarig
and Warga (1989).
TRACE transactions data became available only recently, and therefore
few studies have used the data set. Bao, Pan, and Wang (2009) use TRACE
data to study liquidity eﬀects focusing in particular on a transformation of
the Roll measure. There are several studies on the eﬀects of the introduction
of TRACE. These show that the enhanced price transparency following the
dissemination of prices has lowered transaction costs for investors, see Ed-
wards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007),
and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkaraman (2006). This would suggest
that liquidity has increased. However, as shown in Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and
Sirri (2007) trading volume and trading frequency have not increased as a
consequence of bond price dissemination, and it is still the case that a large
number of bonds trade very infrequently. This is also conﬁrmed by Mahanti,
Nashikkar, Subramanyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008). They combine data
on holdings on corporate bonds by diﬀerent investors with turnover mea-
sures of these investor’s portfolios to infer a turnover measure for bonds,
called latent liquidity. This measure is shown to have predictive power for
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other measures of liquidity. However, since we are interested in yield spread
eﬀects of illiquidity, we must conﬁne ourselves to the more liquid segment of
the corporate bond market for which we can actually observe some trading
and therefore some prices and price changes. Friewald, Jankowitsch, and
Subrahmanyam (2009) and Han and Zhou (2008) are other papers using the
TRACE data set.
2.3 Data description
Since January 2001 members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity (FINRA) have been required to report their secondary over-the-counter
corporate bond transactions through TRACE (Trade Reporting and Com-
pliance Engine). Because of the uncertain beneﬁt to investors of price trans-
parency not all trades reported to TRACE were initially disseminated at the
launch of TRACE July 1, 2002. Beginning October 1, 2004 trades in almost
all bonds except some lightly traded bonds are disseminated (see Goldstein
and Hotchkiss (2008) for details). Therefore our sample starts on this date.
We use a sample of straight coupon bullet bonds with trade reports
from October 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009. That is, we require that bonds
are ﬁxed rate bullet bonds that are not callable, convertible, putable, or
have sinking fund provisions. We obtain bond information from Bloomberg,
and this provides us initially with 10.785 bond issues. We use rating from
Datastream and bonds with missing rating are excluded.2 This reduces the
sample to 5.376 bonds. For these bonds we collect the trading history from
TRACE covering the period from October 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 and after
ﬁltering out erroneous trades, as described in Dick-Nielsen (2009), we are left
with 8.212.990 trades. Finally we collect analysts’ forecast dispersion from
IBES, share prices for the issuing ﬁrms and ﬁrm accounting ﬁgures from
Bloomberg, swap rates from Datastream, Treasury yields consisting of the
most recently auctioned issues adjusted to constant maturities published
by the Federal Reserve in the H-15 release3 and LIBOR rates from British
Bankers’ Association. If forecast dispersion, share prices, or ﬁrm accounting
ﬁgures are not available, we drop the corresponding observations from the
sample.
2We use the rating from S&P. If this rating is missing we use the rating from Moody’s
and if this is missing the rating from Fitch. If we still do not have a rating we use the
company rating.
3Further information about the Treasury yield curve methodology can be found on the
United States Department of Treasury’s web page http://www.treas.gov/oﬃces/domestic-
ﬁnance/debt-management/interest-rate/yieldmethod.html.
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2.4 Empirical methodology
This section provides details on the regression analysis conducted in the next
section and deﬁnes the set of liquidity variables we use.
2.4.1 Regression
As dependent variable we use the yield spread for every bond at the end of
each quarter in the regressions. We calculate the quarter-end yield as the
average yield for all trades on the last day in the quarter where the bond
traded. If a bond did not trade during the last month of the quarter, it
is excluded from that quarter. Retail-sized trades (trade below $100,000
in volume) are discarded. Yield spreads are calculated as the diﬀerence
between the quarter-end yield and the interpolated maturity-matched swap
rate calculated on the same day as the yield is measured. We exclude yield
spreads for bonds that have less than one month to maturity or have a time
to maturity when issued of more than 30 years.
To control for credit risk, we follow Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998)
and others and add the ratio of operating income to sales, ratio of long term
debt to assets, leverage ratio, equity volatility and four pretax interest cov-
erage dummies to the regressions.4 In order to capture eﬀects of the general
economic environment on the credit risk of ﬁrms we include the level and
slope of the swap curve, deﬁned as the 10-year swap rate and the diﬀerence
between the 10-year and 1-year swap rate. Duﬃe and Lando (2001) show
that credit spreads may increase when there is incomplete information on
the ﬁrm’s true credit quality. To proxy for this eﬀect, we follow Gu¨ntay and
Hackbarth (2006) and use dispersion in earnings forecasts as a measure of
incomplete information.
Finally we add bond age, time-to-maturity, and size of coupon to the
regressions - see for example Sarig and Warga (1989), Houweling, Mentink,
and Vorst (2005) and Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005).
For each rating class we run separate regressions using quarterly obser-
4The pretax interest coverage dummies are deﬁned as follows. We deﬁne the pretax
interest rate coverage (IRC) ratio as EBIT divided by interest expenses. It expresses how
easily the company can cover it’s interest rate expenses. However, the distribution is
highly skewed. As in Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) we control for this skewness by
creating four dummies (pretax dummies) which allows for a non-linear relationship with
the spread. The ﬁrst dummy is set to the IRC ratio if it is less than 5 and 5 if it is above.
The second dummy is set to 0 if IRC is below 5, to the IRC ratio minus 5 if it lies between
5 and 10 and 5 if it lies above. The third dummy is set to 0 if IRC is below 10, to the IRC
ratio minus 10 if it lies between 10 and 20 and 10 if it lies above. The fourth dummy is
set to 0 if IRC is below 20 and is set to IRC minus 20 if it lies above 20 (truncating the
dummy value at 80).
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vations. The regressions are
Spreadit = α+ γ Liquidityit + β1 Bond Ageit + β2Amount Issuedit
+ β3 Couponit + β4Time-to-Maturityit + β5 Eq.Volit
+ β6 Operatingit + β7 Leverageit + β8 Long Debtit
+ β9,pretax Pretax dummiesit + β10 10y Swapt
+ β11 10y-2y Swapt + β12 forecast dispersionit + it (2.1)
where i is bond issue, t is quarter, and Liquidityit contains one of the liquidity
proxies deﬁned below. Since we have panel data set of yield spreads with
each issuer potentially having more than one bond outstanding at any point
in time we calculate two-dimensional cluster robust standard errors (see
Petersen (2009)). This corrects for time series eﬀects, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and
heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
2.4.2 Liquidity Measures
Since there is no single measure that adequately describes the liquidity of
an asset, we deﬁne several liquidity-related measures for corporate bonds
in this section. We winsorize the 0.5% highest values of every liquidity
variable, meaning that all values above the 99.5% percentile are set to the
99.5% percentile.
Amihud measure (price impact of trades)
Amihud (2002) constructs an illiquidity measure that is based on the theo-
retical model of Kyle (1985). It measures the price impact of a trade per unit
traded and we use a slightly modiﬁed version of this measure. For each cor-
porate bond the measure is the daily average of absolute returns rj divided
by trading volume Qj (in million $) of consecutive transactions:
Amihudt =
1
Nt
Nt
j=1
|rj |
Qj
= 1Nt
Nt
j=1
|Pj−Pj−1Pj−1 |
Qj
where Nt is the number of returns on day t. At least two transactions are
required on a given day in order to calculate the measure, and we deﬁne a
quarterly Amihud measure by taking the median of daily measures within
the quarter.
Roll measure (bid-ask spread)
A liquid asset can be bought or sold close to the fundamental price of the
asset, implying that roundtrip costs are small. A proxy for roundtrip costs
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is the bid-ask spread, but bid-ask spreads are not available in TRACE.
Since November 2008, buy-sell indicators are available, but this covers only
a fraction of our sample. Roll (1984) ﬁnds that under certain assumptions
the eﬀective bid-ask spread equals two times the square root of minus the
covariance between adjacent price changes:
Rollt = 2

−cov(∆Pi,∆Pi−1)
where t is the time period for which the measure is calculated. The intuition
is that the bond price bounces back and forth within the bid-ask band, and
higher bid-ask bands lead to higher negative covariance between adjacent
price changes. We deﬁne a daily Roll measure using a rolling window of 21
trading days, and the measure is only well-deﬁned if there are at least four
transactions in the window. We deﬁne a quarterly Roll measure by taking
the median of daily measures within the quarter.
Unique roundtrip cost (bid-ask spread)
An alternative measure of transaction costs, proposed in Feldhu¨tter (2009),
is calculated using unique roundtrip trades (URT). Often, we see a corporate
bond trading two or three times within a very short period of time after a
longer period with no trades. This is likely to occur because a dealer matches
a buyer and a seller and collects the bid-ask spread as a fee. When a dealer
has found a match, a trade between seller and dealer along with a trade
between buyer and dealer are carried out. Possibly, the matching occurs
through a second dealer in which case there is also a transaction between
the two dealers. If two or three trades in a given bond with the same volume
take place on the same day, and there are no other trades with the same
volume on that day, we deﬁne the transactions as part of a URT. For a URT
we deﬁne the unique roundtrip cost (URC) as
Pmax − Pmin
Pmax
where Pmax is the largest price in the URT and Pmin is the smallest price
in the URT. A daily estimate of roundtrip costs is the average of roundtrip
costs on this day for diﬀerent volumes, and we estimate quarterly roundtrip
costs by averaging over daily estimates. URC overcomes the problem that
we only have information on trading volume and not, as in Green, Holliﬁeld,
and Schu¨rhoﬀ (2007b), on bid and ask prices or dealer identity. Feldhu¨tter
(2009) examines the properties of URTs in detail, including how much of
total trading volume is captured and for a subsample of TRACE data with
buy-sell indicators available, to what extent URTs capture full roundtrip
costs.
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Turnover (trading intensity)
Assets that trade frequently are intuitively more liquid than assets that only
trade on rare occasions. We therefore consider the quarterly turnover of the
bond:
Turnovert =
Total trading volumet
Amount outstanding
where t is the quarter. We can interpret the inverse of the turnover as the
average holding time of the bond, i.e. a turnover of 1 implies an average
holding time of about 3 months.
Zero trading days (trading intensity)
An alternative trading intensity measure is the number of days where a
bond did not trade. We calculate bond zero-trading days as the percentage
of days during a quarter where the bond did not trade. We also calculate
ﬁrm zero-trading days as the percentage of days during a quarter where none
of the issuing ﬁrm’s bonds traded. Clearly, this is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than
a bond-speciﬁc measure, and it is therefore the same for diﬀerent bonds
issued by the same ﬁrm. Even though a single bond seldomly trades, the
issuing ﬁrm often has bonds of many diﬀerent maturities outstanding. It
may therefore be the case that the waiting time between trades in any of the
ﬁrm’s bond issues is much shorter and that there is relatively frequent new
information about the issuing ﬁrm and frequent trading in close substitutes.
Firm zero trading days addresses this issue.
Variability of Amihud and unique roundtrip costs (liquidity risk)
It is likely that investors consider not only the current level of bond liquidity
but also the possible future levels in case the investor needs to sell the bond.
The variability of both the Amihud measure and unique roundtrip costs
may therefore play a role for liquidity spreads. Thus, we include in our
regressions the standard deviations of the daily Amihud measure and unique
roundtrip costs measured over one quarter. These two measures do not
separate total liquidity risk into a systematic and unsystematic component.
Arguably, only the systematic component is important for pricing, but since
it is diﬃcult to measure this component on a quarterly basis, we calculate the
total component and address the systematic component later in the paper.
2.5 Liquidity premia
2.5.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the liquidity variables. We see that
the median quarterly turnover is 4.5%, meaning that for the average bond
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Turnover (trading intensity)
Assets that trade frequently are intuitively more liquid than assets that only
trade on rare occasions. We therefore consider the quarterly turnover of the
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Turnovert =
Total trading volumet
Amount outstanding
where t is the quarter. We can interpret the inverse of the turnover as the
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Zero trading days (trading intensity)
An alternative trading intensity measure is the number of days where a
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ﬁrm zero-trading days as the percentage of days during a quarter where none
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in the sample it takes 5-6 years to turn over once. The turnover is a lower
bound on the actual turnover since trade sizes above $1mio ($5mio) for
speculative (investment) grade bonds are registered as trades of size $1mio
($5mio). The median number of bond zero-trading days is 60.7% consistent
with the notion that the corporate bond market is an illiquid market. We
also see that the median number of ﬁrm zero-trading days is 0%. This shows
that although a given corporate bond might not trade very often, the issuing
ﬁrm has some bond that is trading. It is likely that the number of bond
zero-trading days overstates the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a trading partner when
buying or selling the bond, since the bond is a close substitute to a number
of other bonds.
The median Amihud measure is 0.0044 implying that a trade of $300, 000
in an average bond moves price by roughly 0.13%. Han and Zhou (2008)
also calculate the Amihud measure for corporate bond data using TRACE
data and ﬁnd a much stronger price eﬀect of a trade. For example, they ﬁnd
that a trade in an average bond of $300, 000 moves the price by 10.2%. The
reason for this discrepancy is largely due to the exclusion of small trades
in our sample and underscores the importance of ﬁltering out retail trades
when estimating transaction costs of institutional investors5.
The median roundtrip cost in percentage of the price is 0.22% according
to the URC measure, while the roundtrip cost is less than 0.05% for the 5%
most liquid bonds. Thus, transaction costs are modest for a large part of
the corporate bond market consistent with ﬁndings in Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), and Bessembinder,
Maxwell, and Venkaraman (2006). The roundtrip cost measured using URC
is lower than the median roundtrip cost of 0.53% when estimated using the
Roll measure.
The correlations of the liquidity measures in Panel B of Table 2.1 reveal
several interesting aspects of liquidity and liquidity risk. The correlation of
87% between URC and URC risk and 61% between Amihud and Amihud
risk shows that liquidity and liquidity risk are highly correlated. This is
consistent with results in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) who likewise ﬁnd a
high correlation between liquidity and liquidity risk. Interestingly, there is a
high correlation of 72% between market depth (Amihud) and bid/ask spread
(URC).
The correlations also show that the Amihud measure is negatively cor-
related with ﬁrm zero, bond zero, and turnover, while the Roll measure has
positive correlations with the three trading activity variables. We would
expect negative correlations for both the Roll and Amihud measure, since
more traded bonds are likely to have lower bid/ask spreads and higher mar-
5A second reason for the discrepancy is that we estimate a quarterly Amihud measure
by taking the median of daily measures, while Han and Zhou (2008) estimate a monthly
measure by taking the mean of daily measures. The eﬀect of ﬁltering out small trades is
by far the most important reason for the discrepancy.
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ket depth. The positive correlations for the Roll measure might be explained
by the statistical properties of the Roll measure. Harris (1990) ﬁnds that the
serial covariance estimator can be severally biased in small samples. The bias
decreases in the number of observations, and this might explain the positive
correlations between the Roll measure and trading activity measures. The
bias might also explain why the Amihud measure is slightly more successful
in explaining spreads than the Roll measure in the next section.
Having deﬁned the individual liquidity measures and looked at some
descriptive statistics, we now turn to the eﬀects on bond spreads of these
variables one at at time.
2.5.2 The eﬀect of liquidity proxies
We have deﬁned eight liquidity proxies and in this section we ask if the
proxies aﬀect spreads. For each variable we run the pooled regression in
Equation (2.1) for each of the seven rating categories and before and after
the onset of the subprime crisis. We windsorize the 0.5% highest and lowest
spreads to make the results robust to outliers. Running separate regressions
for diﬀerent rating categories shows us to what extent the variables aﬀect
bonds of various credit quality and how robust our results are. In addition,
the eﬀect of liquidity on corporate bond spreads might be diﬀerent in periods
of rich liquidity and periods of little liquidity. By splitting the sample into
pre- and post-subprime, we see how liquidity is priced in two such diﬀerent
regimes; the pre-subprime period was a period with plenty of liquidity while
the market in the post-subprime period has suﬀered from a lack of liquidity.
Table 2.2 shows the regression coeﬃcients for each of the variables.6
For the pre-subprime period both measures of transaction costs, Roll and
URC, have positive coeﬃcients for every rating category. All ﬁve coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant for URC while the results are mixed in case of the Roll mea-
sure. We obtain similar results in the post-subprime period, four out of ﬁve
coeﬃcients positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant in case of the URC
measure and mostly insigniﬁcant results for the Roll measure. Transaction
costs are clearly priced, at least when we proxy bid-ask spreads with the
URC measure, which is consistent with the results in Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007) who ﬁnd that bid/ask spreads are priced. We also see that the
Amihud measure has positive regression coeﬃcients across all ratings pre-
and post-subprime and 6 out of 10 are statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 2.1 shows that bid-ask spreads (URC) and the lack of market
depth (Amihud) have increased strongly during the subprime crisis. The
increase from the beginning of the crisis to the end of 2008 in bid-ask spreads
6We only use observations for which an estimate for all measures exists. This ensures
that the regression coeﬃcients for all proxies are based on the same sample. We have also
run the regressions where we allow an observation to enter a regression if the observation
has an estimate for this liquidity proxy, although it might not have estimates of some of
the other proxies. The results are very similar.
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Panel A: Marginal liquidity regressions, pre-subprime (2004:Q4-2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB spec
Amihud 1.15∗∗∗
(4.87)
2.08∗∗∗
(3.85)
4.14∗∗∗
(3.18)
3.68
(1.52)
14.12
(1.63)
Roll 0.02∗∗∗
(3.18)
0.02∗∗∗
(3.48)
0.01
(1.48)
0.02
(0.53)
0.05
(1.26)
ﬁrm zero 0.000
(0.46)
−0.001
(−1.42)
0.000
(0.74)
−0.001∗
(−1.66)
−0.005
(−1.60)
bond zero −0.000
(−0.09)
−0.000
(−0.86)
0.000
(1.13)
−0.003∗∗
(−2.22)
−0.012∗∗
(−2.33)
turnover −0.27∗∗∗
(−6.52)
−0.12
(−0.97)
−0.03
(−0.31)
−0.03
(−0.18)
−0.05
(−0.09)
URC 3.83∗∗
(2.03)
7.11∗∗∗
(2.66)
18.91∗∗∗
(2.61)
47.47∗∗∗
(3.76)
69.29∗∗
(2.26)
Amihud risk 0.39∗
(1.82)
0.55∗
(1.87)
1.43∗∗
(2.42)
3.46∗∗∗
(3.46)
9.48∗∗
(2.29)
URC risk 2.08∗∗
(2.30)
3.98∗
(1.95)
9.16∗∗
(2.29)
25.99∗∗∗
(3.18)
57.20∗∗∗
(3.67)
Panel B: Marginal liquidity regressions, post-subprime (2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
AAA AA A BBB spec
Amihud 2.93∗∗∗
(2.98)
18.40∗∗∗
(2.94)
6.80
(0.82)
21.94∗∗
(2.54)
22.47
(1.52)
Roll 0.04∗∗∗
(2.58)
−0.02
(−1.55)
0.04
(0.87)
0.19∗
(1.76)
−0.73
(−1.47)
ﬁrm zero −0.016
(−1.46)
−0.000
(−0.03)
−0.000
(−0.07)
−0.023∗∗
(−2.22)
−0.047∗∗
(−2.05)
bond zero 0.007∗∗∗
(7.26)
0.002
(0.73)
0.013∗∗
(2.31)
−0.016
(−0.53)
−0.087
(−1.49)
turnover −2.95∗∗∗
(−11.87)
−2.12
(−1.11)
−0.74
(−0.31)
−2.97
(−0.33)
14.47
(0.82)
URC 20.50∗∗∗
(2.88)
191.63∗∗∗
(3.08)
209.47∗∗∗
(4.74)
212.15∗∗∗
(2.96)
−143.70
(−0.57)
Amihud risk 1.99
(1.25)
18.87∗∗∗
(4.74)
20.66∗∗∗
(3.26)
21.42∗∗
(2.22)
24.11∗∗
(2.43)
URC risk 17.40∗∗
(2.07)
167.60∗∗∗
(3.71)
190.46∗∗∗
(4.03)
270.28∗∗∗
(4.23)
233.16∗∗
(2.13)
Table 2.2: Marginal liquidity regressions. For each rating class R and each liquidity
variable L a pooled regression is run with credit risk controls
SpreadRit = α
R + γRLit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in quarter. In total 40 regressions
are run (8 liquidity variables × 5 rating classes). This table shows for each regression
the coeﬃcient and t-statistics in parenthesis for the liquidity variable, γ. The proxies
are described in detail in Section 2.4 and are calculated quarterly from 2004 : Q4 to
2009 : Q2. Panel A shows the coeﬃcients using data before the subprime crisis, while
Panel B shows the coeﬃcients using data after the onset of the subprime crisis. Standard
errors are corrected for time series eﬀects, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and heteroscedasticity, and
signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked ’*’, at 5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked ’***’.
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Figure 1: Time series of liquidity variables in the regression sample. This
graph plots the time series of liquidity variables along with a line marking the start of the
subprime crisis (beginning in 2007Q2). Liquidity variables are measured quarterly, and for
every liquidity variable the mean value of the variable across all observations each quarter
is graphed. For each quarter a bond observation requires a full set of accounting variables
and at least four transactions during the quarter.
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Figure 2.1: Time series of liquidity variables in the regression sample. This
graph plots the time series of liquidity variables along with a line marking the start of the
subprime crisis (beginning in 2007Q2). Liquidity variables are measured quarterly, and
for every liquidity variable the mean value of the variable across all observations each
quarter is graphed. For each quarter a bond observat on requi es a full set of ccounting
variables and at least four transac ions during the quarter.
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is approximately a factor of 4 for bid-ask spreads and a factor of 8 for lack
of market depth. That is, not only have bid-ask spreads widened strongly
during the crisis but the ability to sell large notional amounts of bonds
without a sizeable discount has disappeared. We see that liquidity in the
second quarter of 2009 slowly returns to the market since Amihud and URC
are ﬁnally decreasing after the increase in previous years.
Volume has traditionally been regarded as a proxy for liquidity, since it
should be easier to trade when markets are more active. However, Johnson
(2008) ﬁnds in a simple frictionless model that volume is unrelated to the
level of liquidity but related to liquidity risk as measured by the variance
of liquidity. Table 2.2 shows that 9 out of 10 regression coeﬃcients for
volume are negative indicating that large volumes tend to reduce credit
spreads. The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients is modest though, so the evidence
is not conclusive. Liquidity risk is clearly priced since Amihud and URC
risk have signiﬁcantly positive regression coeﬃcents in 19 out of 20 cases.
Interestingly, all coeﬃcients increase strongly in size post-subprime. Thus,
investors require a larger compensation post-subprime for investing in bonds
with a high uncertainty about the liquidity discount when selling the bond.
Since liquidity risk has increased strongly as Figure 2.1 shows, the impact of
liquidity risk is twofold; through a larger level of liquidity risk and through
a higher risk premium on liquidity risk.
Turning to zero trading days Table 2.2 shows surprisingly that there is no
consistent relationship between the number of zero trading days and spreads.
If anything, the relationship tends to be negative since 14 out of 20 bond
and ﬁrm zero regression coeﬃcients are negative. Constantinides (1986) ﬁnds
theoretically that in the presence of transaction costs, investors will trade
infrequently, and consistent with this line of reasoning Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007) ﬁnd that corporate bond spreads - when controlling for credit
risk - depend positively on the number of zero trading days.
The diﬀerence between our results and those of Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007) is likely to be the data source. While we use actual transaction
data and can directly detect when a trade occurs, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei
(2007) use data from Datastream and deﬁne a zero trading day as a day
where the price does not change. We ﬁnd that Datastream corporate bond
data can diﬀer substantially from actual transaction data in non-predictable
ways. To illustrate this, we calculate for each bond quarter the percentage
zero trading days using Datastream, and Figure 2.2 plots all pairs of TRACE
and Datastream percentage zero trading days. The ﬁgure shows that there
is very little relation between actual and Datastream zero trading days, and
while Datastream often understates the number of zero trading days, they are
also overstated for some observations. Although zero-trading days are not
correctly identiﬁed in Datastream, the LOT measure of Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei (2007) could be a relevant measure to include in our analysis. Therefore
we have calculated a yearly LOT measure as in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei
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is approximately a factor of 4 for bid-ask spreads and a factor of 8 for lack
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during the crisis but the ability to sell large notional amounts of bonds
without a sizeable discount has disappeared. We see that liquidity in the
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where the price does not change. We ﬁnd that Datastream corporate bond
data can diﬀer substantially from actual transaction data in non-predictable
ways. To illustrate this, we calculate for each bond quarter the percentage
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observations in that point. The total number of observations is 60,680.
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(2007) for all TRACE bonds for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 based on
all TRACE trades. The median roundtrip cost is 237 basis points, which
appears too high compared to ﬁndings in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar
(2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), and Bessembinder, Maxwell,
and Venkaraman (2006).
From a theoretical point of view the mixed results regarding the impact
of zero trading days on spreads can be explained by results in Huberman
and Stanzl (2005). They show that an investor trades more often when price
impact of trades is high, because he attempts to reduce the total price impact
by submitting more but smaller orders. All else equal more trades therefore
occur in illiquid bonds since it is necessary to split a sell order in many
small trades, while it can be executed in a single trade in a liquid bond.7 If
this explanation holds true we should expect to see less zero trading days
in illiquid times without an increase in the total trading volume. As Figure
2.1 shows this happens during the subprime crisis. The top-right graph
shows that the median number of percentage zeros in the regression sample
decreases during the subprime crisis. For example, the median number of
percentage zeros is 30% in the last quarter of 2008 while it is 62% in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2007. Also, we see in the bottom-left graph that volume in
our regression sample decreases slightly during the crisis.
Drawing conclusions from Figure 2.1 might be misleading since a bond in
a given quarter is only included in the regression sample if it has a full set of
accounting variables and trades at least four times that quarter (otherwise
the Roll measure cannot be calculated). Thus, it is only the most liquid
bonds that are included and there are less bonds included post-subprime
than pre-subprime. The decrease in zero trading days might therefore be
due to a smaller number of bonds included in the sample. To address this
concern, Figure 2.3 shows time series of the quarterly average number of
trades and average trade size for all straight coupon bullet bond transac-
tions in our sample period. The top graphs are based on transactions of
size $100, 000 or more, which our regression results are based on, while the
bottom graphs are based on all transactions. In both cases we clearly see
an increase on the average number of trades and a decrease in the average
trade size after the onset of the subprime crises.
Overall, there is theoretical evidence both in favor of and against the
7Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) ﬁnd that dealers behave diﬀerently when trading
liquid and illiquid bonds. When trading liquid bonds they are more likely to buy the bond,
have it as inventory and sell it in smaller amounts. When trading illiquid bonds they more
often quickly sell the entire position, so they perform more of a matching function in
these bonds. This is consistent with our argument that illiquid bonds trade more often,
which can be illustrated with the following example. In a liquid bond the investor sells
$1, 000, 000 to a dealer, who sells it to investors in two amounts of $500, 000. In an illiquid
bond the investor sells 500, 000 to two diﬀerent dealers, who each sells the $500, 000 to an
investor. The total number of trades in the illiquid bond is four while it is three in the
liquid bond.
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Figure 3: Time series of average number of trades and average trade size in
the full sample. This graph plots the time series of average number of trades in a quarter
and average trade size along with a line marking the start of the subprime crisis (beginning
in 2007.Q2). Number of trades and trade size are measured quarterly and the mean value
across all observations each quarter is graphed. A bond is included in every quarter if
it traded at least one time during the sample period 2005:Q1-2008:Q4. The top graphs
is based on institutional trades, i.e. trades of size $100, 000 or more, while the bottom
graphs are based on all trades.
61
Figure 2.3: Time series of average number of trades and average trade size
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use of zero trading days as a measure of illiquidity. Our empirical evidence
is also mixed. We show that trading activity increases when the market
becomes more illiquid, while at the same time Table 2.2 shows that bond
zero trading days do tend to predict investment grade spreads after the onset
of the subprime crisis. In any case, we do not ﬁnd that zero trading days
can be consistently used as a predictor of spreads.
2.5.3 Principal component analysis of liquidity
In our analysis we include eight liquidity proxies that measure diﬀerent as-
pects of liquidity. To see if most of the relevant information in the proxies
can be captured by a few factors, we conduct a principal component analysis.
Table 2.3 shows the loadings and the explanatory power of the eight princi-
pal components. We see that both the explanatory power and the loadings
of each PC component are very stable in the two subperiods. Also we see
that the PC components have clear interpretations. The ﬁrst component ex-
plains 40% of the variation in the liquidity variables and is close to being an
equally-weighted linear combination of the Amihud and URC measures and
their associated liquidity risk measures. The second PC explains 20% and
is a zero trading days measure, the third PC explains 13% and is a volume
measure, and the fourth PC explains 9% and is a Roll measure. The last
four PCs explain less than 20% and do not have clear interpretations.
Table 2.4 shows results of adding each of the PCs in turn to our re-
gression in the same way as we did with each liquidity variable in Table
2.2. Strikingly, the ﬁrst PC is signiﬁcant for all rating categories pre- and
post-subprime. For 9 out of 10 regression coeﬃcients the signiﬁcance is at
a 1% level. In addition, the remaining seven PCs are mostly insigniﬁcant
and often with conﬂicting signs. This suggests that although liquidity has
many diﬀerent aspects, a single linear combination of measures of transac-
tion costs, market depth, and liquidity risk explains much of the impact of
liquidity on yield spreads. The factor is priced at all ratings pre- and post-
subprime in contrast to previously proposed liquidity proxies, zero-trading
days (Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007)) and the Roll measure (Bao, Pan,
and Wang (2009)).
The principal component loadings on the ﬁrst PC in Table 2.3 lead us to
deﬁne a factor that loads evenly on Amihud, URC, Amihud risk, and URC
risk, and does not load on any of the other liquidity measures. The factor
is simpler to calculate than the ﬁrst PC while retaining its properties. We
use this factor in our subsequent analysis and call it λ. To be precise: for
each bond i and quarter t we calculate the measure Ljit where j = 1, .., 4 is
an index for Amihud, URC, Amihud risk, and URC risk. We normalize each
measure L˜jit =
Ljit−µ
j
σj where µj and σj are the mean and standard deviation
of Lj across bonds and quarters and deﬁne our liquidity measure for each
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Panel A: Principal Component loadings, pre-subprime (2004:Q4-2007:Q1)
1PC 2PC 3PC 4PC 5PC 6PC 7PC 8PC
Amihud 0.45 0.05 −0.12 −0.05 0.44 0.70 −0.12 0.28
Roll 0.26 0.33 0.08 −0.86 −0.27 −0.06 0.06 0.02
ﬁrm zero −0.04 0.64 −0.02 0.39 −0.56 0.36 0.07 0.02
bond zero −0.00 0.67 −0.10 0.10 0.56 −0.45 0.05 0.11
turnover −0.02 0.07 0.98 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.03
URC 0.52 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.00 −0.10 −0.39 −0.73
Amihud risk 0.47 −0.11 0.01 0.16 −0.01 −0.09 0.85 −0.09
URC risk 0.49 −0.12 0.06 0.21 −0.29 −0.40 −0.31 0.60
cum. % explained 39% 59% 72% 81% 89% 94% 99% 100%
Panel B: Principal Component loadings, post-subprime (2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
1PC 2PC 3PC 4PC 5PC 6PC 7PC 8PC
Amihud 0.46 0.04 −0.10 −0.10 −0.07 0.73 0.43 0.21
Roll 0.06 0.47 0.35 −0.78 0.10 −0.02 −0.17 0.02
ﬁrm zero −0.11 0.59 −0.28 0.33 0.62 0.20 −0.17 0.00
bond zero −0.12 0.64 −0.07 0.21 −0.67 −0.16 0.21 0.12
turnover −0.14 0.05 0.88 0.39 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.01
URC 0.52 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.09 −0.26 0.28 −0.73
Amihud risk 0.46 0.03 0.07 0.21 −0.30 0.19 −0.78 −0.04
URC risk 0.51 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.23 −0.51 0.10 0.63
cum. % explained 39% 58% 71% 81% 88% 94% 99% 100%
Table 2.3: Principal component loadings on the liquidity variables. This table
shows the principal component analysis loadings on each of the eight liquidity variables
along with the cumulative explanatory power of the components.
bond and quarter as
λit =
4
j=1
L˜jit
2.5.4 Size of liquidity component
To calculate the impact of corporate bond illiquidity on yield spreads we do
the following. For each rating R we run the pooled regression
spreadRit = αR + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time (measured in quarters of year), and λit is
our liquidity measure. We deﬁne the liquidity score for a bond in a given
quarter as βRλit. Within each rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB, spec), period
(pre- or post subprime), and maturity (0-2y, 2-5y, 5-30y) we sort all obser-
vations according to their liquidity score. The liquidity component of an
average bond is deﬁned as the 50% quantile minus the 5% quantile of the
liquidity score distribution. Thus, the liquidity component measures the
diﬀerence in bond yields between a bond with average liquidity and a very
liquid bond. Following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) we calculate
46 Essay 2
Panel A: Multivariate liquidity regressions, pre-subprime (2004:Q4-2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB spec
intercept −0.4
(−1.24)
0.2
(1.20)
−0.5
(−1.62)
2.2∗∗∗
(2.84)
−0.1
(−0.03)
1PCA 0.01∗∗∗
(3.22)
0.02∗∗∗
(12.31)
0.03∗∗∗
(3.28)
0.05∗∗∗
(2.88)
0.30∗∗∗
(5.65)
2PCA 0.01
(0.58)
−0.00
(−0.09)
0.04∗∗∗
(3.41)
−0.06
(−1.30)
−0.19
(−1.19)
3PCA −0.014∗∗∗
(−4.20)
−0.006
(−0.72)
0.018∗∗∗
(2.66)
−0.005
(−0.21)
0.093
(0.88)
4PCA −0.020∗∗
(−2.32)
−0.022∗∗∗
(−2.94)
−0.002
(−0.18)
−0.015
(−0.67)
0.112∗
(1.92)
5PCA 0.00
(0.01)
0.02∗∗∗
(3.08)
0.03∗
(1.88)
−0.05
(−1.22)
−0.02
(−0.16)
6PCA 0.00
(0.69)
0.01
(0.81)
0.03∗∗∗
(4.19)
0.03
(0.65)
0.24∗
(1.91)
7PCA 0.00
(0.27)
−0.00
(−0.28)
−0.00
(−0.55)
−0.02∗
(−1.70)
−0.10∗
(−1.68)
8PCA 0.02∗∗∗
(3.07)
0.02
(1.43)
−0.01
(−0.74)
−0.23∗∗∗
(−2.58)
−0.17
(−1.56)
age 0.00
(0.08)
−0.00
(−0.96)
0.00
(1.12)
−0.01
(−1.26)
−0.00
(−0.12)
amount issued −0.025∗∗∗
(−3.52)
−0.012
(−1.34)
0.032∗∗
(2.57)
−0.108∗∗∗
(−2.65)
−0.143
(−0.87)
forecast dispersion 3.05
(1.64)
0.02
(1.30)
0.73∗∗
(2.12)
0.65∗∗
(2.04)
1.21
(1.37)
coupon 0.02∗∗
(1.99)
0.02∗∗∗
(4.00)
0.01∗
(1.79)
0.07∗∗∗
(4.46)
0.29∗∗∗
(3.62)
10y swap −0.05∗
(−1.82)
−0.03∗∗∗
(−3.76)
−0.05∗∗∗
(−4.23)
−0.06∗∗∗
(−4.03)
−0.26
(−1.33)
10y-2y swap 0.005
(0.79)
−0.030∗∗
(−2.28)
−0.020∗∗∗
(−2.89)
−0.107∗∗∗
(−5.31)
−0.132
(−0.44)
equity vol −0.002
(−0.33)
0.008∗∗∗
(15.21)
0.006∗
(1.68)
0.011∗∗∗
(4.17)
0.093∗∗∗
(5.88)
pretax1 0.344∗∗∗
(3.53)
0.023∗∗∗
(2.88)
0.010
(0.57)
−0.026
(−1.36)
0.027
(0.44)
pretax2 −0.051∗∗∗
(−3.06)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−4.90)
−0.011∗
(−1.90)
−0.013
(−1.54)
−0.068
(−0.90)
pretax3 −0.007
(−1.00)
0.000
(0.18)
−0.001
(−0.35)
0.011∗∗
(2.18)
0.048
(0.95)
pretax4 −0.003∗∗∗
(−3.78)
0.000
(0.03)
0.000
(0.26)
−0.005∗∗∗
(−3.31)
−0.022
(−1.30)
sales to income −0.002
(−1.14)
−0.000
(−0.53)
−0.000
(−0.01)
−0.005∗∗
(−2.14)
−0.003∗∗
(−1.97)
long term debt to asset −0.016∗∗
(−2.49)
−0.002∗∗∗
(−4.13)
0.001
(1.16)
0.008∗∗∗
(2.92)
−0.001
(−0.02)
leverage ratio 0.009∗∗∗
(3.04)
0.001
(1.58)
−0.001
(−1.00)
0.000
(0.10)
0.023
(0.91)
time-to-maturity 0.016∗∗∗
(3.50)
0.019∗∗∗
(18.21)
0.022∗∗∗
(15.21)
0.040∗∗∗
(7.95)
0.043∗∗∗
(2.99)
N 533 1869 4148 1340 1075
R2 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.60 0.61
Table 2.4: Multivariate liquidity regressions. For each of the ﬁve rating classes
a pooled regression with quarterly observations is run with variables measuring both
liquidity and credit risk. Panel A shows the regression coeﬃcients and t-statistics in
parenthesis when using data from 2004:Q4 to 2007:Q1, while Panel B shows the results
for data from 2007:Q2 to 2009:Q2. Standard errors are corrected for time series eﬀects,
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and heteroscedasticity, and signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked ’*’, at
5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked ’***’.
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−0.00
(−0.09)
0.04∗∗∗
(3.41)
−0.06
(−1.30)
−0.19
(−1.19)
3PCA −0.014∗∗∗
(−4.20)
−0.006
(−0.72)
0.018∗∗∗
(2.66)
−0.005
(−0.21)
0.093
(0.88)
4PCA −0.020∗∗
(−2.32)
−0.022∗∗∗
(−2.94)
−0.002
(−0.18)
−0.015
(−0.67)
0.112∗
(1.92)
5PCA 0.00
(0.01)
0.02∗∗∗
(3.08)
0.03∗
(1.88)
−0.05
(−1.22)
−0.02
(−0.16)
6PCA 0.00
(0.69)
0.01
(0.81)
0.03∗∗∗
(4.19)
0.03
(0.65)
0.24∗
(1.91)
7PCA 0.00
(0.27)
−0.00
(−0.28)
−0.00
(−0.55)
−0.02∗
(−1.70)
−0.10∗
(−1.68)
8PCA 0.02∗∗∗
(3.07)
0.02
(1.43)
−0.01
(−0.74)
−0.23∗∗∗
(−2.58)
−0.17
(−1.56)
age 0.00
(0.08)
−0.00
(−0.96)
0.00
(1.12)
−0.01
(−1.26)
−0.00
(−0.12)
amount issued −0.025∗∗∗
(−3.52)
−0.012
(−1.34)
0.032∗∗
(2.57)
−0.108∗∗∗
(−2.65)
−0.143
(−0.87)
forecast dispersion 3.05
(1.64)
0.02
(1.30)
0.73∗∗
(2.12)
0.65∗∗
(2.04)
1.21
(1.37)
coupon 0.02∗∗
(1.99)
0.02∗∗∗
(4.00)
0.01∗
(1.79)
0.07∗∗∗
(4.46)
0.29∗∗∗
(3.62)
10y swap −0.05∗
(−1.82)
−0.03∗∗∗
(−3.76)
−0.05∗∗∗
(−4.23)
−0.06∗∗∗
(−4.03)
−0.26
(−1.33)
10y-2y swap 0.005
(0.79)
−0.030∗∗
(−2.28)
−0.020∗∗∗
(−2.89)
−0.107∗∗∗
(−5.31)
−0.132
(−0.44)
equity vol −0.002
(−0.33)
0.008∗∗∗
(15.21)
0.006∗
(1.68)
0.011∗∗∗
(4.17)
0.093∗∗∗
(5.88)
pretax1 0.344∗∗∗
(3.53)
0.023∗∗∗
(2.88)
0.010
(0.57)
−0.026
(−1.36)
0.027
(0.44)
pretax2 −0.051∗∗∗
(−3.06)
−0.016∗∗∗
(−4.90)
−0.011∗
(−1.90)
−0.013
(−1.54)
−0.068
(−0.90)
pretax3 −0.007
(−1.00)
0.000
(0.18)
−0.001
(−0.35)
0.011∗∗
(2.18)
0.048
(0.95)
pretax4 −0.003∗∗∗
(−3.78)
0.000
(0.03)
0.000
(0.26)
−0.005∗∗∗
(−3.31)
−0.022
(−1.30)
sales to income −0.002
(−1.14)
−0.000
(−0.53)
−0.000
(−0.01)
−0.005∗∗
(−2.14)
−0.003∗∗
(−1.97)
long term debt to asset −0.016∗∗
(−2.49)
−0.002∗∗∗
(−4.13)
0.001
(1.16)
0.008∗∗∗
(2.92)
−0.001
(−0.02)
leverage ratio 0.009∗∗∗
(3.04)
0.001
(1.58)
−0.001
(−1.00)
0.000
(0.10)
0.023
(0.91)
time-to-maturity 0.016∗∗∗
(3.50)
0.019∗∗∗
(18.21)
0.022∗∗∗
(15.21)
0.040∗∗∗
(7.95)
0.043∗∗∗
(2.99)
N 533 1869 4148 1340 1075
R2 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.60 0.61
Table 2.4: Multivariate liquidity regressions. For each of the ﬁve rating classes
a pooled regression with quarterly observations is run with variables measuring both
liquidity and credit risk. Panel A shows the regression coeﬃcients and t-statistics in
parenthesis when using data from 2004:Q4 to 2007:Q1, while Panel B shows the results
for data from 2007:Q2 to 2009:Q2. Standard errors are corrected for time series eﬀects,
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and heteroscedasticity, and signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked ’*’, at
5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked ’***’.
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Panel B: Multivariate liquidity regressions, post-subprime (2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
AAA AA A BBB spec
intercept −2.5∗∗
(−2.00)
−2.6
(−1.00)
1.0∗∗∗
(2.66)
24.9
(1.42)
30.2∗
(1.65)
1PCA 0.05∗
(1.91)
0.48∗∗∗
(4.50)
0.45∗∗∗
(4.64)
0.67∗∗∗
(3.18)
1.16∗∗∗
(4.33)
2PCA −0.08
(−0.57)
0.15
(1.60)
0.26∗∗
(2.27)
−0.03
(−0.05)
−0.73
(−1.21)
3PCA 0.066
(1.21)
0.153∗∗∗
(2.96)
0.146∗∗∗
(3.27)
0.389∗
(1.75)
0.349
(0.90)
4PCA −0.125
(−1.35)
0.283∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.267∗∗∗
(4.07)
0.110∗
(1.81)
0.900
(1.40)
5PCA −0.35∗∗∗
(−2.75)
−0.18
(−1.17)
−0.17∗∗∗
(−7.65)
−0.46
(−0.90)
0.52
(0.97)
6PCA −0.09∗
(−1.76)
−0.17
(−1.30)
−0.41∗
(−1.67)
−0.30∗
(−1.70)
1.00∗∗
(2.57)
7PCA 0.07
(0.68)
−0.39∗
(−1.79)
−0.22
(−1.24)
−0.44
(−1.08)
−0.58∗∗
(−1.98)
8PCA 0.12∗
(1.72)
0.07
(0.30)
−0.29∗∗
(−2.14)
1.04
(1.11)
0.63
(0.54)
age −0.03∗∗∗
(−4.83)
−0.02
(−0.84)
0.02
(0.52)
0.10
(1.02)
0.18∗∗∗
(3.12)
amount issued 0.087∗∗∗
(4.22)
0.101
(1.27)
0.009
(0.09)
−0.715
(−1.04)
−0.571
(−0.72)
forecast dispersion 18.32∗∗∗
(3.07)
0.13∗∗∗
(3.75)
0.15∗∗∗
(3.34)
0.76∗∗∗
(7.31)
1.06∗∗∗
(4.31)
coupon 0.10∗∗∗
(4.46)
0.10∗∗
(2.07)
0.02
(0.17)
−0.50
(−1.34)
−0.09
(−0.19)
10y swap −0.32∗∗∗
(−6.18)
0.07
(0.24)
−0.09
(−0.22)
−1.33∗∗∗
(−3.25)
−3.18∗∗∗
(−3.05)
10y-2y swap −0.400∗∗
(−2.17)
−0.490
(−1.58)
−0.820∗
(−1.95)
−0.962
(−1.23)
−1.962∗∗∗
(−2.59)
equity vol 0.096∗∗∗
(6.22)
0.055∗∗∗
(3.82)
0.050∗∗∗
(3.64)
0.050∗∗∗
(3.06)
0.097∗∗∗
(3.24)
pretax1 −0.836∗∗
(−2.17)
0.004
(0.21)
−0.098∗
(−1.80)
−0.051
(−0.53)
0.001
(0.44)
pretax2 0.422∗∗∗
(5.33)
0.033
(0.93)
−0.000
(−0.00)
−0.073
(−0.53)
−0.442
(−0.53)
pretax3 0.144
(0.78)
−0.041∗∗∗
(−2.59)
−0.003
(−0.37)
0.076
(0.81)
0.000
(NaN)
pretax4 0.003
(0.65)
0.052∗
(1.83)
0.008
(0.50)
−0.067
(−0.62)
0.000
(NaN)
sales to income −0.108∗
(−1.68)
−0.003∗∗∗
(−4.56)
−0.001∗∗∗
(−3.79)
−0.002∗∗∗
(−7.81)
−0.013
(−1.25)
long term debt to asset −0.256∗∗∗
(−2.67)
−0.009
(−0.71)
0.044∗∗
(2.40)
0.058
(1.56)
−0.108∗∗∗
(−4.57)
leverage ratio 0.184∗
(1.92)
0.000
(0.00)
−0.026∗∗∗
(−3.55)
−0.005
(−0.17)
0.106∗∗∗
(13.08)
time-to-maturity 0.024∗∗∗
(6.00)
−0.015
(−0.96)
−0.035∗
(−1.72)
−0.064
(−1.43)
−0.124∗∗∗
(−2.63)
N 414 1549 2533 539 464
R2 0.84 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.72
Table 2.4: continued.
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conﬁdence bands by performing a wild cluster bootstrap of the regression
residuals.
Table 2.5 shows the size of the liquidity component. We see that the liq-
uidity component becomes larger as the rating quality of the bond decreases.
For investment grade ratings, the component is small with an average pre-
subprime across maturity of 0.8bp for AAA, 1.0bp for AA, 2.4bp for A, and
3.9bp for BBB. For speculative grade the liquidity component is larger and
estimated to be 57.6bp.
Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime
(2004Q4-2007:Q1)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 0.8 0.6
(0.3;0.8)
0.9
(0.5;1.3)
1.1
(0.6;1.5)
162 178 193
AA 1.0 0.7
(0.3;1.1)
1.0
(0.4;1.7)
1.3
(0.5;2.2)
704 667 498
A 2.4 1.5
(0.6;2.3)
2.5
(1.1;3.9)
3.2
(1.4;4.9)
1540 1346 1260
BBB 3.9 2.8
(1.4;4.4)
4.0
(1.9;6.2)
4.7
(2.3;7.3)
517 270 553
spec 57.6 45.0
(32.3;57.4)
44.0
(31.5;56.0)
83.9
(60.2;106.8)
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime
(2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 4.9 2.5
(0.5;4.4)
4.5
(0.9;8.0)
7.9
(1.7;14.1)
110 149 155
AA 41.8 23.5
(12.9;33.2)
37.1
(20.3;52.4)
64.7
(35.5;91.4)
493 572 483
A 50.7 26.6
(15.3;39.2)
51.0
(29.3;75.1)
74.5
(42.9;109.7)
762 878 890
BBB 92.7 64.3
(36.5;92.7)
115.6
(65.6;166.6)
98.1
(55.7;141.4)
123 159 256
spec 196.8 123.6
(80.2;157.3)
224.0
(145.3;285.1)
242.7
(157.4;308.8)
133 129 201
Table 2.5: Liquidity Component in basis points. For each rating R we run the
pooled regression
spreadRit = α
R + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time, and λit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is
measured with respect to the swap rate. Within each rating and maturity bucket (0-2y,
2-5y, and 5-30y) we sort increasingly all values of λit and ﬁnd the median value λ50 and
the 5% value λ5. The liquidity component in the bucket is deﬁned as β(λ50 − λ5). This
table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parenthesis.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
48 Essay 2
conﬁdence bands by performing a wild cluster bootstrap of the regression
residuals.
Table 2.5 shows the size of the liquidity component. We see that the liq-
uidity component becomes larger as the rating quality of the bond decreases.
For investment grade ratings, the component is small with an average pre-
subprime across maturity of 0.8bp for AAA, 1.0bp for AA, 2.4bp for A, and
3.9bp for BBB. For speculative grade the liquidity component is larger and
estimated to be 57.6bp.
Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime
(2004Q4-2007:Q1)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 0.8 0.6
(0.3;0.8)
0.9
(0.5;1.3)
1.1
(0.6;1.5)
162 178 193
AA 1.0 0.7
(0.3;1.1)
1.0
(0.4;1.7)
1.3
(0.5;2.2)
704 667 498
A 2.4 1.5
(0.6;2.3)
2.5
(1.1;3.9)
3.2
(1.4;4.9)
1540 1346 1260
BBB 3.9 2.8
(1.4;4.4)
4.0
(1.9;6.2)
4.7
(2.3;7.3)
517 270 553
spec 57.6 45.0
(32.3;57.4)
44.0
(31.5;56.0)
83.9
(60.2;106.8)
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime
(2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 4.9 2.5
(0.5;4.4)
4.5
(0.9;8.0)
7.9
(1.7;14.1)
110 149 155
AA 41.8 23.5
(12.9;33.2)
37.1
(20.3;52.4)
64.7
(35.5;91.4)
493 572 483
A 50.7 26.6
(15.3;39.2)
51.0
(29.3;75.1)
74.5
(42.9;109.7)
762 878 890
BBB 92.7 64.3
(36.5;92.7)
115.6
(65.6;166.6)
98.1
(55.7;141.4)
123 159 256
spec 196.8 123.6
(80.2;157.3)
224.0
(145.3;285.1)
242.7
(157.4;308.8)
133 129 201
Table 2.5: Liquidity Component in basis points. For each rating R we run the
pooled regression
spreadRit = α
R + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time, and λit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is
measured with respect to the swap rate. Within each rating and maturity bucket (0-2y,
2-5y, and 5-30y) we sort increasingly all values of λit and ﬁnd the median value λ50 and
the 5% value λ5. The liquidity component in the bucket is deﬁned as β(λ50 − λ5). This
table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parenthesis.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
Corporate Bond Liquidity Before and After the Onset of the Subprime
Crisis 49
There is a strong increase in the liquidity component in the post-subprime
period as Panel B in Table 2.5 shows. The component increases by a factor
10 or more in investment grade bonds of rating AA, A, and BBB while
it increases by a factor 3-4 in speculative grade bonds. This shows that
liquidity has dried out under the subprime crisis and part of the spread
widening for bonds is due to a higher liquidity premium. Figure 2.1 shows
the evolution of liquidity variables over the sample, and we see that the
liquidity variables entering our measure of liquidity (Amihud, URC, Amihud
risk, URC risk) all increase strongly after the onset of the subprime crisis.
Thus, the higher liquidity premium is due to an increase in the sensitivity
of spreads to illiquidity as well as higher levels of illiquidity.
While liquidity components in all ratings increase, we see that in absolute
terms the increase in AAA bonds is modest. Even after the onset of the sub-
prime crisis the component is 8 basis points or less, which is small compared
to the component of other bonds. We see in Table 2.5 that the regression
coeﬃcient for AAA on the ﬁrst principal component is small post-subprime
compared to those of other rating classes, so the sensitivity of AAA-rated
bonds to liquidity is small.8 This suggests that there is a ﬂight-to-quality
into AAA bonds, namely that investors are buying high-quality AAA-rated
bonds regardless of their liquidity.
The average liquidity premium in speculative grade bonds was 57.6bp
pre-subprime, so even in this liquidity-rich period speculative grade bonds
commanded a sizeable liquidity premium. Post-subprime the liquidity pre-
mium increased to 196.8bp for speculative grade bonds. An A rated bond
has an average liquidity premium of 50.7bp post-subprime, so the illiquidity
of such a bond post-subprime is similar to that of a speculative grade bond
pre-subprime.
The size of the liquidity component pre-subprime is comparable in mag-
nitude to the nondefault component in investment grade corporate bond
spreads found by subtracting the CDS premium from the corporate - swap
spread (swap basis), see Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Bren-
nan, and Marsh (2005), and Han and Zhou (2008).9 These papers look at
recent periods before the subprime crisis and our pre-subprime results agree
with their results in that there is a modest liquidity premium in investment
grade corporate bond yields. The nondefault component for speculative
bonds extracted from the swap basis is smaller and often negative, and the
evidence presented here suggests that other factors than corporate bond liq-
8Strictly speaking, we use our measure λ to calculate liquidity components, but the
regression coeﬃcient on λ is close to the coeﬃcient on 1PC.
9Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) ﬁnd an average nondefault component of -7.2bp
for AAA/AA, 10.5bp for A, and 9.7bp for BBB, Han and Zhou (2008) ﬁnd the nondefault
component to be 0.3bp for AAA, 3.3bp for AA, 6.7bp for A, and 23.5bp for BBB, while
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) ﬁnd it to be 6.9bp for AAA/AA, 0.5bp for A, and
14.9bp for BBB.
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uidity are important for explaining the basis for speculative grade bonds.10
Turning to the term structure of liquidity, the general pattern across
ratings and regime is that the liquidity component increases as maturity
becomes higher. Overall, the premium in basis points is around twice as high
for long maturity bonds compared to short maturity bonds. This seemingly
contrasts the work of Ericsson and Renault (2006) who ﬁnd a downward
sloping term structure of liquidity. However, they use two data sets: one
is transaction data from NAIC and the other is Datastream data, and only
ﬁnd support for a downward sloping liquidity eﬀect in the Datastream data
set. In light of the quality of Datastream data discussed earlier in this paper,
we ﬁnd it likely that conclusions based on actual transaction data are more
reliable than those based on Datastream data.
To address how much of the corporate bond spread is due to liquidity,
we ﬁnd the fraction of the liquidity component to the total spread. For each
bond we proceed as follows. We deﬁne the bond’s liquidity component as
βR(λit−λ5t) where λ5t is the 5% quantile of the liquidity scores. The liquidity
component is then divided by the bond’s yield spread to give an estimate of
the fraction of the total yield spread that is due to illiquidity. Within each
group we ﬁnd the median liquidity fraction. We show later that the size of
the liquidity component is robust to the choice of benchmark riskfree rate,
but the liquidity fraction of the total spread is sensitive to the benchmark.
The swap rate is chosen because there is mounting evidence that swap rates
historically have been a better proxy for riskfree rates than Treasury yields
(see for example Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Feldhu¨tter and Lando
(2008)).
Table 2.6 shows the fraction of the liquidity component to the total
corporate-swap spread. The ﬁrst parts of Panel A and B sort according
to rating. We see that the fraction of spreads due to illiquidity is small
for investment grade bonds, 11% or less. Using the ratio of the swap basis
relative to the total spread, Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Han
and Zhou (2008) ﬁnd the fraction of spread due to liquidity at the 5-year
maturity to be 2% respectively 19% consistent with our ﬁnding that it is
relatively small. In speculative grade bonds the fraction due to liquidity is
24%. Post-subprime the fractions increase and range from 23 to 42 % in all
ratings but AAA where it is only 7%. That the liquidity fractions of spreads
in AAA are small in percent relative to other bonds underscores that there is
a ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect in AAA bonds. A consistent ﬁnding from Tables 2.5
and 2.6 is that for investment grade bonds the importance of liquidity has
increased after the onset of the subprime crisis both in absolute size (basis
points) and relative to credit risk (fraction of spread). For speculative grade
bonds the liquidity component in basis points has increased but it is stable
measured as the fraction of total yield spread.
10Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) report an average of 17.6bp for BB, while Han and
Zhou (2008) estimate it to be 2.8bp for BB, -53.5bp for B, and -75.4bp for CCC.
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Panel A: Liquidity component in fraction of spread, pre-subprime
(2005:Q1-2007:Q1)
rating AAA AA A BBB spec
fraction in pct 3
(2;5)
4
(2;7)
11
(5;18)
8
(3;12)
24
(18;30)
N 533 1869 4148 1340 1075
maturity 0-1y 1-2y 2-3y 3-4y 4-5y 5-8y 8-10y 10-30y
fraction in pct 3
(2;4)
7
(4;9)
13
(8;17)
13
(8;18)
13
(8;17)
11
(7;15)
8
(5;11)
10
(7;14)
N 1596 1613 1241 891 641 1187 578 1218
Panel B: Liquidity component in fraction of spread, post-subprime
(2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
rating AAA AA A BBB spec
fraction in pct 7
(1;12)
42
(23;60)
26
(14;39)
29
(16;41)
23
(16;30)
N 414 1549 2533 539 464
maturity 0-1y 1-2y 2-3y 3-4y 4-5y 5-8y 8-10y 10-30y
fraction in pct 11
(7;14)
20
(13;27)
23
(15;31)
27
(18;38)
31
(20;42)
44
(28;60)
33
(21;44)
43
(28;53)
N 809 819 675 657 556 817 568 598
Table 2.6: Liquidity component in fraction of spread. For each rating R we run
the pooled regression
spreadRit = α
R + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time, and λit is our liquidity measure. Within each rating we
sort increasingly all values of λit and ﬁnd the 5% value λ5. For each bond we deﬁne the
liquidity fraction of the total spread as β
R(λit−λ5)
spreadRit
. The estimated fractions in the table
are for each entry the median fraction. Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster
bootstrap.
The last parts of Panel A and B in Table 2.6 show the liquidity fraction of
total spread as a function of maturity. We introduce a ﬁne maturity grid but
do not sort according to rating in order to have a reasonable sample size in
each bucket. We see that the fraction of the spread due to liquidity is small
at short maturities and becomes larger as maturity increases. This is the case
both pre- and post-subprime, although the fraction is higher post-subprime
for all maturities. For example, post-subprime the fraction of spread due to
liquidity is 43% for bonds with a maturity more than 10 years while it is
11 % for maturities less than 1 year. The fraction increases at maturities
shorter than 5 years and thereafter ﬂattens. The slight dip at the 8-10 year
maturity both pre- and post subprime is due to an on-the-run eﬀect; many
bonds are issued with a maturity of 10 years and are more liquid right after
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issuance.11
We ﬁnd strong diﬀerences in the pre- and post-subprime periods, and in
order to examine potential variation within the two periods more closely, we
estimate monthly variations in liquidity and spreads as follows. Each month
we a) ﬁnd a regression coeﬃcient βt by regressing spreads on λ while control-
ling for credit risk, b) calculate for each bond the fraction due to illiquidity,
βt(λit−λ5t)
spreadit
, c) ﬁnd the median fraction, and d) multiply this fraction by the
median spread. This gives us the total liquidity premium in basis points
on a monthly basis. We do this for investment grade and speculative grade
bonds separately.12 This measures the amount of the total spread that is
due to illiquidity. Figure 2.4 shows the time series variation in the median
spread and the amount of the spread due to illiquidity.
The liquidity premium in investment grade bonds is persistent and steadily
increasing during the subprime crisis and peaks in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009
when stock prices decreased strongly. We see that the co-movement between
the liquidity premium and credit spread is quite high. For speculative grade
bonds, the liquidity premium peaks around the bankruptcy of Lehman and
shows less persistence. Furthermore, the co-movement between the liquid-
ity premium and the spread is less pronounced than for investment grade
bonds, and the premium at the end of the sample period is almost down to
pre-crisis levels even though the spread is still higher than before the crisis.
2.5.5 Robustness checks
In Appendix 2.8 we carry out a series of robustness checks. We test for
potential endogeneity bias and ﬁnd that endogeneity is not a major concern.
We calculate liquidity premia using corporate bond spreads to Treasury rates
instead of swap rates and ﬁnd that our conclusions still hold. And we ex-
amine an alternative deﬁnition of our liquidity component and ﬁnd results
to be robust to this deﬁnition. We have also tried to exclude bonds with an
age less than one or two years and ﬁnd that our conclusions hold, a result
not in the Appendix but available on request.
As a further test showing that our regression results are robust, we pro-
vide a diﬀerent methodology for controlling for credit risk in this section.
Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005),
and Han and Zhou (2008) control for credit risk by assuming that the pre-
mium in a credit default swap is a pure measure of credit default risk. How-
ever, credit default swaps are shown also to contain a liquidity component
(Tang and Yan (2006) and Bongaerts, Driessen, and de Jong (2009)) and
11To support this claim we additionally sorted according to bond age (older and younger
than 2 years). After this sort, the dip at the 8-10 year maturity was not present. Results
are available on request.
12The results become unstable if we split into ﬁner rating categories. While the regres-
sion coeﬃcient βRt can be determined reasonable well, the 5% quantile λ5t becomes too
noisy.
52 Essay 2
issuance.11
We ﬁnd strong diﬀerences in the pre- and post-subprime periods, and in
order to examine potential variation within the two periods more closely, we
estimate monthly variations in liquidity and spreads as follows. Each month
we a) ﬁnd a regression coeﬃcient βt by regressing spreads on λ while control-
ling for credit risk, b) calculate for each bond the fraction due to illiquidity,
βt(λit−λ5t)
spreadit
, c) ﬁnd the median fraction, and d) multiply this fraction by the
median spread. This gives us the total liquidity premium in basis points
on a monthly basis. We do this for investment grade and speculative grade
bonds separately.12 This measures the amount of the total spread that is
due to illiquidity. Figure 2.4 shows the time series variation in the median
spread and the amount of the spread due to illiquidity.
The liquidity premium in investment grade bonds is persistent and steadily
increasing during the subprime crisis and peaks in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009
when stock prices decreased strongly. We see that the co-movement between
the liquidity premium and credit spread is quite high. For speculative grade
bonds, the liquidity premium peaks around the bankruptcy of Lehman and
shows less persistence. Furthermore, the co-movement between the liquid-
ity premium and the spread is less pronounced than for investment grade
bonds, and the premium at the end of the sample period is almost down to
pre-crisis levels even though the spread is still higher than before the crisis.
2.5.5 Robustness checks
In Appendix 2.8 we carry out a series of robustness checks. We test for
potential endogeneity bias and ﬁnd that endogeneity is not a major concern.
We calculate liquidity premia using corporate bond spreads to Treasury rates
instead of swap rates and ﬁnd that our conclusions still hold. And we ex-
amine an alternative deﬁnition of our liquidity component and ﬁnd results
to be robust to this deﬁnition. We have also tried to exclude bonds with an
age less than one or two years and ﬁnd that our conclusions hold, a result
not in the Appendix but available on request.
As a further test showing that our regression results are robust, we pro-
vide a diﬀerent methodology for controlling for credit risk in this section.
Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005),
and Han and Zhou (2008) control for credit risk by assuming that the pre-
mium in a credit default swap is a pure measure of credit default risk. How-
ever, credit default swaps are shown also to contain a liquidity component
(Tang and Yan (2006) and Bongaerts, Driessen, and de Jong (2009)) and
11To support this claim we additionally sorted according to bond age (older and younger
than 2 years). After this sort, the dip at the 8-10 year maturity was not present. Results
are available on request.
12The results become unstable if we split into ﬁner rating categories. While the regres-
sion coeﬃcient βRt can be determined reasonable well, the 5% quantile λ5t becomes too
noisy.
Corporate Bond Liquidity Before and After the Onset of the Subprime
Crisis 53
Apr05 Jul05 Oct05 Jan06 Apr06 Jul06 Oct06 Jan07 Apr07 Jul07 Oct07 Jan08 Apr08 Jul08 Oct08 Jan09 Apr09
0
1
2
3
4
5
s
pr
ea
d 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
investment grade spread
liquidity premium
Apr05 Jul05 Oct05 Jan06 Apr06 Jul06 Oct06 Jan07 Apr07 Jul07 Oct07 Jan08 Apr08 Jul08 Oct08 Jan09 Apr09
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
s
pr
ea
d 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
speculative grade spread
liquidity premium
Figure 4: Liquidity premium and total spread for investment grade and specu-
lative grade bonds. This graph shows for investment grade and speculative grade yield
spreads the variation over time in the amount of the spread that is due to illiquidity and
the total yield spread. On a monthly basis, the fraction of the yield spread that is due
to illiquidity is calculated as explained in Section 5.4. This fraction multiplied by the
median yield spread is the amount of the spread due to illiquidity and plotted along with
the median yield spread.
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Figure 2.4: Liquidity premium and total spread for investment grade and
speculative grade bonds. This graph shows for investment grade and speculative
grade yield spreads the variation over time in the amount of the spread that is ue
to illiquidity and the total yield spread. On a monthly basis, the fraction of the yield
spread that is due to illiquidity is calculated as explained in Section 2.5.4. This fraction
multiplied by the median yield spread is the amount of the spread due to illiquidity and
plotted along with the median yield spread.
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this component is likely to have increased after the onset of the subprime
crisis. Furthermore, only a small number of ﬁrms have actively traded credit
default swaps, and those that have typically only have liquid swaps at a ma-
turity of ﬁve years. Using credit default swaps would severely reduce our
sample size.
We use an alternative approach to check our credit risk controls. The
idea is that any yield spread diﬀerence between two ﬁxed rate bullet bonds
with the same maturity and issued by the same ﬁrm must be due to liquidity
diﬀerences and not diﬀerences in credit risk. This intuition is formalized in
the following regression.
We conduct rating-wise ”paired” regressions of yield spreads on dummy
variables and one liquidity measure at the time. The regression is
spreadRit = dummyRGt + βRλit
where dummyRGt is the same for all bonds with the same rating R and ap-
proximately the same maturity. The grid of maturities is 0-0.5y, 0.5-1y, 1-3y,
3-5y, 5-7y, 7-10y, and more than 10y. For example, if ﬁrm y in quarter t has
three bonds issued with maturities 5y, 5.5y, and 6y, the bonds have the same
dummy in that quarter, and we assume that any yield spread diﬀerence be-
tween the bonds is due to liquidity. There are separate dummies for each
quarter. Once we have dummied out credit risk in the regressions, estimated
coeﬃcients for the liquidity measure are not inconsistent because of possi-
bly omitted credit risk variables. Hence, the paired regression is free of any
endogeneity bias due to credit risk. Only groups with two or more spreads
contribute to the liquidity coeﬃcient reducing the sample compared to for-
mer regressions. Therefore, we only look at two rating groups, investment
grade and speculative grade.
Table 2.7 shows the regression coeﬃcients in the paired regression. We
see that λ is signiﬁcant in all regressions while zero trading days, the Roll
measure, and turnover are only signiﬁcant in some of the regressions. This
supports our ﬁnding that λ is a more consistent measure of corporate bond
liquidity compared to previously proposed measures.
2.6 Determinants of bond illiquidity
In this section, we show that our measure is also useful for analyzing other
aspects of corporate bond illiquidity. Speciﬁcally, we focus on liquidity be-
tas, the liquidity of bonds with a lead underwriter in ﬁnancial distress, and
the liquidity of bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms relative to bonds issued by
industrial ﬁrms.
2.6.1 Liquidity betas
We estimate bond-speciﬁc liquidity betas by calculating a monthly time
series of corporate bond market illiquidity, and for each bond estimate the
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pre-subprime post-subprime
investment spec investment spec
λ 0.01∗∗∗
(3.79)
0.09∗∗
(2.43)
0.12∗∗∗
(3.58)
0.41∗
(1.95)
Amihud 2.26∗∗∗
(5.11)
16.80∗∗∗
(3.51)
16.10∗∗∗
(3.04)
54.65
(1.54)
Roll 0.03∗∗∗
(3.56)
0.16∗∗
(2.54)
0.05∗∗
(2.14)
0.39
(1.44)
bond zero 0.00∗∗∗
(5.85)
0.01∗∗
(2.28)
0.00
(0.78)
0.03
(1.12)
turnover 0.11∗
(1.87)
1.48∗
(1.72)
−3.21
(−1.46)
72.74
(1.63)
URC 8.48∗∗∗
(3.72)
125.03∗∗
(2.55)
104.34∗∗
(2.43)
−95.04
(−0.58)
URC risk 1.30
(0.69)
57.15∗∗
(2.15)
39.09∗∗∗
(2.97)
−103.42
(−0.74)
Amihud risk 0.64∗∗∗
(4.21)
9.44∗∗∗
(2.79)
6.56∗∗∗
(3.19)
39.63∗∗∗
(4.60)
Table 2.7: Paired regression.We pair bonds from the same ﬁrm with similar maturity
and regress their yield spreads on liquidity variables one at a time and add a dummy for
a given ﬁrm and maturity combination. Since bonds with similar maturity and issued by
the same ﬁrm have similar credit risk characteristics, the dummy controls for credit risk.
Signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked ’*’, at 5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked ’***’.
correlation between market-wide illiquidity and bond-speciﬁc illiquidity. The
market-wide time series is calculated by averaging on a monthly basis across
all observations of bond-speciﬁc λi using amount outstanding as weight.
Bond-speciﬁc beta is estimated through the slope coeﬃcient in the regression
of bond-speciﬁc λi on market-wide λ, where the regression is based on all
months where a bond-speciﬁc λi can be calculated. We calculate the betas
using the whole sample period 2004Q4-2009Q2, because estimating betas
separately for the pre- and post subprime periods leads to noisier estimates.
For each rating class R pooled regressions are run where yield spreads
are regressed on each bonds liquidity β and our liquidity measure λt with
credit risk controls
SpreadRit = αR + γR1 λit + γR2 βi + credit risk controlsit + it
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in quarter.
The result of the regression is reported in Table 2.8. Our regressions are
run both ’marginally’, i.e. with our liquidity beta as the only regressor in
addition to the credit risk controls, and with our liquidity measure included
as additional regressor.
Both marginally and with λ included, there is no signiﬁcance pre-subprime
except for the AAA-category. After the onset of the crisis, the picture
changes and only spreads in the AAA-category do not depend on our liq-
uidity beta. This is consistent with the regime-dependent importance of liq-
uidity betas noted in Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010). But whereas
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pre-subprime post-subprime
β λ β λ
AAA −0.0034
(−1.34)
−0.0085
(−0.84)
−0.0056∗∗∗
(−3.26)
0.0033∗∗∗
(2.65)
0.0159
(1.26)
0.0234∗∗
(2.38)
AA 0.0012
(0.23)
0.1823∗
(1.94)
0.0067
(1.06)
0.0017
(0.60)
0.1720∗∗
(2.14)
0.1712∗∗∗
(3.82)
A −0.0004
(−0.14)
0.2631∗∗
(2.22)
0.0021
(0.65)
0.0106∗∗
(2.57)
0.2314∗∗
(2.15)
0.1211∗∗
(2.03)
BBB 0.0044
(1.34)
0.2171∗∗∗
(4.05)
0.0012
(0.34)
0.0254∗∗∗
(4.33)
0.3187∗∗∗
(3.44)
0.3242∗∗∗
(2.91)
spec 0.0102
(0.90)
1.3538∗∗∗
(2.60)
0.0162
(1.31)
0.1502∗∗∗
(4.64)
1.3140∗∗
(2.73)
0.4155∗∗∗
(7.08)
Table 2.8: β regressions. For each rating class R pooled regressions are run where
yield spreads are regressed on each bonds liquidity β and our liquidity measure λt with
credit risk controls
SpreadRit = α
R + γR1 λit + γ
R
2 βi + credit risk controlsit + it
where i is for bond in rating R and t is time measured in quarter. Each bond’s βi is
calculated as the covariance between this bond’s monthly λit and a size-weighted monthly
market λMt. Two regressions for each rating pre- and post-subprime are run; one with
only β included and one with both β and λ included. Standard errors are corrected for
time series eﬀects, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and heteroscedasticity, and signiﬁcance at 10% level
is marked ’*’, at 5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked ’***’..
they use stock and Treasury bond market liquidity to measure aggregate
liquidity, our measure speciﬁcally captures corporate bond market liquidity.
We saw in the previous section that the contribution to spreads of liquid-
ity was small for AAA bonds after the onset of the crisis, and the insigniﬁcant
liquidity beta coeﬃcient for AAA in the crisis period conﬁrms that there is
a ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect in AAA-rated bonds.
2.6.2 Lead underwriter
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model that links an asset’s
market liquidity and traders’ funding liquidity, and ﬁnd that when funding
liquidity is tight, traders become reluctant to take on positions, especially
”capital intensive” positions in high-margin securities. This lowers market
liquidity. Empirical support for this prediction is found in Comerton-Forde,
Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) who ﬁnd for equities
traded on NYSE that balance sheet and income statement variables for mar-
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ket makers explain time variation in liquidity.
Since the TRACE data do not reveal the identity of the traders, we
cannot perform direct tests of the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)-model
for the U.S. corporate bond market. However, if we assume that the original
underwriter is more likely to make a market (as is the case in equity markets,
see Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000)), we can provide indirect evidence by
observing bond liquidity of bonds underwritten by Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers, two ﬁnancial institutions in distress during the subprime crisis. We
therefore calculate for all bonds with Lehman Brothers as lead underwriter
their average λ - weighted by amount outstanding - on a monthly basis.
Likewise, we does this for bonds with Bear Stearns as lead underwriter and
for all bonds in the sample. We obtain underwriter information from FISD.
The results are plotted in Figure 2.5.
The liquidity of bonds with Bear Stearns as lead underwriter was roughly
the same as an average bond entering the summer of 2007. During the week
of July 16, 2007 Bear Stearns disclosed that two of their hedge funds had lost
nearly all of the value, and the graph shows that the ’illiquidity gap’ between
Bear Stearns underwritten bonds and average bonds increased this month.
On August 6, Bear Stearns said that it was weathering the worst storm in
ﬁnancial markets in more than 20 years, in November 2007 Bear Stearns
wrote down $1.62 billion and booked a fourth quarter loss, and in December
2007 there was a further write-down of $1.90 billion. During these months,
the ’illiquidity gap’ steadily increased. Bear Stearns were in severe liquidity
problems in beginning of March, and they were taken over by JPMorgan on
March 16. In this month the ’illiquidity gap’ peaked but returned to zero in
June 2008 after Bear Stearns shareholders approved JPMorgan’s buyout of
the investment bank on May 29.
The liquidity of bonds underwritten by Lehman was close to the liquidity
of an average bond in the market up until August 2008, but this changed
in September 2008 when the ’liquidity gap’ between Lehman underwritten
bonds and average market bonds increased strongly in September in response
to Lehman ﬁling for bankruptcy on September 15. The gap stayed at high
levels during the rest of the sample period suggesting that after the Lehman
default, bonds they had underwritten became permanently more illiquid.
2.6.3 Industry
Bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms might by more or less liquid compared to
bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms. They might be less liquid because ﬁnancial
ﬁrms are more opaque, especially in times of ﬁnancial distress, and their
bonds might be more aﬀected by asymmetric information. They might be
more liquid because ﬁnancial ﬁrms are more connected to capital markets
and are liquidity providers to the market.
The empirical evidence is mixed. Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
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Figure 5: Illiquidity of bonds underwritten by Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns. This graph shows the time series variation in illiquidity of bonds with Lehman
Brothers as lead underwriter, bonds with Bear Stearns as lead underwriter, and all bonds
in the sample. For every bond underwritten by Lehman Brothers their (il)liquidity measure
λ is calculated each month and a monthly weighted average is calculated using amount
outstanding for each bond as weight. The graph shows the time series of monthly averages.
Likewise, a time series of monthly averages is calculated for bonds with Bear Stearns as
a lead underwriter and all bonds in the sample. Higher values on the y-axis imply more
illiquid bonds.
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Figure 2.5: Illiquidity of bonds underwritten by Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns. This graph shows the time series variation in illiquidity of bonds with Lehman
Brothers as lead underwriter, bonds with Bear Stearns as lea underwriter, and all
bonds in the sample. For every bond underwritten by Lehman Brothers their (il)liquidity
measure λ is calculated each month and a monthly weighted average is calculated using
amount outstanding for each bond as weight. The graph shows the time series of monthly
averages. Likewise, a time series of monthly averages is calculated for bonds with Bear
Stearns as a lead underwriter and all bonds in the sample. Higher values on the y-axis
imply more illiquid bonds.
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Figure 6: Illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This graph shows
the time series variation in illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. For every
bond issued by a ﬁnancial ﬁrm their (il)liquidity measure λ is calculated each month and a
monthly weighted average is calculated using amount outstanding for each bond as weight.
The graph shows the time series of monthly averages. Likewise, a time series of monthly
averages is calculated for bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms. Higher values on the y-axis
imply more illiquid bonds.
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Figure 2.6: Illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This graph
shows the time series variation in illiquidity of bonds of industrial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
For every bond issued by a ﬁnancial ﬁrm their (il)liquidity measure λ is calculated each
month and a monthly weighted average is calculated using amount outstanding for each
bond as weight. The graph shows the time series of monthly averages. Likewise, a time
series of monthly averages is calculated for bonds issued by industrial ﬁrms. Higher
values on the y-axis imply more illiquid bonds.
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ﬁnd in a study of 68 bonds that bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms are more
illiquid and command a higher liquidity premium. In contrast, Friewald,
Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2009) ﬁnd that there is no diﬀerence,
except during the subprime crisis where bonds of ﬁnancial ﬁrms are in fact
more liquid.
We address the issue by calculating a value-weighted average monthly
illiquidity λ of ﬁnancial respectively industrial ﬁrms and plotting the time
series behavior in Figure 2.6. We obtain bond industry from FISD. In gen-
eral, there is little systematic diﬀerence. For both ﬁnancial and industrial
bonds, illiquidity goes up at the onset of the crisis. There are, however, ad-
ditional spikes in illiquidity for ﬁnancial ﬁrms around the takeover of Bear
Stearns in March 2008, around the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008,
and around the stock market decline in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. That is,
in times of severe ﬁnancial distress, illiquidity of ﬁnancial bonds increases
relative to that of industrial bonds, while in other times illiquidity is similar.
By calculating monthly averages, we are able to draw more high-frequency
inferences compared to other papers, since averaging λ over longer periods of
time, the approach taken in Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Friewald,
Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2009), would wash out the eﬀects we see.
2.7 Conclusion
The subprime crisis dramatically increased corporate bond spreads and while
default risk certainly has increased because of funding constraints and the
slowing of the real economy, it is also widely believed that deteriorating
liquidity has contributed to the widening of spreads. The diﬃculty is how
to measure this contribution.
In this paper, we show that an equally weighted sum of four (normalized)
measures of liquidity and liquidity risk consistently contributes to corporate
bond spreads across time and across ratings. The four measures are the
Amihud measure of price impact, a measure of roundtrip trading costs and
the variability of these two measures. The equally weighted sum is a close
approximation to the ﬁrst factor in a principal component analysis of eight
liquidity measures, and this is true both before and after the onset of the
crisis. Our measure dominates other liquidity measures, such as the Roll
measure and zero trading days.
The measure is used to analyze the contribution of illiquidity to corporate
bond spreads before and after the onset of the subprime crisis. We ﬁnd that
before the crisis, the contribution to spreads from illiquidty was small for
investment grade bonds both measured in basis points and as a fraction of
total spreads. The contribution increased strongly at the onset of the crisis
for all bonds except AAA-rated bonds, which is consistent with a ﬂight-to-
quality into AAA-rated bonds. Liquidity premia in investment grade bonds
rose steadily during the crisis and peaked when the stock market declined
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strongly in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, while premia in speculative grade bonds
peaked during the Lehman default and returned almost to pre-crisis levels in
mid-2009. The number of zero trading days did not increase with the crisis
and we ﬁnd evidence that this was because trades in less liquid bonds were
split into trades of smaller size.
Our measure is useful for analyzing other important aspects of corporate
bond liquidity. From the covariation between an individual bond’s liquidity
measure and a value-weighted average of all bonds’ liquidity measures, we
deﬁne a liquidity beta which is shown to have little eﬀect on spreads before
the onset of the crisis, but does have a positive eﬀect for all bonds except
AAA-bonds after the crisis. This is consistent with the regime-dependent
role of liquidity betas found in Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010) but it
narrows the ﬂight-to-quality story from general investment grade bonds to
AAA-rated bonds only.
We also use our measure to study the impact on bond liquidity of funding
shocks to lead underwriters and to compare illiquidity of corporate bonds
issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms with that of industrial ﬁrms. Financial distress of
lead underwriters clearly aﬀects the liquidity of the bonds for which they
have served as lead underwriters. Bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms are not
permanently more or less liquid than industrials but they do, however, have
illiquidity spikes around the take-over of bear Sterns, the collapse of Lehman
and the March 2009 rapid stock market decline.
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2.8 Appendix: Robustness checks
In this Appendix we discuss possible misspeciﬁcation in our regression anal-
ysis. We test for endogeneity, show that our results are robust to the choice
of benchmark riskfree rate, and show that results are robust to how we deﬁne
the liquidity component.
2.8.1 Endogeneity
There may be a two way causal relationship between contemporaneous mea-
sures of liquidity and credit risk and failing to account for such a relationship
in regressions results in inconsistent OLS estimates. This simultaneity bias
is not a concern in our regressions since liquidity measures lag our measure
of credit spreads. Spreads are measured on the last day in each quarter while
liquidity measures are based on transactions during the quarter, so liquidity
measures are lagged in time relative to spreads.
To test for potential endogeneity bias, we use a residual augmented two
stage least squares t-test as in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), equivalent
to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. We do this for every marginal regression
in Table 2.2, that is, test every liquidity variable separately. If the test
is not signiﬁcant the liquidity variable can be regarded as exogenous. As
instrument we use bond age and therefore exclude it in the yield spread
regressions13. Table 2.9 shows the R2’s for the ﬁrst stage regressions and
the t-statistic tests for endogeneity. Most R2’s are relatively high indicating
that the control variables including the instrument are able to explain a
large portion of the variation in the liquidity measures. Out of the 80 test
statistics 80% are insigniﬁcant at a 10% level indicating that endogeneity is
not a major concern.
2.8.2 Benchmark riskfree rate
The size of the nondefault component in corporate bond spreads investigated
by among others Huang and Huang (2003) and Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis
(2005) depend strongly on the chosen riskfree rate. In Longstaﬀ, Mithal,
and Neis (2005) the diﬀerence is around 60 basis points. As Table 2.10
shows the estimated liquidity component when the Treasury rate is used as
riskfree rate instead of the swap rate does not change much. The change
in estimated liquidity is often less than one basis point and is for all rating
categories less than 10 basis points. Therefore, our ﬁndings on the size of the
liquidity premium in basis points are insensitive to the choice of benchmark
13Another potential instrument is amount issued. Since this variable is signiﬁcant in
most of the regressions in Table 2.4, omitting it from the regressions in the test creates a
new endogeneity problem. The tests in this case would likely show an endogeneity problem
even if it is not there, and if we use amount issued as instrument, this is indeed the case.
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Panel A: Endogeneity tests, pre-subprime (2004:Q4-2007:Q1)
AAA AA A BBB spec
Amihud −0.43
(33%)
−1.00
(20%)
0.98
(18%)
1.31
(9%)
0.71
(34%)
Roll 0.66
(47%)
−0.98
(30%)
0.98
(32%)
1.16
(24%)
−0.45
(25%)
ﬁrm zero −0.25
(88%)
1.08
(34%)
−0.83
(23%)
−1.18
(25%)
0.27
(46%)
bond zero −0.41
(83%)
1.04
(67%)
−0.69
(68%)
0.85
(45%)
−0.87
(61%)
turnover −0.18
(19%)
−1.13
(28%)
0.86
(15%)
−1.05
(29%)
1.04
(39%)
URC 0.51
(34%)
−1.08
(18%)
0.95
(19%)
1.45
(23%)
0.13
(37%)
Amihud risk 0.45
(19%)
−1.09
(10%)
0.89
(11%)
1.43
(13%)
0.31
(31%)
URC risk 0.46
(13%)
−1.08
(12%)
0.90
(11%)
1.29
(14%)
−0.03
(33%)
Panel B: Endogeneity tests, post-subprime (2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
AAA AA A BBB spec
Amihud −5.03∗∗∗
(41%)
−1.06
(31%)
−0.20
(30%)
−0.60
(27%)
−2.82∗∗∗
(42%)
Roll −5.24∗∗∗
(33%)
−1.15
(15%)
0.51
(21%)
0.77
(16%)
−2.89∗∗∗
(23%)
ﬁrm zero 5.50∗∗∗
(87%)
−1.12
(35%)
−0.40
(24%)
−0.82
(44%)
−3.06∗∗∗
(58%)
bond zero 6.40∗∗∗
(79%)
1.10
(73%)
−0.21
(70%)
−0.70
(68%)
−3.26∗∗∗
(76%)
turnover −6.17∗∗∗
(27%)
−1.15
(16%)
0.32
(17%)
0.73
(20%)
2.91∗∗∗
(36%)
URC −4.94∗∗∗
(50%)
−0.84
(42%)
−0.26
(49%)
0.77
(39%)
−2.72∗∗∗
(63%)
Amihud risk −5.07∗∗∗
(21%)
−1.05
(22%)
−0.36
(34%)
−0.59
(45%)
−2.69∗∗∗
(50%)
URC risk −4.82∗∗∗
(39%)
−0.74
(34%)
0.57
(48%)
−0.75
(34%)
−2.75∗∗∗
(55%)
Table 2.9: Endogeneity tests. For each rating class R and each liquidity variable L
we test for potential endogeneity bias by using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. In total 56
tests are run (8 liquidity variables × 5 rating classes) pre- and post-subprime. This table
shows for each test the t-statistics and R2 for the ﬁrst stage regression in parenthesis.
The proxies are described in detail in Section 2.4 and are calculated quarterly from
2004 : Q4 to 2009 : Q2. Panel A shows the coeﬃcients using data before the subprime
crisis, while Panel B shows the coeﬃcients using data after the onset of the subprime
crisis. Signiﬁcance at 10% level is marked ’*’, at 5% marked ’**’, and at 1% marked
’***’.
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Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime
(2004Q4-2007:Q1)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 1.6 1.1
(0.8;1.4)
1.7
(1.2;2.1)
2.0
(1.4;2.5)
162 178 193
AA 1.7 1.1
(0.8;1.5)
1.8
(1.3;2.3)
2.3
(1.6;3.0)
704 667 498
A 2.8 1.7
(0.9;2.6)
2.9
(1.5;4.3)
3.8
(1.9;5.5)
1540 1346 1260
BBB 4.0 2.9
(1.4;4.4)
4.1
(1.9;6.2)
4.9
(2.3;7.3)
517 270 553
spec 57.8 45.2
(33.9;57.4)
44.1
(33.1;56.0)
84.2
(63.2;106.9)
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime
(2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 1.0 0.5
(0.3;5.4)
0.8
(0.5;8.1)
1.7
(0.9;16.6)
110 149 155
AA 40.6 22.9
(11.5;35.2)
36.1
(18.2;55.5)
63.0
(31.8;96.8)
493 572 483
A 47.6 25.0
(12.9;37.6)
47.9
(24.7;72.1)
70.0
(36.1;105.4)
762 878 890
BBB 94.0 65.2
(36.0;97.4)
117.2
(64.8;175.1)
99.5
(55.0;148.6)
123 159 256
spec 189.9 119.3
(79.4;154.9)
216.3
(144.0;280.9)
234.2
(156.0;304.2)
133 129 201
Table 2.10: Liquidity Component in basis points when the Treasury rate is
used as riskfree rate. For each rating R we run the pooled regression
spreadRit = α
R + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time, and λit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is
measured with respect to the Treasury yield. Within each rating and maturity bucket
(0-2y, 2-5y, and 5-30y) we sort increasingly all values of λit and ﬁnd the median value λ50
and the 5% value λ5. The liquidity component in the bucket is deﬁned as β(λ50−λ5). This
table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parenthesis.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
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(while our ﬁndings on the fraction out of the total spread of course depend
on the benchmark riskfree rate).
2.8.3 Alternative deﬁnition of liquidity component
The liquidity component is calculated as the the median minus 5% quantile
of the liquidity score and has the natural interpretation as the liquidity
premium of an average bond in the corporate bond market relative to a very
liquid bond. To check that our main results are robust to the deﬁnition of
the liquidity component, Table 2.11 shows the liquidity component when it
is deﬁned as the 75% quantile minus 5% quantile. The component in this
table can be interpreted as that of an illiquid bond relative to a very liquid
bond. Table 2.11 shows that the liquidity component is larger for an illiquid
bond compared to an average bond (which by deﬁnition must the case).
Also, Table 2.11 shows that the main results of the paper are unchanged:
liquidity premia are increasing in maturity, the liquidity premium is higher
post-subprime compared to pre-subprime, and the liquidity premium for
investment grade bonds is small pre-subprime.
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Panel A: Liquidity component in basis points, pre-subprime
(2004Q4-2007:Q1)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 1.4 1.0
(0.5;1.3)
1.2
(0.7;1.7)
2.0
(1.1;2.8)
162 178 193
AA 1.7 1.1
(0.4;1.7)
1.6
(0.6;2.6)
2.4
(0.9;3.8)
704 667 498
A 4.4 2.8
(1.2;4.3)
4.3
(1.8;6.8)
6.1
(2.6;9.6)
1540 1346 1260
BBB 8.4 5.8
(2.4;9.1)
8.9
(3.6;13.9)
10.4
(4.2;16.3)
517 270 553
spec 117.1 81.5
(61.2;104.4)
90.4
(67.9;115.8)
179.4
(134.6;229.6)
270 324 480
Panel B: Liquidity component in basis points, post-subprime
(2007:Q2-2009:Q2)
average 0-2y 2-5y 5-30y N 0-2y N 2-5y N 5-30y
AAA 9.2 4.4
(0.9;7.9)
8.0
(1.7;14.2)
15.2
(3.2;27.3)
110 149 155
AA 68.5 37.8
(21.2;53.4)
64.0
(35.8;90.5)
103.9
(58.1;146.9)
493 572 483
A 92.6 53.8
(29.4;78.8)
95.9
(52.5;140.6)
128.1
(70.1;187.7)
762 878 890
BBB 176.5 138.6
(76.0;203.3)
201.6
(110.5;295.6)
189.4
(103.8;277.8)
123 159 256
spec 420.5 294.0
(196.2;383.0)
390.5
(260.6;508.7)
577.1
(385.2;751.8)
133 129 201
Table 2.11: Liquidity Component in basis points for an illiquid bond. For each
rating R we run the pooled regression
spreadRit = α
R + βRλit + credit risk controlsit + it
where i refers to bond, t to time, and λit is our liquidity measure. The bond spread is
measured with respect to the swap rate. Within each rating and maturity bucket (0-2y,
2-5y, and 5-30y) we sort increasingly all values of λit and ﬁnd the 75% value λ75 and
the 5% value λ5. The liquidity component in the bucket is deﬁned as β(λ75 − λ5). This
table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parenthesis.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
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the 5% value λ5. The liquidity component in the bucket is deﬁned as β(λ75 − λ5). This
table shows for all buckets the liquidity component with standard errors in parenthesis.
Conﬁdence bands are found by a wild cluster bootstrap.
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Index Driven Price Pressure for Cor-
porate Bonds 1
Abstract
Revisions of the Lehman/Barclay corporate bond index are completely information
free events and have no long term impact on supply and demand. However, both
included and excluded bonds experience a temporary price pressure at the revision
dates. The temporary change in price is usually fully reversed in the days after
the revision. Trading activity spikes at the revision dates consistent with index
trackers seeking to minimize tracking error. The price pressure is signiﬁcant for
newly issued bonds included into the index, for maturing bonds excluded from the
index and for downgraded bonds excluded from the index. Furthermore, dealers
only participate as liquidity providers when the reversal return exceeds the bid-ask
spread and dealers otherwise perform a matching function.
1I thank Peter Feldhu¨tter, Søren Hvidkjær, David Lando, Mads Stenbo Nielsen, Lars
Jul Overby and Ilya Strebulaev for helpful comments. All errors are my responsibility.
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3.1 Price Pressure
When a stock enters a major index it experiences a temporary price increase
followed by a partial reversal. There exists several competing theories that
aim at explaining the stock price reaction following an index revision. This
paper is the ﬁrst to test similar theories for a corporate bond index. Revi-
sions to the Lehman/Barclay Corporate Bond Index mainly happen for four
diﬀerent reasons. Newly issued corporate bonds are included into the index
at the last trading day of the month if they meet certain size and rating re-
quirements. Bonds, that fall below one year to maturity, are excluded from
the index at the last trading day of the month. Upgraded or downgraded
bonds get their index status changed also at the last trading day of the month
of which their ratings were changed. Hence, revisions are always known long
before the rebalancing date and new information therefore has time to be
impounded into bond prices before the index is rebalanced. Contrary to the
S&P 500 index, this practice clearly makes bond index revisions information
free events. At the same time bond indices are not limited to a certain num-
ber bonds. So nothing suggests that index inclusions should raise investor
awareness. Any price reaction at corporate bond index revisions therefore
has to be driven by changes in demand and market frictions.
Trading activity spikes at the rebalancing dates both for included and ex-
cluded bonds. The spike in trading activity is consistent with index trackers
seeking to minimize their tracking error by trading as close to the rebalanc-
ing date as possible. When the index trackers are buying bonds that enter
the index the price goes up in the days leading up to the rebalancing event,
only to be followed by a reversal of equal size over the next 5 to 10 days.
When index trackers are selling excluded bonds the price ﬁrst drops and
is then also reversed in the days after the event. Both price reactions are
consistent with temporary price pressure or short term downward sloping
demand curves for bonds. There is no evidence for a longer term shift in
demand following the rebalancing event, so it is not possible to study de-
mand curves for bonds in the long run through this event. Newly issued
bonds that get included in the index experience an abnormal return of 9.8
bps followed by a reversal of -11.0 bps, both signiﬁcant at a 1% level. Bonds
that get excluded because the maturity falls below 1 year experience an ab-
normal return of -58.0 bps followed by a reversal of 58.7 bps and again both
abnormal returns are signiﬁcant at a 1% level. The price pressure return for
downgraded bonds is -935.1 bps whereas the reversal return is only 348.7
bps. Still, the signiﬁcant reversal return, which is not otherwise found at
bond downgrades, suggests that part of the negative return is price pres-
sure. Only bonds that get included because of an upgrade to investment
grade show insigniﬁcant abnormal returns at the index inclusion. The in-
signiﬁcant returns for upgraded bonds, should be seen in connection with
the trading strategies of index trackers, which make the upgraded bonds less
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attractive. In contrast with stock market index tracking strategies, bond
index trackers are not replicating the index. To keep transaction costs low,
bond index trackers sample the index and only hold about one-third of the
bonds in the index, which is still around 800 bonds for the Lehman/Barclay
corporate bond index. In line with this, we ﬁnd that index trackers have
an aﬃnity for large bond issues with long maturities that reduce the need
for frequent trading. Upgraded bonds are thus competing with newly issued
bonds for a place in an index tracker’s portfolio. Since newly issued bonds
on average have more time to maturity than upgraded bonds, the upgraded
bonds are less attractive for index trackers.
The temporary price pressure around index rebalancing is consistent with
theoretical models of trading in over-the-counter markets such as Duﬃe,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007). In Duﬃe, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007)
buyers and sellers are searching for counterparties with certain intensities.
Once they meet a counterparty they negotiate over the price with bargaining
powers determined by their respective alternatives. When there is a positive
demand or supply shock the bargaining power shifts, causing a price change
and trading volume goes up at the same time. Index trackers entering the
market around the rebalancing date seeking to buy a bond constitute a
positive demand side shock. Following the shock, the supply side has better
opportunities of ﬁnding counterparties, hence their bargaining power goes
up. If this is the case the price should increase temporarily and then return
to the pre-shock price once the index trackers are out of the market again.
This price pattern assumes that the excess demand from index trackers does
not aﬀect the post-shock supply side signiﬁcantly. Empirically, we ﬁnd that
the longer term post event trading activities are not aﬀected by the index
event itself.
Further, we ﬁnd that when the abnormal temporary return caused by in-
dex trackers exceeds the size of an average bid-ask spread, dealers participate
in the event as liquidity providers. The dealers trade against their inventory
when index trackers buy or sell and in the following days the dealers bring
their inventory back to the pre-event level earning a proﬁt from the price
reversal. In the other cases, where the bid-ask spread exceeds the abnormal
price pressure and reversal return, and also in the case of the downgrade
event itself, the dealers only perform a matching service earning the bid-ask
spread.
3.2 Index Tracking
Abnormal returns around stock index revisions have been intensely studied,
but no attention has so far been given to the monthly revisions of corporate
bond indices. We therefore turn to the stock market literature on index
revisions for evidence on how mutual funds track indices and why there is a
price reaction to index revisions. This section starts out by reviewing how
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stock index trackers time their trading. In the later empirical parts of the
paper we will see that bond index trackers follow a similar strategy and
seek to minimize tracking error. Then we discuss how stock prices react to
index revisions and review ﬁve competing explanations as to why the price
reacts. For each explanation we discuss how well it relates to our bond index
setup. Our empirical ﬁndings in the following sections are, in particular,
consistent with the predictions from the price pressure hypothesis. Finally,
we discuss two related papers that document price pressure in the corporate
bond market in a setting closely connected to index revisions, but without
being driven by bond index trackers.
3.2.1 Stock index trading volume and timing
Trading volume associated with revisions of the S&P 500 has increased over
time in line with the increased interest in index tracking by mutual funds.
Beneish and Whaley (1996) report that Vanguard Index Trust-500, which
tracks the S&P 500, has had an increase in their portfolio value from $14
millions in 1976 to $9,356 millions in 1994. Prior to 1976 index tracking
received very little attention and both Shleifer (1986) and Chen, Noronha,
and Singal (2004) report that there was no change in trading volume around
revision dates before that time.
After the new S&P announcement service from September 1976 trading
volume did increase, which is consistent with more mutual funds tracking
the index. Since revision announcements at that point were given after the
market close, the ﬁrst day with abnormal trading volume would be the next
trading day. Harris and Gurel (1986) report an abnormal trading volume of
1.89 times the normal level for this day on average over the period 1973-1983
for stocks added to the index. They also show that the volume for these
stocks over the following week remained 29% above normal. The trading
behavior is consistent with index trackers trading aggressively on the day
closest to the revision date in order to minimize tracking error. For various
sub-periods in the interval from September 1976 to September 1989 Shleifer
(1986), Beneish and Whaley (1996) and Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004)
ﬁnd similar patterns for stocks being added to the index.
Following the separation of the announcement date and the eﬀective date
of revisions in October 1989 the trading volume spikes twice around a change
- once on the day after the announcement and again on the day prior to the
eﬀective day. Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) report a trading volume on
the day following the announcement that is 3.7 times higher than normal
and 12.3 times higher than normal on the day prior to the eﬀective day for
stocks added to the index from October 1989 to 2000. The same pattern is
reported for various periods from 1989 an onwards by Beneish and Whaley
(1996), Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), Blume and Edelen (2002), Hegde and
McDermott (2003), Elliot and Warr (2003) and Cai (2007).
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Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), Blume and Edelen (2002) and Chen,
Noronha, and Singal (2004) report similar patterns for stocks being excluded
from the index.
Most funds committed to tracking the S&P 500 use a portfolio replication
strategy and hold all 500 stocks from the index. Beneish and Whaley (1996)
suggest that arbitragers buy the stocks that get included in the index on
the day after the announcement and then sell them on to the index funds
on the day prior to the eﬀectuation which explains the abnormal volume on
these two days. Since index trackers can anticipate this behavior Beneish
and Whaley (1996) guess that index trackers would move their buying closer
to the announcement date and eventually drive arbitragers out of the ”S&P
500-game”. However, Blume and Edelen (2002) show that this has not been
the case. Barclays Global Investors, which is a major player among the index
funds, have only had an absolute average tracking error per year over the
last decade of 2.7 bps. Tracking errors this low can only be accommodated
by trading very close to the actual revision time. Even though index trackers
could earn a higher abnormal return on a strategy where they traded right
after the announcement date (as implicitly suggested by Beneish and Whaley
(1996)) they are more focused on minimizing their tracking error. Blume
and Edelen (2002) argue that low tracking error is a way for investors to
monitor the actions of index funds. This behavior is not unique for funds
tracking the S&P 500. Greenwood (2005) ﬁnds a similar increase in trading
volume following a revision of the Nikkei225 and Mase (2007) and Mazouz
and Saadouni (2007) for the FTSE100. In general all the studies ﬁnd that
trading volume increases around index inclusions and exclusions as a result of
the change in demand from index funds. Furthermore, for added stocks the
post-inclusion trading volume drops from the peak but stays higher than
the pre-inclusion trading level (Harris and Gurel (1986) and Beneish and
Whaley (1996)).
Part of the stocks included in the S&P 500 are traded on NASDAQ
whereas the rest trades on NYSE. One might expect bonds to react more like
the NASDAQ stocks since they are both traded in dealer markets. There
does seem to be some diﬀerences in trading volume around revisions for
NASDAQ stocks compared to NYSE traded stocks, but Elliot and Warr
(2003) ﬁnd that NYSE stocks experience a larger abnormal increase in trad-
ing volume (13.8 times the normal level) compared to NASDAQ stocks (9.67
times the normal level) for the period 1989-2000, whereas Blume and Edelen
(2002) ﬁnd the opposite relationship for the period 1995-2000. This could
indicate that the behavior has shifted over time and that NASDAQ stocks
are now traded more aggressively than normal compared to NYSE stocks
when included into the S&P 500.
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3.2.2 Stock index rebalancing returns and explanations.
Whereas all studies agree on the changes in trading volume around revisions,
not all agree on how the abnormal returns react and speciﬁcally what hap-
pens in the longer run. Shleifer (1986) and Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004)
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant price changes around index inclusion or exclusion before
the introduction of the announcement service in September 1976. Over the
period from September 1976 until September 1989 Chen, Noronha, and Sin-
gal (2004) report an average abnormal return of 3.7% on the ﬁrst trading
day after the announcement for stocks included into the S&P 500, which is
at the level of Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986), Jain (1987), Dhillon
and Johnson (1991) and Beneish and Whaley (1996) for various sub-periods.
Harris and Gurel (1986) ﬁnd a complete reversal of the abnormal return
over the next 10-14 trading days, whereas the remaining studies only ﬁnd a
partial reversal of the abnormal return. For the newer period from October
1989 until 2000, where the announcement date and the change date for the
S&P500 are separated by 5 days on average, Chen, Noronha, and Singal
(2004) report a 5.4% abnormal return on the announcement day for stocks
being included and a further 3.5% increase from the announcement day to
the eﬀectuation day. After the eﬀectuation day, the cumulative abnormal
return is again partially reversed over time. This return pattern is also found
by Beneish and Whaley (1996), Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), Blume and
Edelen (2002), Denis, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2003), Hegde and Mc-
Dermott (2003), Elliot andWarr (2003), Cai (2007), Petajisto (2009), Elliott,
Ness, Walker, and Warr (2006) for S&P 500 inclusions for various periods
after 1989. The same pattern is also documented by Madhavan (2003) and
Carin˜o and Pritamani (2007) for inclusions to the Russell-indices, for revi-
sions of the Nikkei225 (Greenwood 2005), for revisions of the Toronto300
index (Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck 2000) and for inclusions to the FTSE100
(Mase 2007). Even though index inclusions have received the most attention
in the literature, index exclusions show roughly the same pattern with an ab-
normal (negative) return on the announcement date and a further decrease
up to the change date followed by a reversal (Lynch and Mendenhall (1997),
Blume and Edelen (2002) and Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004)).
Elliott, Ness, Walker, and Warr (2006) list ﬁve competing explanations
for the abnormal return patterns around stock index revisions - price pres-
sure, downward-sloping demand curves, improved liquidity, improved oper-
ating performance, and increased investor awareness. The explanations are
not necessarily exclusive.
According to the price pressure hypothesis the abnormal return at in-
clusion stems from short-run liquidity constraints temporarily driving prices
above the fundamental value in order to compensate liquidity providers. Em-
pirically only Harris and Gurel (1986) ﬁnd full support of the price pressure
hypothesis since they ﬁnd a complete reversal of the abnormal returns. As
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listed above several other studies ﬁnd that part of the abnormal return is
reversed in the days subsequent to the revision, but that a part of the price
increase is permanent, at least for the newer periods. This suggests that
price pressure at most explains part of the return pattern. Scholes (1972),
Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Keim and Madhavan (1998) all study large block
sales of stocks and do also ﬁnd evidence of short-run price pressure in the
stock market. However, contrary to the stock market, large trades in the
corporate bond market are not expected to move prices apriori. Edwards,
Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and Feldhu¨tter (2009) present evidence that
transaction costs are a decreasing function of trading volume for corporate
bonds and that larger trades are executed at lower bid-ask spreads. This
happens because larger trades are carried out by sophisticated investors with
high bargaining power in an over-the-counter market as modeled in Duﬃe,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007). Even though corporate bond index trackers
are sophisticated investors they may still be subject to price pressure since
they are constrained by their investment strategy to minimize tracking er-
ror, which could reduce their bargaining power. This leaves the question of
index driven price pressure for corporate bonds as an empirical question.
In classical asset pricing theory the demand curves for stocks are hori-
zontal at the risk adjusted fundamental value, which implies that a demand
or a supply shift would not aﬀect the price of the stock. To the extent that
index inclusions are information free events, they provide an excellent test of
the slope of the demand curve for stocks. When stocks are included into an
index, demand for the stock will increase as a consequence of index tracking.
Shleifer (1986) is the ﬁrst to suggest this test of downward sloping demand
curves and as listed earlier a range of studies do ﬁnd evidence that part of
the price increase following index inclusions is permanent. Especially Green-
wood (2005)’s study of the Nikkei225 and Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000)
of the Toronto300 present strong evidence in support of downward sloping
demand curves for stocks. In both studies index weights were changed due
to an index redeﬁnition which resulted in price changes for stocks still in
the index, but now with a diﬀerent weight and hence a diﬀerent demand
from index trackers. Also Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) ﬁnd support of
downward sloping demand curves for stocks studying S&P 500 inclusions.
They ﬁnd that index arbitrageurs are unable to ﬁnd close substitutes for the
stocks included which leaves the arbitrageurs with unhedged risk that make
them unwilling to trade at the pre-inclusion price of the stock.
The improved liquidity hypothesis states that when stocks are included
into an index it improves liquidity and reduces asymmetric information per-
manently. This results in lower transaction costs and in the end a perma-
nently higher price as in the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). The
liquidity may be improved upon inclusion because the number of institu-
tional investors increases which increases the level of monitoring of the ﬁrm
thereby lowering the level of asymmetric information. Beneish and Whaley
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(1996) ﬁnd a temporary reduction in bid-ask spreads, Hegde and McDer-
mott (2003) ﬁnd the same but with a permanent reduction and Madhavan
(2003) ascribes the increased trading volume following inclusion into the
Russell index family as improved liquidity. It seems unlikely that a bond
index inclusion should improve liquidity. Inclusion into major bond indices
are based on mechanical rules like that of the Russell indices but the indices
are not limited to contain a certain number of bonds. Most of the bonds
included are issued by large ﬁrms which already have a number of bonds
outstanding, so there is no reason to think that the issuance of yet another
bond from the same ﬁrm would lower the asymmetric information level. If
more bonds from the same ﬁrm get included into the index it might even
lower the liquidity of the bonds, since the issuance of many bonds might
indicate that the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial trouble, which tend to lower the bond
liquidity (see e.g. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009)).
Investors may not be aware of all stocks in the market which would make
them overinvested in the stocks of which they are aware (Merton 1987). In
order to hold less known stocks investors require a return premium (a shadow
cost). Inclusion into a stock index is likely to increase investor awareness
of the stock and it thus reduces the shadow costs. For stocks included into
the index the empirical implications of this hypothesis and of the downward
sloping demand curve hypothesis are identical. However, index exclusions do
allow us to empirically separate the investor awareness hypothesis and the
downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. Chen, Noronha, and Singal
(2004) argue that investor awareness should not decrease after an index
exclusion which should result in a smaller price change for stocks removed
from the index. Empirically, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) do ﬁnd an
asymmetric price response in favor of the investor awareness hypothesis. For
the large majority of corporate bond indices, inclusion is closely related to
the issuance of the bond, since the bonds are included close after issuance.
This means that index inclusion is not a sudden change in the status of the
bond and at the same time index membership is not limited to a selected
number as it is for most stocks indices. All together, it is unlikely that
investor awareness should change upon a bond index inclusion.
All of the above mentioned hypotheses assume that index inclusion is an
information free event in itself. This is a reasonable assumption since index
revision rules for the Nikkei225, the Toronto300 and the Russell index family
are all based on mechanical rules and Standard and Poor’s states that in-
clusion into the S&P 500 is only based upon publicly available information.
However, Standard and Poor’s do make extensive analysis of diﬀerent can-
didate ﬁrms in order to insure a low turnover in index membership. Being a
rating company which specializes in ﬁnancial analysis of ﬁrms, Standard and
Poor’s may unwillingly or unknowingly use the public information in a way
superior to other investors and in the end convey information about the ﬁrm
when they select it for inclusion. Denis, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2003)
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cost). Inclusion into a stock index is likely to increase investor awareness
of the stock and it thus reduces the shadow costs. For stocks included into
the index the empirical implications of this hypothesis and of the downward
sloping demand curve hypothesis are identical. However, index exclusions do
allow us to empirically separate the investor awareness hypothesis and the
downward sloping demand curve hypothesis. Chen, Noronha, and Singal
(2004) argue that investor awareness should not decrease after an index
exclusion which should result in a smaller price change for stocks removed
from the index. Empirically, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) do ﬁnd an
asymmetric price response in favor of the investor awareness hypothesis. For
the large majority of corporate bond indices, inclusion is closely related to
the issuance of the bond, since the bonds are included close after issuance.
This means that index inclusion is not a sudden change in the status of the
bond and at the same time index membership is not limited to a selected
number as it is for most stocks indices. All together, it is unlikely that
investor awareness should change upon a bond index inclusion.
All of the above mentioned hypotheses assume that index inclusion is an
information free event in itself. This is a reasonable assumption since index
revision rules for the Nikkei225, the Toronto300 and the Russell index family
are all based on mechanical rules and Standard and Poor’s states that in-
clusion into the S&P 500 is only based upon publicly available information.
However, Standard and Poor’s do make extensive analysis of diﬀerent can-
didate ﬁrms in order to insure a low turnover in index membership. Being a
rating company which specializes in ﬁnancial analysis of ﬁrms, Standard and
Poor’s may unwillingly or unknowingly use the public information in a way
superior to other investors and in the end convey information about the ﬁrm
when they select it for inclusion. Denis, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2003)
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present evidence that analyst earnings forecasts rise for ﬁrms, whose stocks
are included into the S&P 500 and that these ﬁrms also realize the higher
earnings. The improved operating performance hypothesis states that this
may not just be a result of new information about the ﬁrm. The improved
operating performance is a result of closer scrutiny of the management, which
in the end improves the performance (as also suggested by Shleifer 1986).
Both Denis, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2003) and Dhillon and John-
son (1991) ﬁnd empirically that upon inclusion into the S&P 500 the ﬁrms’
stocks, as well as it’s bonds, increase in value. The increased bond values
indicate that the index inclusion is linked to the fundamental value of the
ﬁrm and not only isolated frictions relating to stocks as an asset class. As
with the Nikkei225, the Toronto300 and the Russell index family, inclusion
to or exclusion from corporate bond indices are non-informational events
and like the investor awareness hypothesis it seems unlikely that inclusion
into the bond index should lead to improved operating performance, since
inclusion does not make the ﬁrm move visible.
3.2.3 Demand Curves for Corporate Bonds
This paper deﬁnes index trackers as investors that seek to replicate the return
of an index while they seek to minimize their tracking error. The deﬁnition
captures the fact that index trackers do not seek or wish to outperform the
index as documented in Blume and Edelen (2002) for S&P 500 index trackers.
Blume and Edelen (2002) show that index trackers actually sacriﬁce trading
gain to reduce the tracking error. No papers have so far looked at the impact
of corporate bond index tracking on the individual bonds being included to or
excluded from the index. However, two papers, Newman and Rierson (2004)
and Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009), present evidence of price
pressure or short-term downward sloping demand curves for corporate bonds
around events closely related to corporate bond index tracking.
Between October 1999 and July 2001 the European telecom-sector is-
sued bonds which increased the overall amount outstanding by 300% for the
sector. The new issues raised funds to the sector that could support bids for
government auctions on cellular bandwidth licenses. Newman and Rierson
(2004) study the price reaction on the already issued bonds in the sector
around the new issuances. They ﬁnd price pressure on the already issued
bonds in the sector that temporarily decreases the price. One explanation
for the price pressure could be that the new issues would enter into a cor-
porate bond index. This new entry would then decrease the weight of the
other bonds in the index forcing index trackers with limited funds to sell
out of the bonds already in the index in order to buy the new issues and
hence still track the index. This explanation is in line with what happened
in Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) and Greenwood (2005). However,
whereas Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) and Greenwood (2005) docu-
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ment the eﬀect of the reweighting in the index to happen on the same day
that the reweightening was eﬀectuated, Newman and Rierson (2004) show
that the price pressure surrounding the new issuances in the telecom sector
was centered around the issuance date of the bonds. As we will describe later
on, newly issued bonds will not enter the major indices until the last day of
the month in which they are issued. Nothing in Newman and Rierson (2004)
suggests that the actual index inclusion day itself should be special. This
indicates that the price pressure they ﬁnd is not driven by index trackers,
since we have no reason to think that index trackers would be active around
the issuance date (see Blume and Edelen 2002).
Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009) look at the eﬀect of a rating
rule change in the Lehman/Barclay index family. In January 2005, Lehman
announced that it would change its practise on index rating deﬁnitions (only
relevant for split-rated bonds). Before the change, a corporate bond was
considered investment grade if it had an investment grade rating by both
S&P and Moody’s. After the change, a corporate bond was considered
investment grade if it had an investment grade rating by at least two out
the three major rating agencies S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. Lehman used the
index rating to determine bond membership of its indices, e.g. membership
of the major US Aggregate Bond Index and of the Corporate Bond index
required an investment grade index rating. The index rating rule change had
an eﬀect on bonds that were mechanically upgraded into investment grade
because of the rule change and on bonds that now had a more save investment
grade rating. Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009) show that the
mechanically upgraded bonds experienced a cumulative abnormal return of
200 bps in the two weeks following the announcement. The price pressure
was transitory and disappeared again after 20 to 30 trading days. While the
index rating rule change without doubt aﬀected the portfolio construction
of index trackers it is unlikely that the 200 bps abnormal return was driven
by index trackers. The actual rule change was not eﬀectuated until the
end of June 2005, long after the announcement return eﬀect in January
2005, had disappeared and Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009)
ﬁnd no abnormal return around the actual index change. As stated in Chen,
Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009) the abnormal return following the
announcement is more likely to have been driven by institutional investors.
Institutional investors are in many cases constrained in their portfolio choice
to investment grade assets and in the case of split ratings industry practise
have been to follow the Lehman index rating rule.
3.3 The Lehman/Barclay Corporate Bond Index
The largest bond index funds (i.e. Vanguard, Schwab and Fidelity Total
Bond Market Index Funds) are tracking the performance of the Barclays
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Capital U.S Aggregated Bond Index (formerly Lehman U.S Aggregated Bond
Index). The index is a broad mixture of Government, Agency, Corporate and
Mortgage Backed bonds all with an investment grade rating. We focus on
the corporate bond part of the index which by itself is known as the Barclays
Capital Corporate Bond Index. As of July 1, 2005, the index consists of all
corporate bond issues which have an investment grade rating by at least two
of the three major rating agencies. The issue size must be $250 millions or
above and time to maturity must be above 1 year. Once a bond is issued
and if it complies with all the rules it is included in the index at the next
rebalancing date. If the bond at some point no longer fulﬁlls all the criteria,
it is excluded from the index at the next rebalancing date.
Reason N Average amt.
($1,000)
Average
Duration
Average
Coupon
Panel A: Inclusions
New issue 4007 663,834 7.4 5.6
Upgrade 554 587,277 5.8 7.0
Other 200 676,832 6.7 5.6
Panel B: Exclusions
Maturity< 1 1817 538,114 0.92 6.0
Called 244 332,439 0.82 7.5
Downgrade 917 587,548 5.0 6.9
Other 1685 247,617 5.8 6.7
Table 3.1: Corporate Bond Index Inclusions and Exclusions Statistics. This
table shows statistics for inclusions and exclusions from the Lehman/Barclay Corporate
Bond Index. The same bonds enters and exits several Lehman/Barclay indices at the
same time. The statistics are accumulated over the period from July 2002 to August
2009. Average amt. is the average amount outstanding in $1,000 at the time of the index
revision.
The index is rebalanced on the last trading day of each month at 3:00 PM
EST. Inclusions to the index mainly happen because a bond is newly issued
or because it is upgraded. Exclusions from the index happen mainly when a
bond is downgraded to speculative grade or when the time to maturity drops
below 1 year. From July 2002 to August 2009, 4,007 bonds were included as
newly issued. In table 3.1 we can see that they had an average duration of
7.4 years, which is higher than the total index duration of around 5 years.
554 bonds were upgraded into the index. These bonds have a lower duration
and a higher coupon since most of them were originally issued as speculative
grade before they were later upgraded. Eﬀective July 2005 Lehman changed
the index rules so that a split rated bond was no longer seen as a speculative
grade, but had the middle rating from Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and
Fitch (the present rating rule). The speciﬁc event involving the rule change
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is researched in Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009). The other
bonds that were included into the index were included for various reasons
e.g. they changed status from non-public to publicly traded. 1,817 bonds
were excluded from the index because the maturity dropped below one year.
A smaller fraction of the bonds were called and 917 bonds left the index
because of a downgrade. The average coupon for the downgraded bonds was
higher than for the maturing bonds, reﬂecting that the downgraded bonds
were issued with a lower rating in the ﬁrst place. A large fraction of the
bonds were excluded for other reasons. The average amount outstanding for
these bonds is below $ 250 million, which is the lower limit for being in the
index today. Most of these bonds were excluded exactly because the amount
outstanding dropped below the limit, either because the amount outstanding
changed or because the index limit was raised. Since the inception of the
index the minimum amount outstanding limit has been raised several times.
Typically, each mutual fund family (Vanguard, Schwab, Fidelity etc.) has
more funds tracking diﬀerent parts of the total aggregated index. Barclays
keeps short-term, intermediate and long-term indices, which have similar
rules for membership as the aggregate index. The only diﬀerence is the
maturity of the bonds in the indices.
None of the bond index funds track the indices by replication, which
is the most common way for stock index funds to track an index (Blume
and Edelen 2002). Instead they are sampling the index (see e.g. Vanguard
(2009) or Schwab (2009)). Typically the fund chooses a selection of the
bonds currently in the index and designs a portfolio of these that match
the index with respect to duration, cash ﬂow, quality and callability. As
of December 31, 2008 Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund held 3,731
diﬀerent bonds out of the 9,168 bonds present in the index at that time.
The corporate bond index has around 3,400 bonds in the index right now
(see ﬁgure 3.1). Since index inception the rules for index membership have
been tightened so that smaller issues have been excluded. It happened once
in October, 2003 and again in July, 2004. The motivation has been to
keep the index from getting too large, but as can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1 the
index has still increased immensely both in the number of bonds and the
amount outstanding. In order to reduce transaction costs from rebalancing,
the index funds also invest outside the index. Typically 80% of the assets
in the funds are invested in bonds currently in the index. The remaining
20% are invested outside the index for example in non-public bonds, lower
rated bonds, non-corporate bonds or derivatives such as futures, options and
swaps. The criteria for investing outside the index are rather loose and in
that way it is not possible to know exactly which assets the funds have on
their balance sheets. Still, even though the bond funds track by sampling
they obtain a rather low tracking error. The average yearly absolute return
tracking error for the shares of Vanguard Total Bond Market Fund over 1995-
2009 is 23.5 bps. The tracking error record is dominated by 2002 which had
78 Essay 3
is researched in Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009). The other
bonds that were included into the index were included for various reasons
e.g. they changed status from non-public to publicly traded. 1,817 bonds
were excluded from the index because the maturity dropped below one year.
A smaller fraction of the bonds were called and 917 bonds left the index
because of a downgrade. The average coupon for the downgraded bonds was
higher than for the maturing bonds, reﬂecting that the downgraded bonds
were issued with a lower rating in the ﬁrst place. A large fraction of the
bonds were excluded for other reasons. The average amount outstanding for
these bonds is below $ 250 million, which is the lower limit for being in the
index today. Most of these bonds were excluded exactly because the amount
outstanding dropped below the limit, either because the amount outstanding
changed or because the index limit was raised. Since the inception of the
index the minimum amount outstanding limit has been raised several times.
Typically, each mutual fund family (Vanguard, Schwab, Fidelity etc.) has
more funds tracking diﬀerent parts of the total aggregated index. Barclays
keeps short-term, intermediate and long-term indices, which have similar
rules for membership as the aggregate index. The only diﬀerence is the
maturity of the bonds in the indices.
None of the bond index funds track the indices by replication, which
is the most common way for stock index funds to track an index (Blume
and Edelen 2002). Instead they are sampling the index (see e.g. Vanguard
(2009) or Schwab (2009)). Typically the fund chooses a selection of the
bonds currently in the index and designs a portfolio of these that match
the index with respect to duration, cash ﬂow, quality and callability. As
of December 31, 2008 Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund held 3,731
diﬀerent bonds out of the 9,168 bonds present in the index at that time.
The corporate bond index has around 3,400 bonds in the index right now
(see ﬁgure 3.1). Since index inception the rules for index membership have
been tightened so that smaller issues have been excluded. It happened once
in October, 2003 and again in July, 2004. The motivation has been to
keep the index from getting too large, but as can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1 the
index has still increased immensely both in the number of bonds and the
amount outstanding. In order to reduce transaction costs from rebalancing,
the index funds also invest outside the index. Typically 80% of the assets
in the funds are invested in bonds currently in the index. The remaining
20% are invested outside the index for example in non-public bonds, lower
rated bonds, non-corporate bonds or derivatives such as futures, options and
swaps. The criteria for investing outside the index are rather loose and in
that way it is not possible to know exactly which assets the funds have on
their balance sheets. Still, even though the bond funds track by sampling
they obtain a rather low tracking error. The average yearly absolute return
tracking error for the shares of Vanguard Total Bond Market Fund over 1995-
2009 is 23.5 bps. The tracking error record is dominated by 2002 which had
Index Driven Price Pressure for Corporate Bonds 79
an exceptionally bad tracking error of 2% under the actual return of the
Lehman/Barclay index. Without that year the mean absolute error is 11.0
bps. Compared to Fidelitys tracking error of 2.3 bps for tracking the S&P
500, the error for the Vanguard bond fund is much higher. Still, the tracking
error record for the Vanguard fund suggests that the goal of the fund is to
track the index very closely. In only one of the years between 1995-2009,
have the Vanguard fund shares had a higher return than the index it tracks,
which is probably due to the transaction costs from the sampling strategy.
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Figure 3.1: Corporate Bond Index Composition. The left graph shows the evolu-
tion of the number of bonds in the index. During the period the index membership rules
where changed twice. First in October, 2003 and again in July, 2004. The left graph
shows the total amount of debt outstanding in the index.
We obtain information about the index rules and composition of the
Lehman/Barclays Capital Corporate Bond Index from their website 2. From
the same place we obtain return series for diﬀerent benchmark indices. Fi-
nally we use the TRACE database fromWRDS for transaction level informa-
tion about the individual bonds in the index. Before using the TRACE data
for calculating returns we ﬁlter the data as in Dick-Nielsen (2009) in order
to avoid biases from the way reporting errors are recorded and cumulating
in the TRACE system.
2See index rules at www.lehman.com/ﬁ/indices/pdf/US Corporate Index.pdf and in-
dex dynamics at https://live.lehman.com/LL/lehmanlive
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3.4 Measuring Abnormal Corporate Bond Returns
Calculating daily corporate bond returns provide quite a challenge compared
to stock market returns. First, an average corporate bond only trades once
in a couple of months making it hard to get time series data. Second, trades
are usually clustered and the same bond might trade several times on the
same day at diﬀerent prices (see e.g. Feldhu¨tter (2009)) making it diﬃcult
to get a unique daily price. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009)
show in an extensive simulation analysis of corporate bond event studies
that tests relying on transactions data have far more power than tests using
daily data quotes from e.g. DataStream. This ﬁnding is in line with Sarig
and Warga (1989) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009) who show
that quoted prices often have little connection to actual transaction prices.
For each bond entering or leaving the index we calculate a daily price on
days with at least one trade above $100,000 in nominal value (100 bonds) as
the trading volume weighted average price of all trades on that day above
$100,000. This method is suggested by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and
Xu (2009) as the best way to calculate daily prices. Bonds might not have
transactions on all days surrounding our index events. To circumvent this
problem we follow the approach in Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) and
calculate event returns as the logarithmic diﬀerence between the price on
the closest day prior to the event and the closet day after or including the
event date:
rb,ai = log pbi − log pai
where i is a bond identiﬁer, b is the event day or the day closest to the event
day, but still after the event and a is the day closest to the event date, but
still before the event. If we deﬁne day number -1 as the day before the event,
day 0 as the event day and day 1 as the day after the event, then
a = max(day number with a return) < 0
b = min(day number with a return) ≥ 0
We extend the method to cumulative returns by restricting the window in
the following way
a = max(day number with a return) < c
b = min(day number with a return) ≥ d
where c ≤ 0 and d ≥ 0 so that the window spans a period. We restrict the
sample to returns calculated using daily prices not more than ﬁve trading
days away from the event date or restriction points (c−a < 6 and b−d < 6).
In comparison Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009) use a return window as
80 Essay 3
3.4 Measuring Abnormal Corporate Bond Returns
Calculating daily corporate bond returns provide quite a challenge compared
to stock market returns. First, an average corporate bond only trades once
in a couple of months making it hard to get time series data. Second, trades
are usually clustered and the same bond might trade several times on the
same day at diﬀerent prices (see e.g. Feldhu¨tter (2009)) making it diﬃcult
to get a unique daily price. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009)
show in an extensive simulation analysis of corporate bond event studies
that tests relying on transactions data have far more power than tests using
daily data quotes from e.g. DataStream. This ﬁnding is in line with Sarig
and Warga (1989) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009) who show
that quoted prices often have little connection to actual transaction prices.
For each bond entering or leaving the index we calculate a daily price on
days with at least one trade above $100,000 in nominal value (100 bonds) as
the trading volume weighted average price of all trades on that day above
$100,000. This method is suggested by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and
Xu (2009) as the best way to calculate daily prices. Bonds might not have
transactions on all days surrounding our index events. To circumvent this
problem we follow the approach in Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) and
calculate event returns as the logarithmic diﬀerence between the price on
the closest day prior to the event and the closet day after or including the
event date:
rb,ai = log pbi − log pai
where i is a bond identiﬁer, b is the event day or the day closest to the event
day, but still after the event and a is the day closest to the event date, but
still before the event. If we deﬁne day number -1 as the day before the event,
day 0 as the event day and day 1 as the day after the event, then
a = max(day number with a return) < 0
b = min(day number with a return) ≥ 0
We extend the method to cumulative returns by restricting the window in
the following way
a = max(day number with a return) < c
b = min(day number with a return) ≥ d
where c ≤ 0 and d ≥ 0 so that the window spans a period. We restrict the
sample to returns calculated using daily prices not more than ﬁve trading
days away from the event date or restriction points (c−a < 6 and b−d < 6).
In comparison Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009) use a return window as
Index Driven Price Pressure for Corporate Bonds 81
large as min(a) = −100 and max(b) = 99. However, a window that long
could have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the variance of the return, which is why
we choose a shorter window. There could still be a problem with the variance
of the return, but Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009) and Cai, Helwege, and
Warga (2007) run various robustness checks and show that there are no
problems with small windows like the one we use.
Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009) propose a diﬀerent method
to circumvent the infrequent trading problem. They calculate cumulative
returns from a given pre-event day to a range of later dates, for each date
disregarding bonds that did not trade on that particular date. Then they
use a value-weighted average of all returns on each of the later days to get
a portfolio return for that day. In this way they get a portfolio time-series,
but with a possibly diﬀerent portfolio on each time series date. However,
this method still requires trading on the post-event dates, which is the major
problem in our event study.
Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) and Chen, Lookman,
Schu¨rhoﬀ, and Seppi (2009) argue that the best way to calculate abnormal
returns is to use a benchmark portfolio of bonds similar to the individual
bond in the event study (in line with Barber and Lyon (1997) for stock re-
turns). We follow these studies and in each of the four following event types
we explain which benchmark portfolio we use.
3.5 Maturity Less Than 1 year
In contrast to stocks, bonds have a maximum lifetime in an index, since
they are excluded 1 year prior to maturity. Corporate bonds that fall below
1 year to maturity are excluded from the corporate bond index at the last
trading day of the month. Exclusion because of low maturity is by far the
most common reason for a bond to leave the index (as seen in table 3.1).
Figure 3.2 shows the aggregate trading volume around the index rebalancing
date. The event date is the last day of the month, negative days are before
the event date and positive days are after the event date. For each bond
excluded because of low maturity the total trading volume (without the sign
of the trade direction) is added for each day around the event across bonds
and calendar dates. Similar to stock index trackers’ timing of their trades
(Blume and Edelen (2002)), the trading activity is highest at the date of
the exclusion. Because bond funds only sample an index, not all bonds that
are excluded from the index exhibits abnormal trading activity. The average
turnover on the event day is 1.2% of the volume outstanding for the 1/3 most
traded bonds on the event day (as stated in section 3.3 bond index funds
typically only hold 1/3 of the bonds in an index). It is clear from ﬁgure 3.2
that the event date is the exclusion date and not the day where the maturity
actually falls below 1 year. Had the latter been the case, then the trading
activity should has been higher 10 to 21 days before the exclusion day, which
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Figure 3.2: Total trading volume for bonds excluded because of low maturity.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event. 1138
bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover for the 1/3 most traded bonds is
1.3%. The most traded bonds are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds with
highest turnover that month.
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Figure 3.2: Total trading volume for bonds excluded because of low maturity.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event. 1138
bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover for the 1/3 most traded bonds is
1.3%. The most traded bonds are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds with
highest turnover that month.
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is not the case. Also, it is not just and end-of-month eﬀect, in the sense that
the same pattern repeats for the same bonds each month. If it was an end-
of-month eﬀect we should also expect to see a spike in trading activity at
around plus and minus 21 days from the event date. Since nothing seems to
happen at the time where maturity actually falls below 1 year and since it
is not just an end-of-month eﬀect, the ﬁgure supports that trading activity
is driven by investors aiming at a low tracking error (in the sense of Blume
and Edelen (2002)). Blume and Edelen (2002) show that the funds with
lowest tracking error following the S&P 500 index need to trade exactly at
the rebalancing dates. Comparing with ﬁgure 3.2 the bond index trackers
also trade very close to the event date and as stated before Vanguard Total
Bond Market Fund only had a yearly tracking error of 23 bps over the most
recent 15 years. Still, the bond trading activity is high from approximately
4 days before to 2 days after the event date. This is most likely due to
the illiquidity of the bond market as compared to the stock market and not
because bond index trackers are careless about their tracking errors.
Panel A: All Bonds
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-10 0 795 -13.6 -6.42***
-10 5 700 -9.8 -3.57***
-10 10 707 -20.4 -6.44***
-10 15 700 -21.1 -5.70***
0 5 870 4.7 2.88***
0 15 808 -6.3 -2.44***
Panel B: From 2008M11 to 2009M08
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-10 -2 95 -58.0 -3.79***
-10 5 85 5.5 0.30
-10 10 79 -10.4 -0.39
-10 15 79 4.5 0.18
-2 5 96 60.7 4.34***
-2 15 90 58.7 3.39***
Table 3.2: Abnormal returns at index exclusion of maturing bonds. The
abnormal return is a size weighted average over all bonds for which it has been possible
to calculate a return. The benchmark return for each bond is the short Lehman/Barclays
index with maturity between 9-12 months that match on rating. The test statistics are
cluster robust to time series and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel A shows the results across all
bonds. Panel B shows the results when only the newest period is analyzed.
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Bonds are usually issued in the ﬁrst part of the month specially on the 1st,
the 5th and the 15th calendar day of the month, so bonds have an average
time to maturity of just above 11 month at the time they are excluded from
the index. When calculating abnormal returns as described in section 3.4
we use the return on the short term bond index from Lehman/Barclay as
benchmark. This benchmark index consists of all bonds that have been
excluded from the investment grade indices and which have a maturity of
9-12 month. Diﬀerent from the pure corporate bond index, the benchmark
index also includes other investment grade bond issues e.g. government
bonds.
In table 3.2 abnormal returns are calculated for diﬀerent periods bracket-
ing the event day. In panel A of table 3.2 the abnormal returns are calculated
using all available bonds in the period from July 2002 to August 2009. From
day -10 to 0 the bonds fall with 13.6 bps on average (size weighted aver-
age). The decrease in price is slightly reversed over the following 5 days,
but eventually drops to a level of around -20 bps. The partial (but signif-
icant) reversal from day 0 to 5 after the event suggests that there is some
price pressure around the exclusion, but that some other eﬀect is giving a
more longer term negative eﬀect. There is no obvious reason as to why the
price should drop permanently after the index exclusion. The event in itself
is completely information free. One explanation could be that the bonds
become more illiquid after they are excluded from the index. But that is
not true. In ﬁgure 3.3 size weighted daily Amihud price impact measures
are calculated for each day around the event across all the bonds. The price
impact is lowest at the event day indicating that the bonds are more liquid
at this time than usually. This could be due to either that there are more
buyers and sellers active at this time, so that it is easier for counterparties
to meet or it could be because the sellers, which are for the most part the
index trackers, are more homogeous and sophisticated than normal. In both
cases, the intraday prices would be more stable than normal and the aver-
age price impact would therefore be lower than normal. When comparing
the level of the Amihud price impact measures before and after the event
there is little economical diﬀerence and no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence
(actually the average price impact level is lower after the event i.e. the
bonds are more liquid). Another explanation for the permanent price drop
of around -20 bps could be a clientele eﬀect. When the index trackers sell
their bond at exclusion there is no natural counterparty for which the bonds
are attractive. If the buyers value the bonds less than the sellers the price
should drop. Still the price drop should only be permanent if the pre-event
clientele is completely diﬀerent from the post-event clientele. For govern-
ment bonds, this is to a large extend true, once the maturity falls below 1
year government bonds are said to trade in the money market. Traditional
money market funds only buy a very small number of corporate bonds and
they only buy the highest rated. However, there do exist funds that buy the
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Figure 3.3: Amihud price impact measure around bond exclusion because of
low maturity. For each bond we calculate an Amihud price impact measure on a daily
basis and then we take a size weighted average across bonds to form a daily Amihud
price impact measure.
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Figure 3.4: Dealer inventory around bond exclusion because of low maturity.
The graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -21 as benchmark.
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The graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
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excluded corporate bonds. These funds are called Ultra Short Bond Funds.
The excluded corporate bonds are attractive for this clientele, but they can
far from absorb all the bonds that are excluded. If they could we would
probably not see any price reaction to an exclusion from the corporate bond
index.
For the later period of the transaction data sample (from November 2008
to August 2009) the trade direction is available. Figure 3.4 shows the cu-
mulative dealer inventory around the event. For each bond we calculate the
diﬀerence between total dealer sells and buys. A negative number indicates
that on that day the dealers have net sold from their inventory. We then
add the daily net inventory positions across bonds for the diﬀerent days
around the event and ﬁnally we calculate the cumulative inventory position
across bonds with day -21 as the benchmark zero position. Seen over the
period from -21 to +21 days around the event the dealers net sell from their
inventory. However, in approximately the same interval as the trading vol-
ume spikes in ﬁgure 3.2, the dealer inventory increases up to the event and
then decreases with an equally amount after the event. This shows, that the
dealers are acting as one of the counterparties for the index trackers in the
sense that they buy up when the index trackers are selling, only to sell out
shortly after. This dealer behavior is not optimal when compared to panel A
of table 3.2. The price reversal in the period when the dealers sell out of the
bonds again from day 0 to 5 is only 4.7 bps, which is far below the bid-ask
spread as reported in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and Feldhu¨tter
(2009). However, when we restrict the abnormal return calculation to the
same period as that for the dealer inventory graph (ﬁgure 3.4), the abnormal
return and the reversal do become economically signiﬁcant. In panel B we
can see that when the index trackers sell their positions the price drops by
-58 bps. Subsequently the price decrease is fully reversed and for this period
there is not any signiﬁcant longer term price eﬀect. In this period it makes
sense for the dealers to participate as counterparties for the index trackers
since the average return is about 3 times the bid-ask spread.
3.6 Newly Issued Bonds
Most stock indices contain a ﬁxed number of stocks and a new stock is only
added when another stock is deleted. The rules for inclusion can either be
subjective as for the S&P 500 or objective as for the Russell index family.
Bond indices are in general not limited to only containing a ﬁxed number of
bonds. Once a new bond has been issued it is included into the corporate
bond index at the last trading day of the month if it fulﬁlls the size and rating
rules etc. as described in section 3.3. Bonds are issued on all days of the
month but the majority of the bonds is issued on the 1st, 5th or 15th calendar
day of the month. Both Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) and Goldstein and
Hotchkiss (2008) look at corporate bonds going from the primary market to
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Figure 3.5: Total trading volume for newly issued bonds included into the
index. Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction)
and then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event.
2014 bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover for the 1/3 most traded bonds
is 2.8%. The most traded bonds are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds with
highest turnover that month. We have excluded a few bonds which where issued during
the last 10 calendar days of the month in order not to mix up any index eﬀect with the
abnormal trading volume on the ﬁrst days of trading in the secondary market.
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Figure 3.5: Total trading volume for newly issued bonds included into the
index. Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction)
and then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event.
2014 bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover for the 1/3 most traded bonds
is 2.8%. The most traded bonds are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds with
highest turnover that month. We have excluded a few bonds which where issued during
the last 10 calendar days of the month in order not to mix up any index eﬀect with the
abnormal trading volume on the ﬁrst days of trading in the secondary market.
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the secondary market. They show that the bonds are heavily traded in the
ﬁrst week of trading on the secondary market. In order not to mix up this
newly issuance eﬀect from the possible index eﬀect on the last day of the
month, all bonds issued (app. 5%) on the last 10 trading days of the month
are excluded from the following analysis.
Figure 3.5 shows the trading activity around the index inclusion date
(event date) for newly issued bonds. Since no bonds are issued on the last
10 trading days of the month the number of bonds that could possibly trade
is the same on all the plotted days. Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) and
Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2008) make similar graphs with the ﬁrst day of
trading on the secondary market as the event date. On average the trading
activity for newly issued bonds is decreasing towards a constant level over the
ﬁrst 60 days of trading. The same decreasing pattern can be recognized from
ﬁgure 3.5 from +1 to +50 days after the inclusion event. The trading activity
increases up to the inclusion day where it spikes. The average turnover on
the inclusion day is 2.8% for the 1/3 most actively traded bonds. The spike
indicates that some investors are actually tracking the index and are trying
to do so with a low tracking error as in Blume and Edelen (2002).
Abnormal returns around the event are shown in table 3.3. The bench-
mark return is chosen for each bond as the part of the Lehman/Barclay
corporate bond index with matching rating and maturity as either interme-
diate term (< 10 years) or longer term bonds (> 10 years). Panel A of table
3.3 shows that the event return for inclusion is 9.6 bps and that the return
stays up around 5 days after the event before it is fully reversed to the pre-
event level after 10 days of trading. In panel B the same abnormal returns
are calculated, but only for the 1/3 most traded bonds. Each month the 1/3
bonds with highest turnover are selected to be included in this calculation.
The reason for picking only the 1/3 most traded bonds is that on average
a bond index fund only sample the index, which means that they only hold
about 1/3 of all the bonds in the index. The majority of the remaining bonds
might not be part of any index tracking strategy, in which case we would not
expect them to have an abnormal return on the event date. Leaving them
in could bias the abnormal returns towards zero. The abnormal returns are
slightly higher for the most traded bonds. From day -1 to +5 the abnormal
return is 15.4 bps compared to 9.8 bps for the entire bond index universe.
As before the abnormal return is fully reversed, but for the most traded
bonds it takes till day +15 after the event. The size of the price pressure
and reversal returns can be compared to the underpricing returns found in
Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2008). Cai,
Helwege, and Warga (2007) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant ﬁrst day abnormal return
of 2 bps for investment grade bond IPOs in a study with data from 1995 to
1999. For a newer data sample matching the one in this paper, Goldstein
and Hotchkiss (2008) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ﬁrst day return of around 40 bps.
However, they do not construct an abnormal return correcting for market
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movements.
Panel A: All Bonds
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 2056 9.6 6.50***
-1 5 2050 9.8 5.05***
-1 10 2042 0.3 0.10
5 10 2140 -11.0 -5.58***
Panel B: Most traded
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 808 10.6 4.73***
-1 5 805 15.4 5.00***
-1 10 805 4.7 1.15
-1 15 803 -5.6 -1.18
5 10 827 -9.7 -2.91***
5 15 824 -18.7 -4.24***
Table 3.3: Abnormal returns at index inclusion of newly issued bonds. The
abnormal return is a size weighted average over all bonds for which it has been possible
to calculate a return. The table excludes a few bonds that were issued on the last 10
trading days of the month in order not to mix up any underpricing with the index eﬀect.
The benchmark return for each bond is the corresponding Lehman/Barclys index that
match on maturity and rating. The test statistics are cluster robust to time series and
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel A shows the results across all bonds. Panel B shows the results
when only the most traded bonds are included in the analysis. The most traded bonds
are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds with highest turnover that month.
The presence of the reversal return in our study supports that the index
trackers trading behavior leads to a price pressure, where the price temporar-
ily increases, because of the temporarily increased demand. The inclusion
event is completely free of any information content and it is not expected to
increase investor awareness, since the index is not limited to a ﬁxed number
of bonds. Altogether the return and trading activity evidence support the
price pressure hypothesis/short term downward sloping demand curves for
bonds. It could also be that demand curves are downward sloping in the
long run. The empirical evidence is not contradicting this hypothesis, but
since the pre and post event demand in the long run cannot be separated
easily from the newly issued bond eﬀect where demand is decreasing (Cai,
Helwege, and Warga (2007) and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2008)) it is hard
to tell if there is any demand shift in the long run caused by the index in-
clusion. However, since there is no reason to expect any increased investor
awareness we would not expect any demand shift even if we could separate
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the index eﬀect from the newly issued eﬀect in the long run.
For the later period of the sample the transaction data contains infor-
mation on trade direction where trades are marked as either a dealer sell (to
a customer), a dealer buy or an interdealer trade. From this information a
cumulative dealer inventory can be calculated. For each bond all sells and
buys are added (with sign) on each date, so that a negative number indicates
that on that day dealers have been net selling from their inventory. The in-
ventory changes are then added across bonds and cumulated over time with
day -5 before the event as the benchmark. Figure 3.6 shows the cumulative
dealer inventory for the bonds included to the index over the period Novem-
ber 2008-August 2009. On the event date where the trading activity spiked
in ﬁgure 3.5, ﬁgure 3.6 with the dealer inventory shows no abnormal change.
Over the period the dealers seem to sell steadily out of their inventory. The
interdealer trading volume does spike on the event date (not shown) which
suggests that the dealers are not providing the liquidity for the index track-
ers but only perform a matching function, unlike what they do in the other
three cases of index rebalancing. However, Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar
(2007) and Feldhu¨tter (2009) ﬁnd that the bid-ask spread is around 20 bps
for large trades across the period. So the dealers can make a higher proﬁt
from just providing the matching function, than they can from selling out
of their inventory. Another reason could be that some dealers, usually some
of the underwriters (see Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2009)), have
market making responsibilities in the bond, which can make it unattractive
to just unload their entire inventory at once.
It is reasonable to think that index trackers prefer some bonds over oth-
ers. Since they only sample the index they have to choose bonds that ﬁt
into a robust portfolio matching the duration, convexity and rating of the
index. If some bonds are more attractive than other we would expect higher
temporary demand for these and hence more price pressure. In order to test
this hypothesis, we regress the bond speciﬁc abnormal return (day -1 to 1)
on diﬀerent bond characteristics and common bond return predictors. Table
3.4 shows the estimates and robust standard errors (see Petersen (2009)) for
4 diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the regression. As bond speciﬁc predictors we use
bond rating, coupon, maturity and size. We also include systematic abnor-
mal return predictors, which are the slope and level of the treasury curve,
credit risk factors (level and monthly change of a BAA yield curve) and
illiquidity factors (level and monthly change). The daily illiquidity factor
is calculated as a size weighted average over a daily Amihud price impact
measure for all corporate bonds on the market. The daily illiquidity fac-
tor is then transformed to a monthly factor by taking the median over the
month. The levels of the credit risk factor and the illiquidity factor are
highly correlated (84%), so only one of the two factor types are included
into the regression. In both regression speciﬁcations for all bonds, maturity
and issue size are signiﬁcant, which indicates a preference for large bond
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Figure 3.6: Dealer inventory around inclusion of newly issued bonds. The
graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -5 as benchmark.
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graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -5 as benchmark.
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All Bonds Most Traded Bonds
Intercept -53.5 -57.7 -35.5 -63.1 -288.3
(-1.32) (-1.63) (-0.54) (-1.11) (-1.55)
AAA 1.1 -4.6 13.0 0.5 -35.8
(0.12) (-0.5) (0.97) (0.04) (-0.66)
AA 4.2 -1.1 10.3 -1.7 0.7
(0.75) (-0.21) (1.34) (-0.24) (0.03)
A 6.1* 0.6 7.4 -3.0 9.4
(1.66) (0.16) (1.34) (-0.57) (0.53)
BAA - - - - -
- - - - -
Coupon 2.9* -1.3 2.1 -4.7** -4.3
(1.73) (-0.79) (0.8) (-1.98) (-0.79)
TTM 0.4** 0.6*** 0.5* 0.8*** 0.9
(2.07) (3.08) (1.84) (3.14) (1.06)
Log(Size) 6.1** 6.9*** 1.1 5.3 5.0
(2.56) (2.97) (0.29) (1.43) (0.4)
Treasury Level -10.6*** -7.4* -1.6 2.4 44.4
(-3.18) (-1.78) (-0.33) (0.41) (1.12)
Treasury Slope -7.7** -7.6** -2.7 -1.3 39.9
(-2.55) (-2.5) (-0.63) (-0.31) (0.75)
BAA yield 0.015 1.9
(0.01) (0.42)
∆BAA yield 14.2*** 6.9
(2.71) (0.91)
Illiq 1765.7** 2266.2* 6178.7
(2.06) (1.86) (1.02)
∆Illiq 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.036***
(11.59) (10.55) (4.54)
∆Inventory -0.9**
(-2.37)
R2 2.6 8.5 1.5 14.0 20.1
N 2055 2053 807 805 164
Table 3.4: Abnormal event return regression for newly issued bonds included
in the index. The table shows the regression coeﬃcients from regressions of the ab-
normal event return (day -1 to +1) for newly issued bonds included into the index on
diﬀerent issue speciﬁc characteristics and common bond return predictors. The bond
characteristics are rating, coupon, maturity and the logarithm of the issuance size. The
common bond return predictors are the level of a Moody’s BAA yield curve, the monthly
change in this yield curve, treasury level (1 year yield), treasury slope (10 - 1 year yield),
and the level and change of an illiquidity factor. The illiquidity factor is a size weighted
average of a bond speciﬁc monthly Amihud price impact measure across the entire corpo-
rate bond market. The ﬁrst 4 columns show the results when all bonds are used and the
remaining columns show the results for the same regressions when only the most traded
bonds are used. The most traded bonds are selected on a monthly basis as the 1/3 bonds
with highest turnover that month. All standard error are robust i.e. controlled for time
series and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
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issues with long maturities. This makes sense since larger issues weigh more
in the index than smaller issues and when buying longer term bonds index
trackers reduce transaction costs. Running the same regression on the most
heavily traded bonds show that maturity still remains signiﬁcant. The is-
suance size has dropped out of the regression but that is mainly due to the
conditioning on the most traded bonds, which is mainly the large issues.
Even though the levels of the credit risk factor and the illiquidity factor is
highly correlated, the illiquidity factors do a better job at explaining the
returns than the credit risk factors based on the R2. The driving diﬀerence
is the monthly change in the illiquidity factor. The change in the illiquidity
factor is not as much correlated with the corresponding change in the credit
risk factor. When the market is illiquid or credit risk is high the abnormal
returns are higher. Also when the illiquidity or credit risk have increased
over the month abnormal returns are higher. The latter could be seen as
extra compensation for the liquidity providers, who have probably bought
the bond on the primary market and then hold it to the last day of the
month. If liquidity has gone down, then the liquidity provision strategy has
become more risky during the month and the index trackers may also have
more problems locating the bond, which would lower their bargaining power
against the liquidity provider. In the last column of table 3.4 we include
the bond speciﬁc change to dealer inventory over day -1 to +1 around the
inclusion. The inventory change is negative and signiﬁcant (on a 5% level).
This means that the more dealers net sell from their inventory the higher
the abnormal return. One could also argue for the causality to be turned
around, so that dealers only participate in the liquidity provision when the
abnormal return is high (enough).
3.7 Downgraded Bonds
When a bond is downgraded from an index rating of investment grade to
speculative grade it gets excluded from the index at the last trading day of
the month. Still, whereas the downgrade itself could contain new informa-
tion to the market the subsequent index exclusion should not contain any
information. A corporate bond that gets downgraded from investment grade
to speculative grade is also known as a fallen angel. Price pressure for fallen
angels have been separately studied in Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009),
but without paying any attention to the index exclusion event.
Figure 3.7 shows the aggregate trading volume for all bonds excluded
because of a downgrade. There is a clear spike on the event date indicating
that index trackers sell out of their portfolio in order to minimize their
tracking error. The bonds are downgraded between day -21 and -1, with
most bonds being downgraded on the 15th calendar day of the month, which
explains the tall spike on that day. When the bonds become speculative
grade they start trading less than before (even when the period is extended
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Figure 3.7: Total trading volume for bonds excluded because of a downgrade.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event. 412
bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover is 1.5%. We have excluded a few
bonds which where downgraded during the last 5 calendar days of the month in order
not to mix up any index eﬀect with the abnormal trading volume around the actual
downgrade.
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back in time on the graph before any ﬁrm distress). Measured by outstanding
volume Ford and GM bonds make up a large part of the market and an even
larger part when only looking at fallen angels. The large volume spike in
the downgrade period is mainly caused by trading in Ford and GM and the
spike at day +21 is because Ford gets an index upgrade again the following
month when Lehman included Fitch in the determination of spilt ratings (as
explained in section 3.3).
Table 3.5 shows the abnormal returns for diﬀerent periods around the
exclusion event. Panel A shows the results for all bonds excluded whereas
panel B shows the results without GM and Ford. Since Ford and GM make
up such a large part of the market they might trade diﬀerently than other
bonds. The event return from day -1 to +1 without GM and Ford is -
136.0 bps consistent with a price decrease when index trackers are trying
to sell the bonds. The negative return is reversed over the next 5 to 10
days. The pattern is the same when Ford and GM are included, although
the event return is virtually 0 bps. The price falls on average with -2,145.7
bps in the downgrade period from day -21 to -5. This is not surprising since
the downgrade probably contains some information for some of the bonds.
Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009) ﬁnd that not all bonds fall in price at
the downgrade to speculative grade, but mainly the bonds for which the
stock price also decreases, which suggests that the price only falls when the
downgrade conveys information. What is interesting in table 3.5 is that the
average bond also decreases in price between day -5 to 0, even though no
ﬁrms are downgraded in that speciﬁc period. It could be because the index
trackers are selling out in this period or just because the market is illiquid,
so that it takes some time for the downgrade information to get impounded
into the price. The following reversal in price indicates that index trackers
cause some price pressure. In panel B the event return of -136 bps is almost
fully reversed after 10 days.
Figure 3.8 shows the cumulative change in dealer inventory over the
shorter period from November 2008 to August 2009. The dealers unload
(part of) their inventory before the downgrade, which can be seen from
the decrease in inventory between day -30 and -21. It does not mean that
the dealers can forecast the downgrade, since the graph is conditional upon
downgrade and dealers might also decrease their inventory in other bonds
which did not end up being downgraded. Comparing with the abnormal
returns in table 3.5 it seems smart to unload inventory in this period, since
the abnormal return between day -30 to -21 is 13.3 bps for all bonds and
-119.7 when excluding Ford and GM. Both returns are far less than the
downgrade month return of more than -2,000 bps. In the downgrade month
from day -21 to -5 (where all the bonds in the sample get downgraded), the
dealers keep a constant inventory. The constant inventory should be seen in
connection with ﬁgure 3.9. Figure 3.9 shows the aggregate trading volume
across all the bonds with day 0 being the actual downgrade date (and not
96 Essay 3
back in time on the graph before any ﬁrm distress). Measured by outstanding
volume Ford and GM bonds make up a large part of the market and an even
larger part when only looking at fallen angels. The large volume spike in
the downgrade period is mainly caused by trading in Ford and GM and the
spike at day +21 is because Ford gets an index upgrade again the following
month when Lehman included Fitch in the determination of spilt ratings (as
explained in section 3.3).
Table 3.5 shows the abnormal returns for diﬀerent periods around the
exclusion event. Panel A shows the results for all bonds excluded whereas
panel B shows the results without GM and Ford. Since Ford and GM make
up such a large part of the market they might trade diﬀerently than other
bonds. The event return from day -1 to +1 without GM and Ford is -
136.0 bps consistent with a price decrease when index trackers are trying
to sell the bonds. The negative return is reversed over the next 5 to 10
days. The pattern is the same when Ford and GM are included, although
the event return is virtually 0 bps. The price falls on average with -2,145.7
bps in the downgrade period from day -21 to -5. This is not surprising since
the downgrade probably contains some information for some of the bonds.
Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2009) ﬁnd that not all bonds fall in price at
the downgrade to speculative grade, but mainly the bonds for which the
stock price also decreases, which suggests that the price only falls when the
downgrade conveys information. What is interesting in table 3.5 is that the
average bond also decreases in price between day -5 to 0, even though no
ﬁrms are downgraded in that speciﬁc period. It could be because the index
trackers are selling out in this period or just because the market is illiquid,
so that it takes some time for the downgrade information to get impounded
into the price. The following reversal in price indicates that index trackers
cause some price pressure. In panel B the event return of -136 bps is almost
fully reversed after 10 days.
Figure 3.8 shows the cumulative change in dealer inventory over the
shorter period from November 2008 to August 2009. The dealers unload
(part of) their inventory before the downgrade, which can be seen from
the decrease in inventory between day -30 and -21. It does not mean that
the dealers can forecast the downgrade, since the graph is conditional upon
downgrade and dealers might also decrease their inventory in other bonds
which did not end up being downgraded. Comparing with the abnormal
returns in table 3.5 it seems smart to unload inventory in this period, since
the abnormal return between day -30 to -21 is 13.3 bps for all bonds and
-119.7 when excluding Ford and GM. Both returns are far less than the
downgrade month return of more than -2,000 bps. In the downgrade month
from day -21 to -5 (where all the bonds in the sample get downgraded), the
dealers keep a constant inventory. The constant inventory should be seen in
connection with ﬁgure 3.9. Figure 3.9 shows the aggregate trading volume
across all the bonds with day 0 being the actual downgrade date (and not
Index Driven Price Pressure for Corporate Bonds 97
Panel A: All Bonds
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 360 0.2 0.003
-5 0 346 -935.1 -5.28***
-5 10 317 -586.5 -3.14***
0 4 315 348.7 6.17***
0 10 348 255.8 4.28***
-30 -21 279 13.3 0.31
-30 10 271 -2682.2 -6.20***
-21 -5 808 -2145.7 -7.34***
Panel B: Without GM and Ford
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 334 -136.0 -2.06**
-5 0 320 -1303.5 -6.25***
-5 10 291 -930.7 -4.35***
0 4 289 270.2 4.29***
0 10 322 125.0 1.90*
-30 -21 253 -119.7 -2.53**
-30 10 245 -3652.5 -7.28***
-21 -5 808 -2742.3 -8.23***
Table 3.5: Abnormal returns at index exclusion of downgraded bonds. The
abnormal return is a size weighted average over all bonds for which it has been possible
to calculate a return. The table excludes a few bonds that were downgraded on the
last 5 trading days of the month in order not to mix up any downgrade day eﬀect with
the index eﬀect. The benchmark return for each bond is the corresponding high yield
Lehman/Barclys index that match on maturity and rating. The test statistics are cluster
robust to time series and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel A shows the results across all bonds.
Panel B shows the results without Ford and GM bonds, which together make up a large
part of the sample measured by volume.
98 Essay 3
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
50
0
50
Days around event
D
ea
le
r I
nv
e
n
to
ry
 ($
 m
illio
n)
Figure 3.8: Dealer inventory around exclusion of downgraded bonds. The
graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -31 as benchmark.
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Figure 3.8: Dealer inventory around exclusion of downgraded bonds. The
graph shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August
2009 transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade.
Using this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -31 as benchmark.
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Figure 3.9: Total trading volume for bonds around the actual downgrade date.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the actual event
date. 288 bonds trade on the event date. For a large part of the bonds, we are not able
to determine the exact downgrade date because of lack of data. The average turnover on
the event day is 14.7%.
100 Essay 3
the index exclusion date). A lot of institutional investors are selling their
positions on the downgrade day because they cannot hold speculative grade
securities (even though they might have a grace period of up to 90 days).
Despite the heavy trading activity on the downgrade day the dealers keep a
constant inventory indicating that they are not absorbing any bonds. Instead
they only perform a matching function. In this way the dealers earn the bid-
ask spread and avoid holding the bonds when they subsequently fall in value
between day -5 to 0. During the period up to the index exclusion where the
index trackers are assumed to unload their position, the dealers net buy and
ﬁll up their inventory to a position around the original level from day -30.
Finally the dealers sell out of their inventory in the days after the exclusion,
where the price is partially reversed. In this case, where the reversal return is
higher than the bid-ask spread the dealers play the role as liquidity providers
for the index trackers. Still, there could also be other investors providing
liquidity for the index trackers.
3.8 Upgraded Bonds
Bonds that get upgraded from speculative grade to investment grade are
included into the index at the last trading day of the month. The index rating
rule change in 2005 was an exception from normal upgrades. As described
in section 3.3, Lehman included Fitch ratings together with Moody’s and
Standard and Poor’s to determine the index rating of split rated bonds. The
rule change has been speciﬁcally studied in Chen, Lookman, Schu¨rhoﬀ, and
Seppi (2009), but only at the announcement date 5 month prior to the actual
index change. Figure 3.10 shows the aggregate trading volume for all bonds
around the index inclusion of upgraded bonds. The volume spikes on the
inclusion date indicating that index trackers do buy the upgraded bonds at
index inclusion. The picture becomes more clear when excluding the bonds
that enter the index because of the rule redeﬁnition, which can be seen in
ﬁgure 3.11. There is an increase in volume between day -21 to 0, where the
bond is actually upgraded. The same pattern can be seen in ﬁgure 3.12,
which shows the aggregate trading volume, but around the actual upgrade
day. There is a clear upward shift in trading activity from speculative grade
to investment grade, with a spike on the day after the upgrade. The spike
after the upgrade day is probably due to the timing of the upgrade, which
could happen after market close.
Table 3.6 shows the abnormal returns around the index inclusion date.
We use the Lehman/Barclay investment grade corporate bond index as
benchmark and match the bonds on rating and maturity (intermediate term
(< 10 years) or longer term (> 10 years)). There is a positive abnormal
return around the index inclusion indicating that demand is higher than
normal at this point. The price increase is followed by a slight price rever-
sal, but the reversal is only partial. When excluding the bonds that are
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Figure 3.10: Total trading volume for bonds included because of an upgrade.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the event. 206
bonds trade on the event date. The average turnover is 1.9%. We have excluded a few
bonds which were upgraded during the last 5 calendar days of the month in order not to
mix up any index eﬀect with the abnormal trading volume on around the upgrade itself.
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Figure 3.11: Total trading volume for bonds included because of an upgrade
without index rule redeﬁnition months. Trading volume for each bond is added
on a daily basis (without trading direction) and then the daily volume is added across
bonds according to distance from the event. 147 bonds trade on the event date. We have
excluded a few bonds which were upgraded during the last 5 calendar days of the month
in order not to mix up any index eﬀect with the abnormal trading volume on around the
upgrade itself.
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Figure 3.11: Total trading volume for bonds included because of an upgrade
without index rule redeﬁnition months. Trading volume for each bond is added
on a daily basis (without trading direction) and then the daily volume is added across
bonds according to distance from the event. 147 bonds trade on the event date. We have
excluded a few bonds which were upgraded during the last 5 calendar days of the month
in order not to mix up any index eﬀect with the abnormal trading volume on around the
upgrade itself.
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Figure 3.12: Total trading volume for bonds around the actual upgrade date.
Trading volume for each bond is added on a daily basis (without trading direction) and
then the daily volume is added across bonds according to distance from the actual event
date. 106 bonds trade on the event date. A large part of the bonds are excluded in the
analysis, because of missing rating data. The average turnover for is 8.9% on the day
after the event.
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Panel A: All Bonds
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 188 21.7 3.96***
-5 0 208 32.1 3.96***
-5 10 197 63.6 5.13***
0 4 161 -16.8 -2.60**
0 10 194 32.8 3.83***
-30 -21 165 257.2 8.35***
-30 10 155 259.6 8.31***
-21 -5 186 -13.6 -1.03
Panel B: Without index rule redeﬁnition months
From
(Day)
To
(Day)
N Return
(bps)
T-Stat
-1 1 136 2.5 0.41
-5 0 152 9.3 1.07
-5 10 140 2.0 0.15
0 4 114 4.8 0.71
0 10 138 -7.4 -0.83
-30 -21 113 16.1 0.97
-30 10 101 53.8 1.95*
-21 -5 128 43.1 2.69***
Table 3.6: Abnormal returns at index inclusion of upgraded bonds. The
abnormal return is a size weighted average over all bonds for which it has been possible
to calculate a return. The table excludes a few bonds that were upgraded on the last 5
trading days of the month in order not to mix up any upgrade day eﬀect with the index
eﬀect. The benchmark return for each bond is the corresponding Lehman/Barclys index
that match on maturity and rating. The test statistics are cluster robust to time series
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel A shows the results across all bonds. Panel B excludes the
bonds that where mechanically upgraded because of the rating rule change in July 2005.
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Figure 3.13: Dealer inventory around inclusion of upgraded bonds. The graph
shows the cumulative dealer inventory change. From November 2008 to August 2009
transactions in TRACE are marked as dealers sell, dealer buy or interdealer trade. Using
this marking, we calculate dealer inventory change as the volume diﬀerence between
dealer buys and sells each day for each bond. Then we add the bond speciﬁc inventory
changes together according to distance from the event. Finally, we cumulate the aggregate
changes using day -21 as benchmark.
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mechanically upgraded because of the index rule change in 2005 the event
returns become insigniﬁcant. The remaining bonds show a positive and sig-
niﬁcant abnormal return in the period of the actual upgrade of 43.1 bps,
which seems to be a lasting price increase. When including all bonds there
is a signiﬁcant and positive return of 257.2 bps from day -30 to -21, which is
before the upgrade month. However, since the rule change was announced 5
month prior investors could at this point forecast that speciﬁc bonds would
be upgraded. The increase in price before the upgrade month, which is
mainly driven by the mechanically upgraded bonds could be explained by
the incentives for the investors to front run the market in anticipation of a
further price increase once the bond is actually upgraded. Figure 3.13 shows
the cumulative change in dealer inventory around the index inclusion. The
graph is only based on 28 bonds for the period November 2008 to August
2009, so it is not very robust. It seems like the dealers are buying up the
bonds around the actual upgrade and then sell out in the days up to the
index inclusion. Such a dealer strategy would be consistent with price pres-
sure caused by the index trackers, but we could not see that eﬀect in the
returns in panel B of table 3.6.
3.9 Conclusion
Similar to stock index trackers, corporate bond index trackers seek to min-
imize their tracking error. This results in an increased trading activity at
the rebalancing date in bonds that are included to or excluded from the
Lehman/Barclays index. The trading activity spikes both when bonds are
included because they are newly issued, when they are included because
they are upgraded, when they are excluded because of low maturity and
when they are excluded because they have been downgraded from invest-
ment grade to speculative grade. The information deciding whether a bond
should be included or excluded is always available before the index revision
and in most cases even long before. Hence, the informational content leading
to the index revision usually gets impounded into prices before the bond is
excluded or included.
Parallel with the increased trading activity from index trackers at the
rebalancing date, the bonds experience a price pressure. When index trackers
buy up bonds the price temporarily increases, causing an abnormal positive
return. The abnormal return is fully reversed 5 to 10 trading days after
the index inclusion. The opposite happens when index trackers are selling
a bond that leaves the index. The price temporarily decreases, only to be
reversed afterwards. The abnormal price pressure return and reversal are
signiﬁcant in all four cases, except for upgraded bonds where there is no
price reaction to the index inclusion.
For bonds excluded because of low maturity and for bonds excluded be-
cause of a downgrade, the reversal returns are economically signiﬁcant and
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further price increase once the bond is actually upgraded. Figure 3.13 shows
the cumulative change in dealer inventory around the index inclusion. The
graph is only based on 28 bonds for the period November 2008 to August
2009, so it is not very robust. It seems like the dealers are buying up the
bonds around the actual upgrade and then sell out in the days up to the
index inclusion. Such a dealer strategy would be consistent with price pres-
sure caused by the index trackers, but we could not see that eﬀect in the
returns in panel B of table 3.6.
3.9 Conclusion
Similar to stock index trackers, corporate bond index trackers seek to min-
imize their tracking error. This results in an increased trading activity at
the rebalancing date in bonds that are included to or excluded from the
Lehman/Barclays index. The trading activity spikes both when bonds are
included because they are newly issued, when they are included because
they are upgraded, when they are excluded because of low maturity and
when they are excluded because they have been downgraded from invest-
ment grade to speculative grade. The information deciding whether a bond
should be included or excluded is always available before the index revision
and in most cases even long before. Hence, the informational content leading
to the index revision usually gets impounded into prices before the bond is
excluded or included.
Parallel with the increased trading activity from index trackers at the
rebalancing date, the bonds experience a price pressure. When index trackers
buy up bonds the price temporarily increases, causing an abnormal positive
return. The abnormal return is fully reversed 5 to 10 trading days after
the index inclusion. The opposite happens when index trackers are selling
a bond that leaves the index. The price temporarily decreases, only to be
reversed afterwards. The abnormal price pressure return and reversal are
signiﬁcant in all four cases, except for upgraded bonds where there is no
price reaction to the index inclusion.
For bonds excluded because of low maturity and for bonds excluded be-
cause of a downgrade, the reversal returns are economically signiﬁcant and
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above an average bid-ask spread for large trades. We present empirical evi-
dence that shows dealers only participate as liquidity providers for the index
trackers when the reversal return is higher than bid-ask spreads. Hence,
dealers increase their inventory up to the rebalancing date, when buying up
excluded bonds. After the rebalancing date dealers decrease their inventory
again to the pre-event level, so that they proﬁt from the reversal return.
Consistent with a proﬁt maximization strategy, dealers do not trade against
their inventory, when the reversal return is lower than an average bid-ask
spread. This happens when newly issued bonds are included into the in-
dex and at the actual downgrade date. In both of these cases dealers only
perform a matching function.
Index trackers seek to minimize transaction costs and thus only sample
the bond index. In eﬀect they do not hold all bonds in the index. We present
evidence on which bonds are most attractive for the index trackers. In a
regression using the price pressure return of newly issued bonds included into
the index, we ﬁnd that maturity and issuance size help predict the abnormal
return and e.g. bond rating do not. This indicates that index trackers prefer
bonds which weigh more in the index and which have a longer time in the
index, both characteristics reduce the need for frequent trading.

Summary
English Summary
Essay 1: Liquidity Biases in TRACE
The transactions database TRACE is rapidly becoming the standard data
source for empirical research on US corporate bonds. This paper is the ﬁrst
to thoroughly discuss the assumptions needed to clean the disseminated
TRACE data and to suggest that diﬀerent ﬁlters should be used depending
upon the application. According to the FINRA rule 6700 series all members
(dealers) are required to report an over-the-counter corporate bond trans-
action in the secondary market using the TRACE system. The TRACE
system was introduced for the ﬁrst time in July 2002 and the dissemination
of transactions from TRACE has gradually been expanded to include the
entire corporate bond universe. The dissemination of the transactions is a
great improvement for empirical research, but the construction of the sys-
tem means that errors are accumulating. Around 7.7% of all trade reports
in TRACE are errors and in some cases up to 18% of the reports should
be deleted. The errors accumulate because TRACE is essentially a one day
system. If a dealer makes a reporting error, he can easily correct it if the
correction is made within the same day as the report was ﬁled. In this case
the dealer ﬁles a new report, but the old report containing the error still
remains in TRACE. In the disseminated data this yields two reports. The
ﬁrst report contains the error, the second report either cancels or corrects
the wrong report but none of them replaces the ﬁrst report. Hence, one or
both reports should be deleted from the sample before the data is used for
research.
While same-day corrections can easily be matched with the original trade
report, corrections on a later date cannot. In order to ﬁnd the original
report in the latter case a range of assumptions are needed. This paper
explains the assumptions and sets up a ﬁlter that deletes almost all error
reports from TRACE. For the 10 most frequently traded bonds in 2007 the
deviation between ﬁltered TRACE reports and the oﬃcial FINRA number
of reports is in the range of 0.05%. Failing to ﬁlter the data before use
will most likely result in diﬀerent biases. As an example this paper shows
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that popular liquidity measures will be biased towards a more liquid market.
The median bias for the daily turnover will be 7.4% and for a quarter of the
bonds the Amihud price impact measure will be underestimated by at least
14.6%. These biases are encountered if nothing is done about the data after
download. WRDS supplies the TRACE data for academic research together
with some sample programs. However, if one uses the sample programs, they
will encounter exactly the biases just described. A naive ﬁlter would be to
delete all trade reports marked as error reports. This is what Bloomberg
does when they report statistics based on TRACE data. However, the naive
ﬁlter deletes less than half of what should be deleted, since they do nothing
about the original report containing the error. Even after applying the
error ﬁlter there is still a lot of identical trade reports in TRACE. They
are a result of the way certain agency transactions are reported. I suggest
deleting the duplicates if the price sequence is important, since the sequence
otherwise would be biased. Finally, I show that normal price based ﬁlters
cannot replace the error ﬁlter. In a normal price based ﬁlter trade reports
are deleted if the transaction price falls outside a certain range based on the
surrounding price sequence. A standard price sequence ﬁlter only deletes a
very small fraction of the errors detected by the error ﬁlter. Price sequence
ﬁlters are usually motivated by a desire to detect and delete typing errors
from the dealers. However, it is worth noting that the TRACE system by
itself performs a price sequence test. If the price deviates too much the trade
report is dismissed and the dealer has to overwrite the system. The TRACE
system then expands the allowed price range. If the price is still outside the
range the report is dismissed again and the dealer has to phone in the report
and explain why the price deviates.
Essay 2: Corporate Bond Liquidity Before and After the On-
set of the Subprime Crisis
The subprime crisis dramatically increased corporate bond spreads and while
default risk certainly has increased because of funding constraints and the
slowing of the real economy, it is also widely believed that deteriorating
liquidity has contributed to the widening of spreads. The diﬃculty is how
to measure this contribution. We analyze liquidity components of corporate
bond spreads by using transaction-level corporate bond prices from TRACE.
The high data quality of TRACE allow us to compute a range of diﬀerent
liquidity measures and asses their performance over a period spanning both
a pre-crisis period and the onset of the subprime crisis.
When calculating the liquidity measures we restrict the transaction sam-
ple to only include trades with a nominal value above 100,000$. In this way
we only look at trades from sophisticated traders, since retail traders rarely
trade above 100,000$. The volume restriction together with the transac-
tion level information signiﬁcantly reduce the size of the liquidity measures
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towards a more liquid pre-crisis market than what is usually found in previ-
ous studies. The performance of each bond liquidity measure is assessed by
running marginal regressions with only one liquidity measure at the time.
We use quarter-end yield spreads as the depended variable in all regressions
and a range of diﬀerent credit risk controls as independent variables. The
marginal regressions show that the Amihud price impact measure, a mea-
sure of round-trip transaction costs and the standard deviation of these two
measure are all signiﬁcant in explaining the liquidity component in credit
spread both before and after the onset of the crisis. The bond turnover,
the Roll measure, the number of zero-trading days and the number of ﬁrm
zero trading days are not consistently signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we ﬁnd in
a principal component analysis of the liquidity measures that an equally
weighted linear combination of the four signiﬁcant measures captures most
of the liquidity-related variation of credit spreads.
Using this new measure of bond liquidity we estimate the absolute and
relative size of the liquidity component in credit spreads. Further, we use
the measure to shed new light on ﬂight-to-quality, liquidity risk, the impact
of trading frequency, the role of funding shocks to lead underwriters, and
the liquidity of corporate bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that
before the crisis, the contribution to spreads from illiquidity was small for
investment grade bonds both measured in basis points and as a fraction of
total spreads. The contribution increased strongly at the onset of the crisis
for all bonds except AAA-rated bonds, which is consistent with a ﬂight-to-
quality into AAA-rated bonds. Liquidity premia in investment grade bonds
rose steadily during the crisis and peaked when the stock market declined
strongly in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, while premia in speculative grade bonds
peaked during the Lehman default and returned almost to pre-crisis levels in
mid-2009. The number of zero trading days did not increase with the crisis
and we ﬁnd evidence that this was because trades in less liquid bonds were
split into trades of smaller size.
Essay 3: Index Driven Price Pressure for Corporate Bonds
The impact of stock index tracking has been intensely studied and there
exists several competing theories seeking to explain the price reaction at
index inclusion. This paper is the ﬁrst to test similar theories for a corporate
bond index. Unlike the S&P 500 index, inclusions and exclusions to the
Lehman/Barclays Corporate Bond Index are monthly recurrent events. The
rules for inclusion and exclusion are fully transparent and based on bonds
characteristics. Another unique feature of bond indices is that they are not
limited to a certain number of securities. The main reasons for inclusion
are that the bonds are newly issued or that the bonds get upgraded from
speculative grade to investment grade. The inclusion itself always happens
on the last trading day of the month, which makes the inclusions information
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free events.
Trading activity at the date of inclusion is higher than normal and this
spike indicates that some investors are in fact tracking the index. The in-
centive for index trackers to trade close to the rebalancing date is that they
want to minimize tracking error (Blume and Edelen (2002)). A similar trad-
ing pattern can be observed for excluded bonds. Again, the trading activity
spikes at the exclusion date, where index trackers want to sell the bonds. The
main reason for bonds to be excluded from the index is because their ma-
turity falls below one year or because they are downgraded from investment
grade to speculative grade. As with the inclusions, exclusions are eﬀectuated
at the last trading day of the month.
Parallel with the increased trading activity from index trackers, the
bonds experience a price pressure. When index trackers buy up bonds the
price temporarily increases, causing an abnormal positive return. The ab-
normal return is fully reversed 5 to 10 trading days after the index inclusion.
The opposite happens when index trackers are selling a bond that leaves the
index. The price temporarily decreases, only to be fully reversed afterwards.
The abnormal price pressure return and reversal are both signiﬁcant in all
four cases, except for upgraded bonds. For bonds excluded because of low
maturity and for bonds excluded because of a downgrade, the reversal return
is signiﬁcant and above an average bid-ask spread for large trades over the
period. In these two cases, dealers participate as liquidity providers for the
index trackers. Dealers increase their inventory up to the rebalancing date,
when buying up from the index trackers. After the rebalancing date dealers
decrease their inventory again to the pre-event level, while they earn the
reversal return. Consistent with a proﬁt maximization strategy, the dealers
do not trade against their inventory, when the reversal return is lower than
an average bid-ask spread. This happens both when newly issued bonds are
included into the index and at the actual downgrade date, where dealers
only perform a matching function.
We ﬁnd that the price pressure for newly issued bonds at index inclusion
is positively correlated with maturity and issuance size and not with e.g.
bond rating. This indicates that index trackers prefer bonds which weigh
more in the index and which have a longer time in the index. These charac-
teristics are important for the bond index trackers, since bond index trackers
do not replicate the index, but only sample the index. Sampling the index
means that they only hold part of the index, unlike S&P 500 index funds
that holds all 500 securities. The Lehman/Barclay corporate bond index
has around 3,400 bonds, so holding all the bonds would result in a very high
level of transaction costs. In order to avoid the transaction costs, bond index
funds only hold about 1/3 of the bonds in the index and they invest 20% of
their portfolio outside the index. Despite the sampling strategy, we still ﬁnd
index driven price pressure in corporate bonds.
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Dansk Resume´
Essay 1: Likviditetsbias’ i TRACE
Transaktionsdatabasen TRACE er hurtigt ved at blive standarden indenfor
empiriske undersøgelser af amerikanske virksomhedsobligationer. Denne ar-
tikel er den første, der grundigt diskuterer de forudsætninger, der ligger til
grund for anvendelserne af dette datasæt. Inden man kan benytte den givne
data er det nødvendigt at ﬁltrere datasættet og slette alle transaktionsrap-
porter, der indeholder fejl, hvilket ikke kan gøres uden visse antagelser. Ifølge
amerikansk lovgivning kræves det, at alle dealere indberetter handler i virk-
somhedsobligationer gennem TRACE systemet senest 15 min. efter, handlen
er eﬀektueret. TRACE systemet blev introduceret i juli 2002 og transaktion-
srapporterne er efterfølgende blevet oﬀentligt tilgængelige. Tilgængelighe-
den er gradvist blevet øget s˚aledes, at alle transaktioner i dag er oﬀentligt
tilgængelige s˚a snart, de er blevet rapporteret. TRACE systemet er s˚aledes
en kæmpe fordel for empiriske studier, men selve konstruktionen af TRACE
gør, at fejl akkumuleres i det oﬀentliggjorte datasæt. Omkring 7.7% af
transaktionsrapporterne i TRACE skal slettes før datasættet kan bruges til
forskning, og i nogle tilfælde skal helt op til 18% slettes. Fejlrapporterne
akkumuleres, fordi TRACE er konstrueret som et samme-dag-system. Hvis
en dealer kommer til at sende en rapport med en fejl, kan han nemt rette
den indenfor samme dag, som rapporten er sendt. For at rette en fejl in-
denfor samme dag sender dealeren en ny rapport, men uden at den gamle
rapport slettes. Den nye rapport fortæller blot, at den gamle rapport var
en fejl, som man skal se bort fra. Men systemet indeholder nu to rapporter
for en enkelt handel. Før datasættet kan bruges til forskning skal mindst
e´n af rapporterne slettes. Hvis en dealer først retter en fejl p˚a en dag, der
ligger senere end den dag, hvor den oprindelige rapport blev sendt, sker det
samme som lige beskrevet. Men i det oﬀentlige datasæt kan vi nemt matche
fejlrapporten med original rapporten indenfor samme dag, mens vi ikke kan
lave samme match, n˚ar fejlrrapporten er sendt p˚a en senere dato. I det
sidst nævnte tilfælde opstiller vi en række antagelser, der gør, at vi alligevel
kan lave et match til en potentiel original rapport. Ud fra antagelserne op-
stilles et ﬁlter, der fjerner alle fejlrapporter fra det oﬀentlige datasæt. For
de 10 mest handlede virksomhedsobligationer i 2007 kan vi sammenligne re-
sultatet af vores ﬁlter med det tal, som FINRA selv ﬁnder. Den relative
forskel mellem vores ﬁlter og FINRA’s tal ligger alle i omegnen af 0.05%.
Hvis man ignorer ﬁlteret og blot bruger data uden nogen modiﬁkationer, vil
man højst sandsynligt f˚a systematiske fejl i sine udregninger. Medianfejlen
for den daglige omsætning vil ligge p˚a 7.4%, mens Amihud likviditetsm˚al
vil blive mindst 14.6% for sm˚at for hver fjerde obligation. Disse fejl opn˚as,
hvis man bruger datasættet ukritisk uden at gøre noget ved data inden brug.
WRDS, som sikre oﬀentlig adgang til datasættet, vedlægger samtidig ogs˚a
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sm˚a program eksempler, som anvender data. Disse programmer indeholder
netop den slags fejl, som er beskrevet ovenfor. En naiv tilgang til brugen
af datasættet, kunne være at slette alle rapporter, der er markeret som fejl-
rapporter. Det er, hvad Bloomberg gør, n˚ar de bruger TRACE datasættet.
Men denne tilgang sletter kun under halvdelen af fejlene, fordi de ikke gør
noget ved den oprindelige rapport, som i første omgang indeholdt en fejl. En
anden standardtilgang til at fjerne fejlrapporter er at lave et ﬁlter baseret
p˚a prissekvensen. Men et s˚adan ﬁlter fjerner kun en meget lille andel af
de fejl, som vores ﬁlter ﬁnder, s˚a det er p˚a ingen m˚ade en erstatning. Et
prissekvensﬁlter fjerner rapporter, hvor prisen ligger langt væk fra resten af
de omkringliggende rapporters priser. Dette ﬁlter bliver ofte motiveret, som
et ﬁlter, der fjerner tastefejl beg˚aet af dealerne. Men faktisk har TRACE
allerede et lignende ﬁlter implementeret. S˚a hvis en pris ligger ekstremt
bliver rapporten ikke godkendt af systemet og dealeren skal ringe ind til
FINRA og forklare prisen.
Essay 2: Likviditeten i markedet for virksomhedsobligationer
før og efter starten p˚a subprime krisen
Subprime-krisen har ført til en voldsom stigning i kreditspændene for virk-
somhedsobligationer. En del af stigningen skyldes helt klart kreditrisiko,
som følge af en nedkølning af real økonomien og begrænsninger i likviditeten
hos de ﬂeste virksomheder og investorer. Men stigningen i kreditspændene
skyldes i høj grad ogs˚a at selve virksomhedsobligationerne er blevet mindre
likvide. Udfordringen i denne forbindelse er, hvorledes likviditetspræmien
i kreditspændene kan m˚ales. Vi analyserer likviditetskomponenten i kred-
itspændene for virksomhedsobligationer ved at bruge transaktionsdata fra
TRACE. Den høje datakvalitet i TRACE gør, at vi kan udregne en række
forskellige likviditetsm˚al og teste deres kvalitet over en periode, der b˚ade
omfatter før og under krisen. N˚ar likviditetsm˚alene udregnes ses bort fra
handler med en nominel værdi p˚a under 100.000$. Derved bliver m˚alene
udelukkende udregnet p˚a baggrund af handler fra soﬁstikerede investorer,
da almindelige investorer sjældent handler over 100.000$. Denne restrik-
tion i udregningen, sammen med at vi bruger egentlige transaktionspriser
,gør, at likviditetsm˚alene bliver signiﬁkant mindre før krisen end, hvad man
tidligere har fundet i litteraturen. For at afgøre hvilke likviditetsm˚al, der er
bedst til at beskrive variationen i kreditspændenes likviditetskomponent, s˚a
estimerer vi en række marginale regressioner. Regressionerne er marginale i
den forstand, at vi kun inddrager et enkelt likviditetsm˚al i hver regression.
Vi bruger kvartalsvise obligationsspeciﬁkke kreditspænd, som den afhængige
variable og inddrager udover likviditetsm˚alet en række kreditvariable. Disse
marginale regressioner afslører, at Amihuds likviditetsm˚al, et m˚al for di-
rekte transaktionsomkostninger og disse to m˚als standardafvigelser er dem,
der bedst fanger likviditetsvariationen i kreditspændene, b˚ade før og un-
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tidligere har fundet i litteraturen. For at afgøre hvilke likviditetsm˚al, der er
bedst til at beskrive variationen i kreditspændenes likviditetskomponent, s˚a
estimerer vi en række marginale regressioner. Regressionerne er marginale i
den forstand, at vi kun inddrager et enkelt likviditetsm˚al i hver regression.
Vi bruger kvartalsvise obligationsspeciﬁkke kreditspænd, som den afhængige
variable og inddrager udover likviditetsm˚alet en række kreditvariable. Disse
marginale regressioner afslører, at Amihuds likviditetsm˚al, et m˚al for di-
rekte transaktionsomkostninger og disse to m˚als standardafvigelser er dem,
der bedst fanger likviditetsvariationen i kreditspændene, b˚ade før og un-
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der krisen. De øvrige m˚al; obligationsomsætningen, antallet af dage uden
handler for obligationen, antallet af dage uden handler for virksomheden og
Rolls transaktionsomkostningsm˚al, er enten ikke signiﬁkante eller f˚ar inkon-
sistent fortegn. Vha. en principalkomponentanalyse ﬁnder vi yderligere, at
en ligevægtet linearkombination af de ﬁre gode likviditetsm˚al faktisk fanger
det meste af den likviditetsrelaterede komponent i kreditspændene. Ved
at bruge denne linearkombination og det deraf konstrueret likviditetsm˚al
kan vi give et estimat af b˚ade den absolutte og den relative betydning af
likviditetskomponenten. Vi bruger ogs˚a m˚alet til at kaste nyt lys p˚a ﬂight-
to-quality, likviditetsrisiko, betydningen af handelsaktivitet, likviditetschok
til de ledende obligationshandlere og likviditeten for obligationer udstedt
af ﬁnansielle virksomheder. Vi ﬁnder blandt andet, at før krisen var il-
likviditetskomponenten i kreditspændene meget sm˚a for investment grade
obligationer b˚ade m˚alt i bps og som en relativ andel af spændet. Bidraget
fra illikviditet steg voldsomt efter krisens start undtagen for AAA ratede
obligationer, konsistent med en investorﬂugt væk fra d˚arligt ratede obliga-
tioner og ind i højt ratede obligationer. Illikviditetspræmien steg generelt
under krisen for investment grade og toppede i første kvartal 2009, mens illik-
viditetspræmien for speculative grade obligationer toppede under Lehmans
krak og efterfølgende faldt tilbage til før-krise-niveaeuet.
Essay 3: Pristryk fra rebalancingen af virksomhedsobligation-
sindex
En række investeringsfonde følger en strategi, hvor de replikerer afkastet fra
et aktieindeks. For disse fonde er det primære ma˚l at følge afkastene s˚a
nøjagtigt som muligt. Det er s˚aledes d˚arligt for fondene, b˚ade n˚ar de klarer
sig d˚arligere end indekset, og n˚ar de klarer sig bedre end indekset. Det opti-
male for fondene bliver at handle nøjagtigt p˚a de tidspunkter, hvor nye aktier
bliver tilføjet til indekset. Denne handelsstrategi har en række implikationer
for handlen og prisen for de aktier, der bliver inkluderet eller ekskluderet fra
fx S&P 500 indekset. I litteraturen ﬁndes der en række forskellige teorier, der
forklarer priseeﬀekten b˚ade p˚a kort- og langtsigt n˚ar en aktie bliver tilføjet
til et indeks. Denne artikel er den første til at undersøge ligende teorier
for et obligationsindeks. For Lehman/Barclay indekset for virksomhedsobli-
gationer er inklusioner og eksklusioner tilbagevendende m˚anedlige begiven-
heder. Reglerne, for hvilke obligationer der bliver inkluderet og ekskluderet,
er fuldt transparente og udelukkende baseret p˚a objektive kriterier. Desu-
den er antallet af virksomhedsobligationer i indekset ikke begrænset til et
fast antal. De primære a˚rsager til at en obligation bliver inkluderet er, at
den er nyudstedt, eller at den har f˚aet sin rating opgraderet til investment
grade. Selve inkluderingen i indekset sker altid p˚a den sidste handelsdag
i m˚aneden, hvilket gør, at inkluderingen i sig selv ikke indeholder nogen
speciel information. Empirisk stiger handelsaktiviteten p˚a selve dagen for
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inkluderingen til et signiﬁkant højere niveau end normalt, hvilket er kon-
sistent med, at de fonde der følger indeksets afkast, køber obligationerne
her. Et tilsvarende mønster ﬁnder sted ved ekskludering af obligationer fra
indekset. Ekskluderinger sker primært, fordi obligationens løbetid falder
under 1 a˚r, eller at den f˚ar sat sin rating ned til speculative grade. Selve
ekskluderingen ﬁnder ligesom inkluderingen sted p˚a den sidste handelsdag
i m˚aneden. Samtidig med, at der er en stigning i handelsaktiviteten, der
er drevet af indeksfondene, oplever obligationerne et midlertidigt pristryk.
N˚ar indeksfondene opkøber obligationer, der indtræder i indekset, s˚a stiger
prisen p˚a obligationerne som følge af den øgede efterspørgsel. Efter indeks-
fondene har købt de obligationer, de skal bruge, s˚a falder efterspørgslen, og
prisen falder tilbage til det oprindelige niveau. Det samme sker med mod-
sat fortegn, n˚ar indeksfondene sælger obligationer, der bliver ekskluderet af
indekset. B˚ade den abnormale stigning i afkastet og det efterfølgende fald
er signiﬁkante i alle af de ﬁre tidligere nævnte tilfælde, p˚a nær n˚ar obli-
gationer bliver opgraderet ind i indekset. For de obligationer, der bliver
ekskluderet, fordi de har lav løbetid eller fordi de er blevet nedgraderet, er
prisændringerne større end de direkte transaktionsomkostninger. Derfor ser
man ogs˚a dealerne p˚a markedet deltage aktivt i handelen og handle imod
deres lager. Dealerne øger s˚aledes deres lager n˚ar indeksfondene sælger ud af
deres obligationer. Kort efter indeksrebalanceringsdagen sælger dealerne ud
af deres lager og reducerer niveauet til det oprindelige lagers størrelse. Ved
denne strategi tjener dealerne penge p˚a det midlertidige pristryk. Derimod
bruger dealerne ikke deres lager n˚ar obligationer bliver inkluderet i indek-
set. Her matcher de udelukkende handlerne, hvorved de tjener p˚a kundernes
transaktionsomkostninger. Igen er denne strategi optimal for dealerne, fordi
pristrykket er mindre end transktionsomkostningerne. Transaktionsomkost-
ningerne er ogs˚a bestemmende for indeksfondenes handelsstrategi. Mens en
aktieindeksfond holder en andel af alle aktierne i indekset, s˚a holder obliga-
tionsindeksfondene kun andel af cirka 1/3 af obligationerne i indekset. Det
gør de for, at holde transaktionsomkostningerne nede. I tr˚ad med dette fore-
trækker obligationsindeksfondene at holde obligationer med lang løbetid og
fra store udstedelser.
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